The Human Rights Sector in Morocco
Evidence from Activists and the Public

The Human Rights Organizations Project
July 2014
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Cover: “Arab Spring” protests in Morocco.
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Suggested Citation:

1 James Ron conceived of this project, obtained the funding, wrote the survey instruments, helped select and train the survey team, and edited the final report. He bears responsibility for the findings. Shannon Golden helped visualize the data, drafted Part III, and helped draft Parts I and II. Ghita Benessahraoui conducted the field interviews with key informants and local human rights organization representatives in Rabat and Casablanca, and wrote preliminary drafts of Parts I and II. Archana Pandya and David Crow helped select the Moroccan survey company, while David Crow, along with James Ron, helped oversee and train the survey team. Jenn Halen assisted with copyediting tasks. In Casablanca, LMS Consulting planned and conducted the public opinion survey. This project was funded by the Social Science Research Council of Canada, and the Stassen Chair of International Affairs at the University of Minnesota’s Humphrey School of Public Affairs and Department of Political Science.
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Executive Summary

Morocco survived the Arab Spring better than most. Although it has its fair share of political dissent, repression, and instability, Morocco has not endured the civil violence witnessed elsewhere.

The Moroccan human rights sector is an important player in the country’s comparatively peaceful liberalization. To learn more about its resources, capacities, reputation, and prospects, we gathered data in 2011-12 from informed experts, local human rights organizations (LHROs), and the general public. This work is one part of a broader study of local human rights communities and public opinion worldwide. For details of this project, visit http://www.jamesron.com/Current-Projects.php.

We began by interviewing a representative sample of 30 local human rights organizations in Rabat and Casablanca. According to human rights workers at these organizations:

1. Human rights ideas in Morocco are catching on.
   LHRO leaders believe human rights ideas are increasingly popular in their country and that most members of the public can engage with human rights ideas without problem. To be truly successful, however, human rights promotion in Morocco must be accompanied by direct and positive interventions by human rights workers in the lives of ordinary people. Human rights concepts need to be made concrete and visible, and while some of this is already being done, much more is required.

2. Human rights groups in Morocco are self-confident and financially resilient.
   Although Moroccan LHROs heavily rely on foreign funds, their leaders remain confident they could survive a foreign aid cutoff with the help of local volunteers. The sector is self-confident, largely as a result of recent legislative and policy successes, the country’s political liberalization process, and LHROs’ historical reliance on volunteer activists. LHRO leaders believe they could, in theory, successfully raise funds locally, though they acknowledge that few of their peers do this now.

3. Human rights groups in Morocco are uneasy about the country’s Islamists.
   Moroccan LHROs are reluctant to partner with Islamist groups, even though they recognize that these faith-based organizations are often deeply embedded in and respected by local communities. Indeed, LHROs see one of their tasks as counteracting Islamist influence and ideology. Human rights groups are eager, however, to partner with Moroccan development organizations, believing that they share the same values and that LHROS can capitalize on the development groups’ access to local communities.

Next, we conducted a representative survey of 1,100 adults in Rabat, Casablanca, and the surrounding rural areas. Like the Moroccan public at large, survey respondents had little formal education, were deeply religious, and often struggled to cover household expenses. Survey respondents reported that:

1. They often encounter the term “human rights” in their daily lives.
   They also associate the term with positive concepts, including “protecting the rights of women” and protecting “people from being tortured or murdered.” Respondents with higher education hear “human rights” more often.
2. They view Moroccan human rights groups positively.
   Most often, respondents saw LHROs as brave, helpful, and trustworthy.

3. Their participation in Moroccan human rights groups, however, is low.
   Very few respondents had met a human rights worker, could name a specific local human
   rights group, had participated in their activities, or had donated money.

4. They were unsure how Moroccan LHROs are funded.
   Respondents were split on whether local rights groups were funded from local or foreign
   sources.

5. They report modest levels of trust in their country’s human rights groups.
   Trust is highest among the middle class, those who mistrust politicians, and those who think
   LHROs are locally funded. Respondents trust local organizations more than their international
   counterparts, but they trust international human rights groups more than other international
   institutions.

Comparing the Two Data Sources

In several cases, Moroccan human rights workers accurately perceived the public’s attitudes towards the
broader political environment, human rights organizations, and the human rights discourse. For example:

1. Moroccan rights workers felt confident that the concept of “human rights” was easy for the
   average Moroccan to understand and identify with positively (pages 12-14). Our survey lends
   some support to this view. Most of the public in Rabat, Casablanca and their rural environs hears
   the term frequently (page 36) and associates it with positive-sounding phrases (pages 37-38).

2. Moroccan human rights workers see their sector as moving towards a focus on socioeconomic
   and cultural rights, and they believe that this has boosted their appeal among ordinary people
   (pages 13-14). Our opinion polls show that the public still strongly associates human rights with
   civil and political rights, but they similarly associate the term with socioeconomic justice (pages
   37-38).

3. As Moroccan rights workers anticipated, our poll shows that ordinary people in Morocco display
   very little trust in local politicians (pages 40-41). This suggests that rights groups’ attempts to
   distance themselves from politics (pages 16, 18) are well-founded.

4. Moroccan rights workers thought human rights ideas should be grounded in ordinary people’s
   daily lives (pages 16-17, 20). Our poll supported this view by demonstrating that the public trusts
   local rights groups more than international organizations (pages 43-44).

5. Moroccan rights workers stressed the importance of “proximity work” to reach the general
   public (pages 13-14, 16-17, 20), and while some were enthusiastic about their ability to do this,
others were more circumspect. Our survey suggests the skeptics are right; very few members of the public reported personal contact with or participation in human rights groups or activities. (pages 36, 42-43)

In other cases, professional human rights workers’ sentiments differed from those of the general public:

1. Some human rights workers believed the human rights community was becoming more connected to ordinary people and was no longer exclusively composed of social elites (pages 17-18). A quick glance at the socio-demographic characteristics of Moroccan human rights workers, however, suggests that they are considerably more privileged than the general public; they are far more educated, less actively religious, and have far more international experience (pages 10-11, 34-35).

2. Moroccan human rights organizations are highly dependent on foreign funding (pages 21-23), but the Moroccan public thinks that local citizens give them the bulk of their funding (page 40). They are considerably less likely to trust rights groups when they perceive they are internationally funded (page 41).

3. Moroccan human rights workers are confident about their sector’s resilience in the face of a foreign aid cutoff (pages 22-23), largely because they believe local volunteers will keep them afloat. Our polling data, however, suggests that only a tiny fraction of ordinary Moroccans participate in LHRO activities (pages 42-43). Furthermore, those who are more familiar with HROs are not necessarily more trusting of the organizations (page 41).

4. Some LHRO respondents were concerned that human rights is seen as opposed to local culture and values (pages 15-16). We found, however, that most public survey respondents did not see human rights as promoting foreign values or ideas (pages 37-38).

5. Most rights workers vehemently opposed collaboration with religious groups (pages 28-30). Our poll shows that Moroccans are highly religious (pages 34-35) and have considerable trust in religious institutions (pages 40-41), suggesting that efforts to work with local religious institutions—at least to some extent—may aid in rights’ groups mobilizing power and local legitimacy.
Part I:  
The Context

Political Liberalization and Democratization

Morocco won its independence from France in 1956, established a constitutional monarchy in 1957, and was ruled by King Hassan II from 1961 until his death in 1999. The monarchy orchestrated a campaign of political repression from the early 1970s to the late 1980s following two failed military coups and political opposition, chiefly from leftist forces. With the end of the Cold War, Morocco began to liberalize politically, due in part to pressure from the United States and France. Although both powers had earlier supported the monarchy’s repression of the political left, they changed their approach once the Soviet bloc collapsed.

The government created a consultative council for human rights in 1990 (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme (CCDH)) and revised the country’s constitution in 1992 to include an explicit commitment to international human rights. The government also created a human rights ministry, amnestied political prisoners and exiles, and established the Instance Indépendante d’Arbitrage (IIA) to compensate victims of the 1970s repression.²

On ascending to the throne in 1999, King Hassan II’s son, Mohammed VI, accelerated the liberalization and accountability process. He established a new human rights and truth commission, the Instance Équité et Reconciliation (IER), to investigate a broad range of abuses during Hassan II’s reign, hold public hearings, and recommend legal change. Additionally, following a lengthy struggle by women’s rights organizations, the government began promoting gender equality by reforming the country’s personal status code.³ Still, Mohammed VI’s record has been marred by press restrictions, questionable prosecutions of suspected terrorists, and an anti-terrorist law aimed at repressing Islamist radicals.

In 2011, citizens demanded greater democracy, social justice, and an end to political corruption through Arab Spring-style street demonstrations.⁴ This wave of popular protest fueled a shift in activism in Morocco, bringing human rights issues to the fore. Mohammad VI proposed constitutional reforms that were overwhelmingly approved in popular referendum.⁵ Although the new constitution preserves the king’s powers over the military and religious matters, it grants more powers to the democratically-elected government. Additionally, the CCDH was succeeded by an independent National Human Rights Council (CNDH) tasked with protecting the human rights of Moroccan citizens. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), a moderate Islamist political party, won national elections.

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³ The Moudawana, or family code, is a collection of legal rules that organize kinship relationships. It regulates the rights and duties pertaining to marriage, the custody of children, inheritance, divorce and alimony. (For more on Moudawana, visit: http://www.cics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/ISITA_09-002_Harrak.pdf)


Contemporary Human Rights Concerns

Despite reform efforts since the early 1990s, there are still serious human rights concerns in Morocco. The 2011 constitutional amendments integrated new human rights protections, but this commitment has not yet translated into significantly improved practices in several areas.⁶ Human rights commentators are particularly concerned about unfair trials, freedom of speech, and freedom of association, especially for political or politicized groups and individuals. For example, convictions of political protesters or dissidents have relied heavily on alleged coerced confessions which have then been contested by defendants in court.⁷ Free speech in Morocco is limited, as there are prohibitions on speaking against or undermining Islam, the monarchy, or Morocco’s territorial integrity (that is, its claim to Western Sahara). Crossing these lines results in criminal prosecutions.⁸ The law protects citizens’ freedom of association, but in practice officials still prevent certain types of politically sensitive groups from registering, organizing, or being active in other ways.⁹ Political protests are at times dispersed with excessive force.

Activists calling for Western Saharan self-determination are particularly vulnerable,¹⁰ as are suspected Islamist extremists. Since a 2003 series of suicide bombings in Casablanca, the authorities have arrested hundreds of persons suspected of being connected to terrorist networks. Often, their imprisonment comes after secret and illegal detention and unfair trials.¹¹ The United States and some of its allies see Morocco as a key partner in the global war on terror.

In 2004, revisions to Morocco’s family and personal status code afforded women expanded rights in divorce, child custody, and other family matters, but some gendered discriminatory provisions remain.

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⁶ For specific information on the human rights record in Morocco each year, see the annual reports of Human Rights Watch (available at: [http://www.hrw.org/node/79288](http://www.hrw.org/node/79288)) or Amnesty International (available at: [http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/moroccowestsahara](http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/moroccowestsahara)). General information included in this section was obtained from these reports.


Implementation of the reform, moreover, has been slow. There are also serious concerns about violations of the rights of domestic workers in Morocco, many of whom are children, as national labor laws do not protect these workers.\textsuperscript{12} Despite prohibitions on employing children under 15 years old, thousands of children—typically from disadvantaged backgrounds—are domestic workers in Morocco and often face abusive conditions.\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, Morocco’s truth commission (IER)\textsuperscript{14} completed its mandate and produced a final report in 2005,\textsuperscript{15} providing acknowledgment and reparations to about 16,000 victims of past human rights abuses. However, particular perpetrators were not named, so no prosecutions have been conducted. Similarly, although the commission recommended institutional reforms to prevent future human rights violations, legal and security sector reforms have not occurred.\textsuperscript{16}

Morocco’s Non-Governmental Rights Sector\textsuperscript{17}

Left-wing activists and former political prisoners created Morocco’s first human rights groups in the early 1970s, focusing primarily on civil and political rights, including freedom of speech and association and judicial and prison reform.\textsuperscript{18} In the 1980s, gender-based activists created the country’s first women’s rights groups. In the 1990s, a new generation of activists began to create more narrowly focused and specialized rights groups, including those concerned with the rights of women, children, handicapped persons, and specific cultures. In the new millennium, a variety of

\textsuperscript{17} Some information in this section came from key informant expert interviews conducted by the research team in 2010 and 2011. For a list of key informants, see Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{18} Key Informant Interviews 5 & 6
Moroccan civil society groups went a step further and began advocating for freedom of religion, sexual orientation, secularism, and language. Unlike the more established rights groups, the recent local human rights organizations are often not rooted in Morocco’s political left.\textsuperscript{19}

LHROs kept their distance from the government until the 1990s, when the political environment began to liberalize. Since then, some rights groups have adopted a more collaborative approach toward the state, working together on various legislative and judicial reforms, or through specific government ministries, programs, and projects.\textsuperscript{20} During the last decade, additionally, development NGOs began using human rights principles in their work, as part of the broader global policy turn towards the rights-based approach to development.\textsuperscript{21}

The new millennium also witnessed the emergence of some Islam-based human rights groups. Like the Marxists of the 1970s, these activists created rights organizations to protect themselves and their peers from political repression.\textsuperscript{22} Additionally, some Islamic groups have joined forces with established secular rights groups to protest abuses of civil and political rights, and have used these alliances to strengthen their national and international profiles.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} Key Informant Interviews 2, 4, 5 & 6
\textsuperscript{20} Key Informant Interview 3
\textsuperscript{21} Key Informant Interviews 3 & 5
\textsuperscript{22} Key Informant Interview 1
\textsuperscript{23} Key Informant Interview 3
Part II:
Local Human Rights Organizations in Rabat and Casablanca

Our research team was interested in the ways human rights language, issues, and activists were perceived in Morocco. We began by asking Moroccans working for local human rights organizations (LHROs) for their views. We asked informants both for their personal experiences and their informed opinions.

First, we discuss the resonance of human rights ideas in Morocco, including respondents’ perceptions of both what hinders and what facilitates the dissemination of human rights to the grassroots. Next, we analyze potential and actual sources of LHRO funding, and consider how vulnerable the human rights sector may be if faced with a loss of foreign funding. Finally, we explore how the Moroccan human rights sector collaborates or conflicts with other types of organizations.

Methodological Overview

We conducted 30 in-depth interviews in 2011 with a stratified random sample of LHROs in Casablanca (the largest city in Morocco) and Rabat (the capital city). For an organization to be included in our sampling frame it needed to both be a registered NGO and have the term “rights” in its organizational mission or description of activities. We began by constructing a list of all potential organizations, using extensive web searches and consulting expert key informants. Next, the research team screened all organizations to confirm whether or not they fit the criteria for inclusion. The resultant sampling frame included 56 LHROs in Rabat and Casablanca. The sample was stratified according to whether or not the organizations had a web presence and were part of a network. LHROs were randomly selected from the list. We contacted 37 organizations to complete the sample of 30 LHROs, resulting in a response rate of 81%. The resultant data are representative of all LHROs in Rabat and Casablanca.

Each selected organization was contacted by telephone and/or email, and the LHRO staff decided who would be the most appropriate interview participant. Interviews included a combination of open-ended questions and closed-response items, on average lasting 47 minutes. For more details, see Appendix B.

Characteristics of LHROs and Respondents

The 30 LHRO interview respondents were more highly educated, more urban, and less religious than the Moroccan public. On average, they were 49 years old and just over half (53%) were female. Although their parents were not highly educated—just four people reported their father had attended university, and just one reported a mother who had—respondents all completed secondary school and all but one attended university, for a median of five years. Most had spent substantial time in urban areas, with 80% attending secondary and 93% attending university in a major city. While 80% reported that they were Muslim, just 30% claimed to be practicing members of their faith, in stark contrast to the highly-religious Moroccan general public.
The respondents had high levels of experience and authority in their respective organizations. They had been working with their current LHROs for a median of 12 years and just under three-quarters were senior-level staff. Their work typically involved international travel, with respondents reporting, on average, three international work-related trips in the past five years.

As Table 2.2 shows, the vast majority (93%) of sampled LHROs had a national-level scope. They are most frequently engaged in formal legal interventions (37%) and public advocacy (33%), and to a lesser extent education about human rights (23%) and gathering information (just 7%).
The sampled LHROs were generally well-established organizations, with about two-thirds having been in operation for at least ten years. The median staff size was 50 people, but there was a large range in the number of staff, from just two people up to about 10,000. However, not many of these people are paid for their work, with an average of just 24% paid staff. The LHROs rely heavily on funding from both the government (79%) and foreign sources (77%). They have relatively well-developed networks with foreign organizations, as they reported a median of four visits from foreign organizations in the year prior.

Resonance of Human Rights Ideas

We began by making a statement—“Some say the term ‘human rights’ is hard for the average person to understand and use”—and asking respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed. As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, most (18 of 30 respondents) either “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the claim, while a minority (10 of 30 respondents) either “agreed” or “strongly agreed.” Moroccan LHRO workers, in other words, are more likely than not to believe that human rights language is comprehensible to ordinary people in their country. In today’s Morocco, one respondent observed, “we can talk about rights to anyone,” since “people are increasingly interested in and sensitive to human rights culture, terms and practice.”

For many respondents, the culture of human rights has been spreading in Morocco and, while the average person may not be familiar with the technical or legal dimensions of human rights, they understand the crux
of human rights and its centrality to human dignity. They see evidence of human rights ideas spreading to the grassroots and people increasingly demanding their rights, such as through the Arab Spring movement. A few respondents emphasized that the concept of human rights is inherent to the experience of being human. For example, one articulated the “instinctive” awareness of human rights, saying, “There is not one being who cannot conceptualize the fact that she or he has rights…all human beings are inherently entitled to dignity and hence instinctively demand and understand rights.”

Another explained that human rights are about human dignity, which is a concept anyone could understand, and that ordinary people “will adhere to the human rights cause—any cause—that defends their dignity.” Others, however, emphasized the essential role of LHROs in raising awareness and spreading human rights culture throughout Morocco.

**Generational Improvement**

Respondents noted the importance of generational change, arguing that people who had grown up during the 1970s—the country’s dreaded “years of lead”—would be likely to view human rights ideas and activists with apprehension, as they were seen as risky and oppositional. Others might see rights as “favors offered by the state,” rather than something that all people possessed by virtue of being human. According to respondents, Morocco had labored for too long under the “Makhzen culture,” a popular term denoting the country’s power elite. The Makhzen mindset was “backward,” undermining the country’s more recent move towards “democratic and human rights values.”

One significant historical change, respondents noted, was a shift within the human rights community to a greater recognition of struggles for socio-economic and cultural rights beginning in the 1990s, linked to broader trends in redefining human rights, particularly in the Global South. Political and civil rights were not particularly salient to the Moroccan public, and so the human rights sector’s “historic focus on political and civil rights is what made it difficult for the masses to understand and adhere to the concept.” The shift to a socio-economic focus has helped to spread human rights culture to the grassroots.

This shifted the nature of human rights work from a political struggle to action-oriented work that placed LHROs in closer proximity to the population. LHROs are now “present on the field and have penetrated the grassroots.” According to several respondents, this direct action approach helped to anchor human

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29 GB-019-2011  
30 GB-019-2011  
32 The “Years of Lead” typically refer to the 1960s through 1980s, the period of rule of King Hassan II, years characterized by state violence against opponents and activists.  
33 GB-002-2011  
34 GB-002-2011  
35 GB-027-2011  
36 GB-029-2011  
38 GB-008-2011
rights culture among the grassroots and change the earlier perception of human rights as linked solely to political struggle and opposition. For example, one respondent asserted, “Lately, human rights organizations’ work on social and economic rights has increased the population’s acceptance and respect of human rights activists.” Respondents were pleased to report that “LHROs’ actions today are no longer just limited to debates and concepts,” but instead “respond to society’s needs and demands, particularly related to socio-economic rights.”

Respondents described an accompanying shift in the Moroccan state’s approach to human rights. During the “years of lead” repression, respondents said, the state demonized the concept of human rights. Since the mid-1990s, respondents perceived that the state’s approach to human rights had been increasingly characterized by openness and support. For the LHROs, this translated into concrete initiatives for human rights, such as the Equity and Reconciliation Commission and the reform of the family code, which have helped to decrease the public stigma associated with human rights work. Because of the government’s greater openness to human rights, “it became a national, public and open debate.” Importantly, however, some respondents still perceive the state to be a barrier to the spread of human rights, as we’ll see in the next section.

According to some respondents, the simultaneous occurrence of these shifts in the past 20 years was the key to the spread of the human rights culture in Morocco and led to an increasingly positive public perception. Without the human rights sector’s increasing focus on working with the population for their socio-economic and cultural rights and the government’s recently progressive efforts to promote human rights, such positive changes would not have occurred.

**Barriers to Resonance**

While they were generally highly optimistic about the public resonance of human rights ideas—particularly when placed in historical perspective—respondents were quick to also discuss significant obstacles to public receptivity. The LHRO representatives described three primary barriers to the dissemination of a human rights culture in Morocco: low levels of education, a clash with local culture and religion, and Morocco’s political history and current political climate.

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40 GB-010-2011
41 GB-005-2011
43 GB-019-2011
For many respondents, inadequate education, illiteracy, and severe poverty were significant barriers to human rights receptivity.\textsuperscript{44} They located the fault, however, in the country’s faltering public education system, rather than the individuals themselves. “Even the uneducated are aware they have rights,” one argued, but have a hard time identifying those “taking away their rights.”\textsuperscript{45} Public schools were unable to help Morocco’s poor understand the sources of their oppression. Low levels of education and literacy, particularly in rural areas, serve to increase the gap between urban LHROs and the population they are trying to reach.\textsuperscript{46}

One the other hand, some respondents argued that the ideas flowed easily across social barriers, and that people with low education can and do understand human rights.\textsuperscript{47} “It’s not a question of education,” one claimed, but rather of “the way you explain the term [human rights].”\textsuperscript{48} Another concurred, noting, “When one is a victim of injustice…one does not need to go through school to understand that.”\textsuperscript{49} A third poured scorn on those identifying an educational barrier to human rights diffusion. “People who say that [Moroccans]…are illiterate and hence do not understand human rights,” he said, “are people who do not work with…the population. They are in the elite bubble…in five-star hotels.”\textsuperscript{50} In fact, several argued that Morocco’s wealthier classes were more likely than the poor to resist human rights ideas.\textsuperscript{51} Average people were not “the source of resistance to the spread of human rights culture,” one said. Instead, the real problem is “the [Moroccan] elite.”\textsuperscript{52}

There were also split opinions as to what extent human rights values clash with Moroccan culture and Islamic beliefs and practices. Some respondents spoke of this as a significant obstacle to overcome, saying that human rights are often seen as western concepts.\textsuperscript{53} Religious and cultural “mentalities” can block the dissemination of human rights ideas,\textsuperscript{54} as people perceive the messages spread by LHROs to be at odds with teachings from their religion or traditional ways of life. This conflict emerges particularly strongly over the issue of women’s rights, which some respondents say are the most difficult to talk about in religious or traditional spheres.\textsuperscript{55} One respondent pointed out that Moroccan women

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\textsuperscript{45} GB-001-2011

\textsuperscript{46} GB-013-2011, GB-018-2011


\textsuperscript{48} GB-021-2011

\textsuperscript{49} GB-008-2011

\textsuperscript{50} GB-026-2011

\textsuperscript{51} GB-002-2011, GB-019-2011, GB-025-2011

\textsuperscript{52} GB-019-2011


were particularly conflicted, since they were both “interested in the rights discourse” but “concerned that [human rights] would contradict their religious beliefs.”

Others, however, disagreed and said that Moroccans do not see a cultural clash nor do they perceive human rights to be a western import. Still others agree that human rights may be seen as incompatible with local religious or cultural values, but contend that this is a misplaced perception, spread primarily by religious extremists. “Since the 1990s,” one said, “religious extremists have been the ones who stigmatize…human rights as being Western,” and, another added, people are receptive to the extremists’ message because of their low education and other vulnerabilities. These respondents saw the conflict between human rights and culture or religion as essentially propaganda, not coming from Islam or cultural traditions. LHROs, they argued, need to work to inform people about how human rights actually fit well with their beliefs and practices.

Finally, the third major barrier to the dissemination of human rights ideas throughout Morocco, according to respondents, is the relationship of the human rights sector to the political establishment. In many cases, respondents blamed the government and its agencies for the persistence of anti-human rights ideas. Although the state has done much to politically liberalize Morocco, respondents argued it was not sufficiently integrating human rights into its communications and policies. “The government does not do anything,” one asserted, to “promote and disseminate a human rights culture.” As evidence, others pointed to women’s rights issues, which had been broadly diffused by public agencies once the powers-that-be had agreed to revisions to the country’s family or personal status laws. That was the happy exception to prove the unhappy rule, however, demonstrating that “the forces in power…are key in acquiring popular support” for human rights.

Beyond not doing its part in spreading human rights culture, some respondents reported that the state is actually a hindrance, actively working against the grassroots dissemination of human rights, even when they are—in theory—working with LHROs. Although most respondents perceived these difficulties to be diminishing somewhat, they said there was still a ways to go and that the state is a necessary partner to bring fundamental change and “revolutionize” human rights in Morocco.

Vernacularization of Human Rights

Despite these barriers, most respondents noted growth in Morocco’s human rights culture. Several argued that human rights had moved from being an elite ideology to one that was more socially rooted, fought for, and understood, by an increasing number or ordinary people. To be successful, however,

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56 GB-028-2011
59 GB-002-2011
60 GB-013-2011
61 GB-012-2011, GB-024-2011, GB-026-2011
63 GB-013-2011
64 GB-027-2011
LHRO workers had to “speak the local language and dialect, not the intellectual jargon of those big human rights organizations in the city.”

The key to making human rights locally resonate, over half of the respondents emphasized, was to offer explanations using simple terms, anecdotes, concrete examples, and cultural or religious references. This approach to human rights education, respondents insisted, could overcome the initial obstacles of low education or literacy.

More importantly, however, they had to connect human rights ideas to ordinary peoples’ needs, providing concrete services in order to raise awareness of human rights culture. Linking human rights ideas to actions to help meet daily needs actually shows people the meaning of human rights and empowers them to get involved in the process of claiming their own rights. The real challenge, one respondent explained, is to “build action-oriented strategies” that help people “grasp the importance of rights.”

The LHRO workers strongly emphasized the importance of “proximity work,” linking ordinary people with human rights ideas through services and concrete actions. Without real action, human rights languished as top-down ideas that were “hard to understand,” and most people would perceive of human rights as “just empty talk.” When people saw “concrete results,” on the other hand, “they would start to believe.” Even people who did not embrace the human rights approach would be drawn to goods or services, which would then allow the LHROs to gain some traction to teach about human rights.

For many respondents, in order for a rights culture to effectively take root in the public consciousness, it is essential to anchor human rights discourse in people’s reality. When the human rights framework is brought close and made relevant to people’s lives, it has great potential to bring long-term transformation.

**Moroccan Human Rights Activists**

We asked, “What does the term ‘human rights activist’ mean to the average person in Morocco?” Perceptions of human rights activists had changed, respondents said, with a few even claiming that they were no longer “activists”—a term which held connotations of 1970s political activism—but were now seen more broadly as civil society actors.
A few respondents said that activists had once been social and political elites, but LHRO workers were now perceived as middle class, with strong connections to ordinary people in both urban and rural areas.\textsuperscript{79} LHROs, and thus, human rights workers, had contributed to constructive social change in the past two decades, increasingly engaging in programs that directly involve communities and lead to observable positive results. Until the 1990s, human rights activists were highly stigmatized, but today there is a much more encouraging perception of LHRO workers, according to respondents.\textsuperscript{80} Respondents perceived that they are “seen as helpers, fighters for their beneficiaries’ dignity”\textsuperscript{81} and “respected as being actors of positive change and development.”\textsuperscript{82} Respondents said that people turn to human rights activists and LHRO workers to help them with their problems: “People with any form of injustice will go to LHROs first before they go to anyone else. Women go to HROs before they go to their own families.”\textsuperscript{83}

Many respondents said that human rights activists were generally perceived positively in Morocco.\textsuperscript{84} Tempering this, however, was the recognition that perceptions of human rights activists vary depending on both the activists’ behaviors and the actions of their organizations in Moroccan communities. When activists build a “relationship based on a progressive, simple dialogue, not a top-down approach, it will lead to a positive contact.”\textsuperscript{85}

Further, activists will face local stigma if their actions are (or are perceived to be) associated with political or personal gains.\textsuperscript{86} In such cases, they will also face direct opposition from influential actors, such as the state or religious conservatives, who have the ability to shape public opinion. A few respondents compared human rights workers to politicians, arguing that activists have a greater credibility among the public, so it is important to maintain separation. As one respondent explained, “The more we are independent from political parties, the more trust we will get from the population.”\textsuperscript{87} Another echoed this perception, explaining that HR activists’ work “without invested political interest gives them great credibility.”\textsuperscript{88}

Finally, a few respondents implied, or explicitly explained, that there is a difference between general LHROs and those that focus on specialized issues.\textsuperscript{89} To the public, they explained, activists at

\textsuperscript{79} GB-022-2011, GB-030-2011
\textsuperscript{80} GB-019-2011, GB-022-2011, GB-024-2011, GB-027-2011
\textsuperscript{81} GB-024-2011
\textsuperscript{82} GB-018-2011
\textsuperscript{83} GB-019-2011
\textsuperscript{85} GB-011-2011
\textsuperscript{87} GB-026-2011
\textsuperscript{88} GB-008-2011
\textsuperscript{89} GB-017-2011, GB-031-2011
specialized, action-oriented HROs are often not perceived as human rights activists at all, but instead may be seen as social service or charity “good-doers.”

Evaluating the Human Rights Approach

We asked respondents to synthesize: “In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses of using a ‘human rights’ framework?” and they described several key strengths of using a human rights approach.

First, most prominently, many explained that human rights are a universal framework with widespread appeal and legitimacy, allowing LHROs to be “the voice that is heard locally, nationally and internationally.” One explained, “To have a certain legitimacy today an organization has to embrace the human rights approach, even the Islamist approach is looking for that legitimacy…human rights actors have become the center of the struggle.” The human rights approach provides the “mother frame of reference” that both encompasses and accepts all others.

Second, human rights’ universal appeal has the potential to help resolve conflicts within Morocco. According to some, a human rights framework is “fundamentally objective” and advocates protecting all groups equally, resulting in a non-discriminatory language that is useful in reconciling differences in a heterogeneous Morocco. “It is the common denominator which could solve the issues associated with the different ideologies present in the Moroccan society, and among the different social and political actors. It is a way of transcending the conflicts generated by different ideologies.”

Third, a human rights approach brings long-term solutions by addressing “root problems,” rather than trying to “fix a problem by paying for something.” Unlike with “charity” or development approaches, people are empowered, making “beneficiaries become activists themselves.” It not only “gives the fish,” but “the human rights approach teaches how to fish, the human rights approach builds the citizen.” As one respondent explained, this contributes to a long-term transformation: “All other approaches (development, political, or religious) cannot last in the long run because they do not carry a project for a society based on equality and justice…when we win part of the mass to join our cause, we win it forever.”

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90 GB-017-2011, GB-031-2011
92 GB-027-2011
93 GB-030-2011
94 GB-022-2011
96 GB-025-2011
98 GB-005-2011
100 GB-026-2011
101 GB-017-2011
102 GB-024-2011
103 GB-013-2011
Some respondents were also cognizant of internal and external challenges to their approach. For most, however, these are not weaknesses inherent in the human rights approach, but are possible challenges to the effective utilization of the approach. In fact, several respondents said they did not see any weaknesses to the human rights approach itself.  

The most substantial limitation of the human rights framework, according to respondents, is a potential gap between human rights discourse and real-world application. As discussed above, in order for LHROs to be seen favorably by the public, it is important for them to be perceived as close to the ground and as implementing observable positive changes. Unfortunately, human rights may be seen as an ideology without action, with LHROs “perceived as removed from reality.” Although a strength of a human rights framework is its ability to bring long term change, it can be challenging to produce immediate results, leading to negative perceptions: “Some claim that bread is more important, that they need to feed themselves first. They claim, ‘what are human rights going to do for me?’” Respondents did not see this as insurmountable, but described how LHROs need to be aware of this limitation and work to “reduce our human rights speeches and discourse and increase our actions.”

Human rights also use “specialized jargon,” which can make it “elitist compared to religious simplistic and populist discourse.” Some argued that the perception of human rights as elitist discourse needs to be challenged—and that it is effectively being challenged—as LHROs engage in more proximity work and “translation” of human rights. Even while retaining an emphasis on advocacy efforts, respondents thought LHROs ought to focus their attention on practical applications of human rights ideas: “The rights elite use these international conventions like the Islamists use the Koran…[but] our role is not to remind people of the content of the conventions but to find sustainable solutions to the real issues at hand, given the reality.”

Additionally, there are challenges that arise external to LHROs. There are detractors or opponents who limit the work of LHROs, particularly religious extremists or some political agents. These actors are resistant to a human rights framework and pose an obstacle to the spread of a human rights culture. One explained, “We LHROs can work with the communities but if the system does not follow, our work faces obstacles.” Another external challenge to a human rights approach is that they are not supported with enough resources: “People ask for more than we can deliver. One organization with limited resources cannot address all the demands that it receives.” The next section discusses LHROs’ resources in greater depth.

106 GB-023-2011
107 GB-024-2011
108 GB-014-2011
109 GB-010-2011
110 GB-019-2011
111 GB-028-2011
112 GB-015-2011
Resourcing the Moroccan Human Rights Sector

To find out how Moroccan LHROs financed their work, we asked the 30 respondents, “What, in your opinion, is the estimated percentage of rights-based organizations in Morocco that receive substantial foreign funding?” We were asking respondents to serve as key informants on the Moroccan human rights sector as a whole. The respondents also provided data about their own organizations when asked, “Does your organization receive foreign funding?”

As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, 18 respondents answered the first question, indicating that many were not confident in their estimations of foreign funding in their sector. For those who did respond, their mean estimate was that 84% of Moroccan LHROs received “substantial” foreign funding. All 30 responded to our second question about whether their own organization received foreign money, and as Figure 2.3 notes, 77% did. Foreign aid plays a vital role in the country’s rights-based sector.

Several respondents expressed concern that accepting foreign support might compromise local organizations’ autonomy, so they emphasized the need to maintain independence, look for partnership models, and ensure donors share their human rights values. For a few established organizations, this was such a significant concern that they had only recently begun accepting foreign money.

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113 Although we asked respondents to offer a concrete numerical estimate, not everyone was comfortable doing so. Of the 18 who responded, five said 100%, one estimated 90%, nine estimated “a majority,” another said “more than half,” one argued for 50%, while yet another said “a minority.” To translate these into point estimates, we transformed the phrase, “a majority,” into the range, 75-100%, and then took the midpoint, or 88%, to calculate the average. We transformed “more than half” into 51-75%, with a midpoint of 63%; and “a minority” into 0-25%, with a midpoint of 12.5%.


115 GB-019-2011

116 GB-014-2011, GB-016-2011


118 GB-012-2011, GB-024-2011
The organizations varied in how substantial international support was in their budget, with estimates ranging from about 20%\(^{119}\) to 95%.\(^{120}\) Fifteen respondents gave precise estimates of the percentages of their total funding that came from foreign sources. Of these, four respondents said their organization received no foreign funding, while the remaining reported an average of 64% of their funding.

**Dependence on Foreign Funding**

With this high level of reliance on foreign funding, we assessed respondents’ perceptions of the sector’s resilience in the face of an aid cut off. We asked, “If foreign funding for human rights work in Morocco was cut off, would local human rights activities...?”

The majority of respondents were extremely optimistic about the sector’s robustness. Eighteen respondents (64%) believed human rights work would continue much as it had been, while 10 respondents (36%) believed it would “collapse somewhat.”

This resilience, in their view, stemmed from civil society’s historic reliance on volunteers, rather than paid workers. Morocco has a long tradition of vigorous volunteerism, which is a deeply embedded practice in the local culture\(^{121}\) and essential to the functioning of the human rights sector. Even without foreign support, volunteers and activists would allow the sector to survive.\(^{122}\) “We do not count on foreign funding...we rely on our activists and volunteers,” explained one.\(^{123}\) Another noted that since the country’s first human rights groups emerged prior to the era of foreign funding, they had built a capacity to survive regardless of overseas donations: “We...worked for a very long time without foreign funding,” she explained, so if the foreign money ended, “the movement would continue.”\(^{124}\) Some respondents explained that they “will be activists forever,”\(^{125}\) and they “believe in change [and] cannot stop.”\(^{126}\) For them, “true activism” is more important than financial support,\(^{127}\) which is just a tool to amplify their actions, but is not the heart of the human rights movement.\(^{128}\)

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\(^{119}\) GB-020-2011
\(^{120}\) GB-013-2011
\(^{121}\) GB-022-2011, GB-027-2011
\(^{123}\) GB-009-2011
\(^{124}\) GB-008-2011
\(^{125}\) GB-025-2011
\(^{126}\) GB-028-2011
\(^{127}\) GB-015-2011
\(^{128}\) GB-019-2011, GB-021-2011, GB-022-2011
Some, however, did admit that there would be changes without foreign funds. Particularly, they reported that some LHROs are more heavily reliant and would struggle.\textsuperscript{129} Others claimed that, while the activism would continue, daily operations and programs would decline without foreign funds.\textsuperscript{130} On a more skeptical note, 5 of 28 respondents predicted the sector would severely struggle should foreign money be cut off.\textsuperscript{131} They cited the lack of an alternative model of operation, lamenting that volunteering and activism is not enough; “we cannot function without [foreign money],” one explained.\textsuperscript{132}

Of those who said they knew that this reliance on foreign money was problematic, and a few had begun to explore revenue-generating activities and self-financing projects. One respondent said they used project money to buy rather than lease offices, thereby building up their group’s assets.\textsuperscript{133} Several organizations collect membership fees, which they see as a sustainable funding source; one respondent estimated that 80\% of their organization’s funding came from membership fees and volunteers.\textsuperscript{134}

Some respondents were more confident than others:

1. **Respondents from larger organizations were more optimistic**: Respondents from organizations with at least 40 staff members were more likely to see LHROs as able to survive without foreign funds; about 85\% said the sector would be resilient, compared to 46\% of those from smaller organizations.

2. **Respondents from organizations with professional staff were hesitant**: In LHROs with more than half volunteer staff, about two-thirds of respondents thought the human rights movement would stay the same without foreign funding, compared to half of those from LHROs with higher percentages of paid staff.

3. **Respondents from advocacy-centered organizations were confident**: Those from organizations that focused on formal legal advocacy were more likely to say the movement would remain the same without foreign funds (90\%), compared to those from organizations that focused on education, media, or other public activities (50\%).

**Local Funding Sources**

Next, we asked respondents about the availability of local funding: “Is substantial local funding for human rights organizations a possibility in Morocco?” Again, we treated respondents as local experts on the Moroccan LHRO sector.

The vast majority (28 of 30 respondents) believed that “substantial” local funding was indeed available (see Figure 2.5), while only a minority (8 of 21) believed that either “some” or “most” rights-based groups actually utilize local funds (see Figure 2.6).

\textsuperscript{129} GB-010-2011, GB-018-2011, GB-020-2011, GB-025-2011
\textsuperscript{130} GB-001-2011, GB-021-2011, GB-030-2011
\textsuperscript{132} GB-013-2011
\textsuperscript{133} GB-024-2011
\textsuperscript{134} GB-010-2011
Respondents explained that the most significant (potential and actual) source of local funding was the government, through grants or project partnerships that first became available in the late 1990s. The Moroccan Justice Ministry was a key funder for general human rights groups, while the Ministry of Social Development and Family Affairs and the National Initiative for Human Development were funders of specialized LHROs. National or local governments also helped by seconding public servants, lending groups their office space, or granting other subsidies. In some cases, LHROs had secured access to dedicated municipal-level civil society grants. About 79% of respondents reported their organizations received some form of government funding.

The government support was limited, especially when compared to funds available from outside the country. The Ministry of Justice’s grants to local human rights groups ranged from $2,000 to $13,000 USD per year, paling in comparison to those available from foreign agencies. Respondents were critical of this perceived low level of commitment from the state. In fact, several respondents framed getting public funds as a right of LHROs, whom they see as doing work the government ought to be doing, and as protecting the rights of citizens whose taxes create the public funds. One respondent said, “It is the role of the government to support the work of civil society organizations,” while another said, “Increasing national funding is our future fight.” A third argued that “the government should support us more and they have the resources to do it,”

Figure 2.5
Respondents Think There Are Substantial Local Funding Sources (N=30)

“Is substantial local funding for human rights organizations a possibility in Morocco?”

Yes (93%)
No (7%)

Figure 2.6
Respondents Do Not Think Many LHROs Receive Funds From Local Sources (N=21)

“In actuality, how many of Morocco’s human rights groups raise substantial funds from local sources?”

Very few (62%)
Some (24%)
Most (14%)

135 INDH is a national initiative launched by Morocco’s King Mohammed VI in May 2005 to alleviate poverty and extreme vulnerability through a nation-wide human development programme. Since 2005, INDH has financed more than 20,000 sub-projects, targeting more than 4.6 million people, in 264 urban neighborhoods and 403 rural communities.


138 GB-019-2011

139 GB-021-2011

140 GB-022-2011

141 GB-024-2011

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while a fourth said that part “of the public budget [should] go, in a transparent and institutionalized way, to LHROs.”

The national private sector is not yet a significant funding source for LHROs. Some respondents explained that the private sector is not—yet—a part of human rights “culture,” suggesting perhaps potential private donors need to be “sensitized.” They see private companies as unwilling donors because they are not part of a socially-responsible sector with practices that respect human rights, and they fear that LHROs will expose them. Despite this, some respondents were optimistic about potential future partnerships with the Moroccan private sector, and a few reported that their organizations already received some limited private funding.

In general, respondents perceived a lack of political will to fund LHROs, which limits their access to both public and private local funds. Respondents noted that public and private donors preferred to support groups providing concrete services, and that “human rights” can still be a red flag. “People, private companies, financiers in general want to give money to something concrete,” and social services or charity programs are more attractive because they offer tangibles. Respondents thought that both government and private donors, moreover, were wary of supporting rights groups because they “denunciate too much” and there is still holdover suspicion of rights groups from their past work on political rights. “The government does not want any headaches,” another explained, and to them, “human rights are…a…headache.”

**Unequal Access**

Respondents described an array of funding options, but many were frustrated by an uneven allotment of funds throughout the sector. First, they observed a skew towards larger or more “successful” organizations, while smaller organizations receive little or no money. This may be a result of dedicated fundraising staff, greater knowledge of how to access funding, or more streamlined procedures to handle paperwork requirements. This was particularly frustrating to respondents from smaller organizations; one respondent described it as a monopoly by a handful of prominent groups. “National and foreign funding suffer from favoritism,” another said, with the same groups “always benefit[ing] from foreign funding, and others never [so benefiting].”

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142 GB-030-2011
143 GB-012-2011, GB-025-2011, GB-030-2011
144 GB-024-2011
146 GB-030-2011
149 GB-017-2011
150 GB-008-2011
151 GB-029-2011
152 GB-025-2011
154 GB-007-2011, GB-016-2011, GB-017-2011
155 GB-025-2011
156 GB-016-2011
A second critique by respondents was of the importance of personal connections in obtaining organizational funding. Nearly half (13 out of 30 respondents) claimed that both government and foreign monies were distributed in opaque, clientelistic ways. “One needs to have strong connections,” one respondent said, and “the more connections you have, the more funding you get.”157 Another said that organizations need “strong contacts and to know the ropes” to get public or foreign money.158 Indeed, several said that public agencies financed only those groups that were close to political elites.

In short, foreign funds sustain human rights groups in Rabat and Casablanca, although LHRO workers were confident that volunteerism remains at the heart of the movement. Public and private financing in Morocco provides limited financial support, and their role may increase in the future.

**Relationships with Other Social Sectors**

Rights groups in Morocco face a variety of challenges and enjoy a range of successes, both in terms of the resonance of their discourse and in obtaining resources. At the same time, there are other groups also working to reach the public and mobilize resources for their own causes.

In order to gauge LHROs’ effectiveness in comparison to other groups, we asked, “In Morocco, are there political or religious organizations that are more effective than human rights organizations in reaching the grassroots?” and “Why are these other groups more successful?”

Of the 30 total respondents, 14 named at least one other type of group that they thought was more effective at grassroots mobilization than LHROs and five of those gave two responses. As Figure 2.7 shows, they overwhelmingly perceived religious organizations (including Muslim solidarity or charity organizations and Islamist political parties) as the most effective mobilizers of the Moroccan public. When asked to name specific examples of effective religious groups, respondents named political groups, such as *Al Adl Wal Ihsan*159 and the Justice and Development Party (PJD).160

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157 GB-001-2011
158 GB-007-2011
159 *Al Adl Wal Ihsan*, or the “justice and charity” movement, is an Islamist organization tolerated by the State but prohibited from the electoral process and not recognized as a political party.
160 The PJD, the *Parti de la Justice et du Développement*, is a moderate Islamist political party which has been the ruling party in government since winning a majority during the legislative elections of November 2011.
In addition to religious organizations, five respondents thought secular civil society organizations (such as development or charity NGOs) were more effective than LHROs, and one person mentioned that non-religious political actors were particularly effective.

The remainder of respondents thought that other types of organizations were not necessarily more effective than LHROs. They explained that it is difficult to assess which approach is more successful,\(^{161}\) that different organizations mobilize different segments of the population,\(^{162}\) or that they have varying strengths.\(^ {163}\) Others argued that the human rights approach most effectively mobilizes the population.\(^ {164}\)

*The Islamists’ Mobilizing Appeal*

Respondents described Islamist groups as having broad appeal to the Moroccan public for three primary reasons: first, their affiliations and resources; second, their ideological framework or discourse; and third, their strategies of action.

A major strength of religious organizations is their party affiliations, with their accompanying power and resources. Religious organizations work as local development NGOs, under the “charity banner,”\(^ {165}\) but respondents described how such organizations are funded by or have other connections to Islamist political parties.\(^ {166}\) According to some respondents, this means religious organizations are reinforced by the state and have political power,\(^ {167}\) as well as having financial power from these connections.\(^ {168}\) They also often work with or through mosques, which can provide both effective spaces for mobilization\(^ {169}\) and access to financial resources.\(^ {170}\)

Second, respondents explained that Islamist groups blur the line between religious and political discourses, offering a framework that resonates particularly easily in underprivileged or poorly-educated communities.\(^ {171}\) While people may struggle to understand the more complex, technical discourse surrounding a “universal human rights activist discourse,” “religious discourse is generally very easily welcome in a Muslim society, especially given the high rate of illiteracy.”\(^ {172}\) These organizations “use a religious discourse and mosques to diffuse their political messages,” which allows their ideas to permeate deeply, “because it touches upon people’s faith and emotions not upon their mentalities.”\(^ {173}\) Because Morocco is a Muslim society, this appeal to faith and belief is particularly effective and is spread daily through mosques.\(^ {174}\) Although respondents saw religious organizations as effective at mobilizing the grassroots, they often characterized them as demagogic, dangerously appealing to emotions and prejudices, and capitalizing on ignorance of less-educated citizens.

\(^{161}\) GB-001-2011, GB-019-2011
\(^{162}\) GB-026-2011
\(^{163}\) GB-027-2011
\(^{164}\) GB-002-2011, GB-007-2011, GB-014-2011, GB-023-2011
\(^{165}\) GB-014-2011
\(^{166}\) GB-009-2011, GB-011-2011, GB-024-2011
\(^{167}\) GB-013-2011
\(^{168}\) GB-013-2011, GB-022-2011
\(^{169}\) GB-029-2011
\(^{170}\) GB-028-2011
\(^{172}\) GB-008-2011
\(^{173}\) GB-029-2011
A third major appeal of Islamist groups, according to respondents, is their focus on “very active social work with the underprivileged,” placing them in close proximity to communities and giving them widespread appeal. They often take a “charity-based” approach that emphasizes the distribution of material benefits and services, which “uses people’s poverty to favor the Islamist political party.” Therefore, Islamist groups “get more adherents because they offer concrete benefits to the underprivileged communities...If I were them I would also prefer to go to organizations that will take care of my basic needs, rather than an organization that promotes [rights].” Pragmatically, respondents recognized that any organization “that comes with material benefits to give away will have more respondents.” Critically, however, they saw this as exploiting poverty to spread ideology, as offering short-term fixes for problems, and as just creating “debt-based adherence” or blind loyalty.

While their affiliations, discourse, and strategies of action certainly are formidable strengths, Islamist groups in Morocco may also be facing challenges. One respondent described a recent decrease in the public’s trust of religious organizations because of their perceived association with terrorism. Another said that youth are finding the religious approach increasingly prohibitive. Yet another said that people are tired of being disappointed by empty promises made by political religious organizations leading up to elections. Additionally, a few respondents argued that the population is increasingly skeptical of charity as a solution to socioeconomic problems, instead favoring programs that emphasize their rights to a decent living.

Contestation between LHROs and Religious Organizations

Many respondents openly stated that “LHRO’s are not only in competition but in rivalry with religious organizations.” Several respondents described religious organizations as spreading propaganda against rights groups. According to one, religious extremists say that human rights are associated with

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175 GB-006-2011
177 GB-024-2011
178 GB-004-2011
179 GB-004-2011
182 GB-016-2011
183 GB-001-2011
184 GB-011-2011
185 GB-001-2011
186 GB-024-2011
188 GB-014-2011
the ills of society, such as prostitution. Another said that religious organizations open women’s centers to combat the message of LHROs. A third described religious propaganda that LHROs, and specifically women’s rights organizations, have foreign agendas. A final respondent explained that Islamists work against LHROs by claiming they are against religion. Several respondents took serious issue with this last claim, arguing that LHROs are not against religion, but rather, that all people in Morocco are Muslim, so organizations should not use religion to promote their own narrow interests.

Many respondents portrayed LHROs as having a message that is superior to that of religious organizations. Unlike religious organizations that “deal with the population by creating dependence and blind loyalty,” LHROs empower the population, “teaching them their rights and ways to freedom as citizens.” As one respondent explained, “Today the average Moroccan is no longer fulfilled with a pound of sugar or a sack of flour…the rise of a human rights culture in Morocco has shown them that sugar and flour will not resolve their real socio-economic and political problems.” Although people may initially be attracted to the material benefits of religious organizations, some respondents described how people eventually grow disillusioned and turn to LHROs instead.

Going further, a few respondents also discussed how LHROs “try to undo what [religious organizations] do.” They perceive damage done by religious organizations, and so “we are behind to erase what they—religious organizations—do among our target population…we tell the women we work with that those religious organizations’ discourse does not correspond to our culture and that of our mothers.”

**Shared Values and Ideology**

Finally, we asked, “Do human rights organizations in Morocco work with these other organizations?” In order for their organizations to work in conjunction with others, many respondents (particularly those from Western-based organizations) explained that there needs to be a convergence in ideology and values of the organizations. For some, this ideological compatibility could be specific to certain issues or actions, while for most, a more global and systematic match in ideology is necessary for collaboration. Half of respondents explicitly stated that they do not work with organizations unwilling to embrace a human rights approach and their values of equality and democracy.

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189 GB-022-2011
190 GB-024-2011
191 GB-009-2011
192 GB-026-2011
195 GB-001-2011
196 GB-027-2011
197 GB-007-2011, GB-014-2011, GB-024-2011
199 GB-011-2011
Thus, most religious organizations were excluded from possible collaboration with LHROs, particularly because of their stances on women’s rights. One respondent described a fundamental lack of compatibility, saying, “Our society is split in two: the conservative and extremist regressive mentality on the one hand, and the democratic, human rights-oriented and progressive mentality on the other.” This means that “there is no collaboration with non-democratic organizations or parties nor with religious organizations, given the clear clash in the frame of reference.”

A few respondents provided more nuanced perspectives and would consider collaboration with Islamist organizations on very specific issues on which they could agree, such as political detention. Another respondent explained that her western-linked LHRO works in collaboration with organizations with a moderate religious discourse (such as working with the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs to reform the status of women), but not extremist, Islamist organizations. There were two respondents who reported that their LHROs worked with all social and political actors, including Islamist organizations, and another who said their organization would like to pursue broader collaborations with all actors in their issue area. One respondent distinguished between religious organizations that promote the “official discourse,” which is “tolerant and open,” and those that utilize “the extremist religious discourse, which we cannot work with at all.”

In contrast to their largely negative perceptions of compatibility with religious organizations, respondents reported that many other types of civil society organizations do share their values. They stressed the importance of these organizations collaborations. One respondent explained, “Except for political-religious organizations, which do not have a real interest in society’s sustainable development and democratization, Morocco needs all social and political actors and forces that work with democratic values yet anchored in local traditions and culture.” Because of this common ground, their LHROs are able to engage in partnerships with such organizations.

**Complementary Relationships with NGOs**

Respondents were quite unified in glowing descriptions of constructive collaborations with progressive social and political actors, particularly emphasizing positive working relationships with local development NGOs. One respondent asserted, “Coalition work is in vogue in Morocco.” Not only are collaborations possible, but “without alliances we cannot become a force of proposition and pressure.” Respondents talk of the importance of their “work in collaboration with development and local NGOs to reach the masses,” because “on our own it wouldn’t work.” Each organization

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203 GB-026-2011
204 GB-010-2011
205 GB-030-2011
206 GB-019-2011, GB-030-2011
207 GB-017-2011
208 GB-013-2011
210 GB-007-2011
211 GB-030-2011
212 GB-029-2011
213 GB-006-2011
mobilizes a particular part of the population, varying with their respective missions and means, complementing one another’s work. For them, one type of organization is not necessarily more effective than any other, but LHROs, development organizations, and other types of local NGOs each have their own strengths.

LHROs’ “field partnerships” with local development organizations are especially important to respondents, as such organizations have access to and a presence in local communities, taking “a local approach based on local needs and specificity.” Working with such groups allows penetration into rural areas, which would otherwise be difficult for urban-based LHROs to achieve. A few LHROs work across Morocco by operating local branches, but many rely on collaborative work with local organizations.

In return, LHROs provide training in the human rights approach, advocacy efforts, and long-term solutions to socioeconomic inequalities. Respondents emphasized that LHROs and local NGOs “play complementary roles,” with the LHRO “focusing on the advocacy level while the NGO focuses on proximity activities.” From respondents’ perspectives, just as the LHROs need the local development organizations, “there is a very strong complementarity between human rights and development work,” and the LHRO contributions are necessary as they “help implement development projects by integrating a human rights approach.” While the local NGOs help activists cover more ground, the LHRO “brings them the rights-based dimension.”

Although collaborations between LHROs and local civil society organizations were described most often, some respondents did also mention partnerships with both local and regional HROs, democratic political parties, and government ministries.

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215 GB-002-2011
216 GB-007-2011
217 GB-010-2011
220 GB-010-2011
221 GB-016-2011
222 GB-013-2011
223 GB-007-2011
Summary

In speaking directly with a representative sample of LHROs in Rabat and Casablanca, we found a level of confidence and optimism about their work. They see human rights discourse as widely resonant among the general population, as long as their ideas are connected to concrete actions and translated into locally meaningful terms. Although they perceive some barriers to the spread of a human rights culture, they generally see the situation as improving.

LHROs largely rely on funding from foreign sources, though they perceive that their organizations would be resilient in the face of cuts to aid, because of the spirit of volunteerism and activism that pervades human rights work. Local funds, however, are not fully utilized and access to such money is often skewed in favor of larger organizations and those with political connections.

Human rights professionals perceive their organizations as in direct competition with religious organizations, which they describe as extremely effective at grassroots mobilization. They see their values as fundamentally incompatible with most religious organizations, but they enthusiastically seek complementary relationships with other organizations, particularly local development NGOs.
Part III:  
Public Opinion in Rabat, Casablanca, and their Rural Environs

The previous section provided a self-evaluation from LHRO workers, and Part III checks these perceptions against the broader public’s ideas about human rights and LHROs.

Methodological Overview

We surveyed 1,100 total respondents in September and October 2012, with 800 from the urban areas of Rabat and Casablanca and 300 from the rural areas within a 70 to 80 kilometer radius of the two cities, as shown in Figure 3.1. We conducted the survey in conjunction with LMS-CSA, a leading Moroccan polling firm. The sample is a proportional stratified random sample, which is not nationally representative, but is representative of the regions included in the sample.

The area was divided into Primary Sampling Points (PSP), based on the smallest, well-defined geographic units for which reliable population figures were available. To obtain a proportional sample, we randomly selected PSPs in Casablanca, Rabat, and the rural areas. Within each selected PSP, two working areas were randomly selected using Google maps. Teams of investigators traveled to each working area, began from a fixed and recognizable starting point (such as a gas station or mosque), then followed a specified route to systematically select potential households.

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227 PSPs corresponded to administrative divisions of districts, municipalities, and “commune rurales.”
228 Investigators attempted to contact a selected household three times before selecting a substitute household.
Within a selected household, the interviewer randomly selected a potential interview respondent, with a gender quota ensuring a balance of men and women. Interviews were conducted in the respondent’s home, in Moroccan Arabic, using pencil and paper, lasting an average of 21 minutes. The final questionnaire included 42 questions, which had been revised to incorporate feedback from the local survey firm, pilot surveys, and the interviewer training process. Most questions had fixed-choice responses, with two items being completely open-ended.

We contacted 3,349 households, for an overall 33% response rate. After accounting for ineligible cases (such as nobody being at home, being unable to access the household because of security, the respondent being unavailable, or the housing unit being uninhabited), the rate of participation in the survey was about 57%, while the rate of refusal was about 27%. For details, see Appendix D.

**Respondent Characteristics**

Key socio-demographic characteristics are highlighted in Table 3.1. The sample was nearly gender-balanced, with an average age of 38 years. Respondents’ household monthly income was, on average, between $2,000 and $3,000 and just over a third felt their income could cover their monthly expenses. About 60% of respondents did not have higher than a primary education and nearly half did not work outside their homes. Most respondents self-identified as Arab. Respondents were highly religious, which they expressed through daily personal prayers more often than attending mosque. Finally, most respondents did not support a political party and just over half did not vote in the last general election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>52% female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>38 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>18-82 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Household Income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $2000</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2000 to $3000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $3000</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income range</td>
<td>$2,000-$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel their income can cover household expenses</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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229 The field team attended three days of training, which included learning the underlying objectives of the study and the rationale for each question, conducting simulations of the interviews, and training on the sampling methods.

230 Respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics are described in detail in Appendix E.

231 Weights were derived and applied to the survey data in order to correct imbalances in the sample on age and education level for the total sample and location for the rural sample. The weighting procedure used was the statistical technique of RIM weighting, using survey data from the 2004 Moroccan census. Details are available upon request. All the results presented describe the weighted sample.
### Human Rights Conditions in Morocco

*Adults in Rabat, Casablanca and their rural environs have a pessimistic view of current human rights conditions.*

We asked respondents to evaluate current Moroccan human rights conditions, replicating a World Values Survey question, “*How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in Morocco?*” Despite recent government reforms, respondents were largely skeptical of human rights protection, with only 9% stating that there was “a lot of respect” for human rights in the country, and over half saying that there was “no” (33%) or “not much” respect (20%). These findings are more pessimistic than the World Values findings from five years earlier.\textsuperscript{234}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{human_rights_conditions.png}
\caption{Most Respondents Say There is Little Respect for Human Rights in Morocco (N=1,048)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{232} These figures indicate the percentage of respondents who completed at least one year of education at each level; for example, 32% of respondents had completed at least one year of secondary school.

\textsuperscript{233} About 51% reported that they did not vote in the election. Additionally, about 2% reported, without prompting, that they annulled their vote.
Human Rights’ Resonance and Reach

Respondents were highly exposed to the term “human rights.” They had positive perceptions of both the concept of human rights and human rights organizations. Their face-to-face contact with both human rights workers and organizations, however, is low.

To assess respondents’ exposure to human rights language, we asked, “In your daily life, how often do you hear the term ‘human rights’?” Figure 3.3 indicates that respondents heard the term often, with over half reporting regularly hearing it in their lives.

Figure 3.3
Respondents Hear "Human Rights" Frequently in their Daily Lives (N=1,085)

“In your daily life, how often do you hear the term ‘human rights’?”

Figure 3.4
Few Respondents Had Met a Human Rights Worker (N=1,092)

“Have you ever met someone that works in a human rights organization?”

Few respondents, on the other hand, had met a human rights worker. Just 7% said “yes” when asked, “Have you ever met someone that works in a human rights organization?”

We found that not all individuals were equally exposed to human rights:

1. Respondents with more education heard “human rights” more often: While people with no formal education had about a 50% chance of hearing the term “daily” or “frequently,” those who finished secondary school had a 56% chance and those with the highest education had about a 63% chance.

234 This finding was different than that of the World Values Survey in 2007, which found that 7% thought there was a lot of respect for human rights, 58% thought there was some respect, 30% thought there was not much respect, and 5% thought there was no respect at all for individual human rights in Morocco. Most notably, respondents in our survey were much more likely to say there is no respect for human rights in present-day Morocco. See the World Values Survey for Morocco, available online at: http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalyzeQuestion.jsp. Accessed 3 April 2013.

235 These multivariate findings are statistically significant at the .10-level in an ordinal logistic regression. The model also includes measures of urban residence, income, and sex, none of which were significantly associated with exposure to “human rights” or meeting a human rights worker. For full results, see: Ron, James, David Crow, and Shannon Golden. 2014. “Human Rights Familiarity and Socio-Economic Status: A Four-Country Study.” Sur – International Journal on Human Rights, forthcoming.

236 Those with no formal education had a .50 predicted probability of hearing human rights daily or frequently; in other words, out of 100 respondents with no education, we would expect about 50 people to hear the term daily or frequently.
2. **Highly educated respondents were also more likely to have met a human rights worker:** Those with the most years of education were about eight times as likely to have met a human rights worker as those with no education (24% and 3%, respectively).

3. **Internet users were more likely to meet human rights workers:** Internet users had an 11% likelihood of meeting a human rights worker, compared to just 5% for non-internet users. Internet use, however, wasn’t associated with more frequent exposure to human rights language.

4. **Older people met human rights workers more:** As age increased, so did respondents likelihood of having met a human rights worker.

5. **Surprisingly, some socioeconomic factors didn’t matter:** Living in urban areas and having higher income levels was not significantly associated with greater exposure to human rights.

We asked respondents to evaluate the term “human rights,” requesting that they rank the extent to which they associated the term with other phrases: “*In your opinion, how strongly will you associate _____ with the term ‘human rights’?*” Although not all differences were statistically significant, as Figure 3.5 indicates, most respondents associated “human rights” with positive-sounding phrases.

**Figure 3.5**
Respondents Had Positive Associations with "Human Rights"

“In your opinion, how strongly will you associate _____ with the term ‘human rights’?”

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237 The differences between the categories in brackets in Figure 3.5 (and the figures that follow) are not statistically significant. All other differences in Figure 3.5 are statistically significant at the .05-level.
More specifically, as Figure 3.6 demonstrates, many respondents strongly associated human rights with “protecting women’s rights” (76%), “protecting people from torture and murder” (63%), “promoting socio-economic justice” (62%), and “promoting free and fair elections” (54%).

![Figure 3.6](image)

**Figure 3.6**
**Respondents Strongly Associated "Human Rights" with Positive Definitions**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents strongly associated with positive definitions of human rights](image)

As Figure 3.7 shows, however, a sizeable minority strongly associated human rights with less positive phrases: “promoting the interests of people in big cities” (38%), “promoting U.S. interests” (26%), and “promoting foreign values and ideas” (24%). A few strongly associated human rights with the most negative phrases: “not protecting or promoting anyone’s interests” (15%), “protecting criminals” (11%), and “protecting terrorists” (11%).

![Figure 3.7](image)

**Figure 3.7**
**Some Had Negative Associations with "Human Rights"**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents with negative associations with human rights](image)

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238 A strong association here refers to respondents who selected a 6 or 7 on the scale; a medium association refers to respondents who selected 3, 4, or 5; and a weak association refers to respondents who selected 1 or 2.
To probe further, surveyors read a list of adjectives and asked respondents to use an ascending, seven-point scale to specify the extent to which the words, in their view, described LHROs. The survey item stated, “I’d like you to tell me how much you associate non-governmental human rights organizations in Morocco with each of the following words.” As Figure 3.8 indicates, respondents were more likely to consider human rights groups as “brave,” “helpful,” and “trustworthy,” than as “elitist,” “corrupt,” or “useless.”

Most of these attitudes are directed towards the general idea of Moroccan rights groups, rather than specific, individual organizations. As Figure 3.9 demonstrates, slightly less than 30% were able to specify the name of a Moroccan HRO.

Figure 3.8
Respondents Think LHROs Are Brave and Helpful

Figure 3.9
A Minority of Respondents Could Name Specific LHROs (N=1,100)

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239 Although the difference between “trustworthy” and “helpful” was not significant (sig.=.221), all other differences were statistically significant at the .10-level.

240 We did not exclude responses that did not specify a correct name. Rather, our goal was to see how many respondents were willing, and able, to offer any kind of specific LHRO name.
Resourcing LHROs

Most respondents thought that LHROs are funded by Moroccan citizens and, to a lesser extent, by international organizations. Very few reported having ever donated money to a Moroccan LHRO.

When asked “In your opinion, where do you think that non-governmental human rights organizations in Morocco receive most of their funding from?” most respondents thought that the funding for LHROs came from Moroccan citizens (34%) or international organizations (30%). These figures must be interpreted cautiously, however, as the response rates for this question was low. Despite thinking that other Moroccan citizens donated to LHROs, only 1% of respondents reported having donated money themselves to these groups. Although this number is small, Figure 3.13 (below) suggests Moroccan LHROs may be attracting comparatively more donations than other civic organizations.

Trust in Local Rights Groups

LHROs are situated in the middle of respondents’ spectrum of trust in domestic institutions.

When asked, “Please tell me how much trust you would place on the following institutions, groups or persons,” respondents said the domestic actors they trusted most were the army, religious institutions, national police, and Prime Minister.241 Their least trusted institutions, by contrast, were the Assembly of Representatives, politicians, Moroccan NGOs, private companies, and banks. As Figure 3.11 indicates, trust in LHROs was situated between these extremes. We note, however, that the difference in the mean level of trust in Moroccan HROs and the general population is not statistically significant.242

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241 The new 2011 constitution describes the “head of government,” rather than the Prime Minister. As per Moroccan law, we were not permitted to ask respondents their opinions of the monarchy.

242 There is a statistically significant difference, however, in the mean levels of trust between Moroccan HROs and both the Prime Minister (sig.=.000) and banks (sig.=.000).
We found key characteristics associated with trust in Moroccan rights groups:

1. **Perceived international funding is associated with less trust in LHROs**: Respondents who thought rights groups received most of their funding from international organizations were about 8% less trusting of LHROs than those who thought funds came from Moroccan citizens.

2. **Local politics matter**: For each point increase (on the 7-point scale) in trust in politicians, there was a 15% decrease in trust in rights groups. Also, respondents with no political party affiliation were about 8% less trusting of LHROs.

3. **Those who trust the police also trust LHROs**: For each one point increase in trust in the police, there was an 11% increase in trust in rights groups.

4. **Living abroad is associated with lower LHRO trust**: Respondents who had lived outside Morocco were about 11% less trusting of domestic groups.

5. **Trust is highest among the middle class**: Compared to more poor or rich respondents, those in the middle of the income spectrum were most trusting of LHROs.

6. **Men were less trusting**: On average, male respondents trusted LHROs 8% less than females.

7. **Familiarity with the human rights movement did not increase trust**: Surprisingly, hearing “human rights” more often, meeting a human rights worker, and participating in HRO activities were not associated with greater trust.244

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Civic Participation and Donations

*Human rights organizations attract fewer participants than other civic groups, but may get more charitable donations than other civic groups.*

To explore civic engagement in formal organizations, we asked, “Could you tell me if you have participated in the activities of any of the following organizations?” Active participation in LHROs was one of the least common forms of participation (1%). Instead, those few respondents who were engaged at all mentioned political parties (3%), neighborhood associations (3%), or parents’ associations (3%). Organized civil society mobilizes few people, and LHROs mobilize even fewer.

![Figure 3.12](https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/WorldGivingIndex2012WEB.pdf)

**Figure 3.12**

Citizen Participation in LHROs is Low

“Could you tell me if you have participated in the activities of any of the following organizations?”

Moroccan LHROs did comparatively better with financial donations, however. We asked, “Have you ever donated money to any of the [se] organizations?” Only 6% reported having ever donated, but LHROs appear to have benefitted more than some others.

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244 The model also included a number of other variables, none of which were significantly associated with trust: internet usage, speaking a foreign language, number of trips abroad, urban residence, education, number of rooms in household, political party, voting behavior, ethnicity, and trust in the Prime Minister, the Assembly of Representatives, and the army.

245 The World Giving Index, based on 2011 data collected by the Gallup World Poll, found the same rate of charitable giving at the national level. Like our survey, however, the Gallup project did not ask specifically about participation in the Islamic *zakat*, and thus is likely to have grossly underestimated this key area of charitable activity. The World Giving Index also found that 6% of respondents in Morocco reported volunteering their time and 42% reported helping a stranger. See page 36 of the “World Giving Index 2012: A Global View of Giving Trends,” by Charities Aid Foundation, available at: [https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/WorldGivingIndex2012WEB.pdf](http://www.cafonline.org/PDF/WorldGivingIndex2012WEB.pdf). See also the Gallup World Poll, available at: [http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/en-us/worldpoll.aspx](http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/en-us/worldpoll.aspx). Accessed 23 March 2012.
Crucially, however, we likely missed an important source of charitable giving in Morocco: the Islamic zakat, or voluntary religious tax, typically 2.5% of wealth and assets. A 2012 Pew Research Center poll found that 92% of Moroccan Muslims engaged in the practice of giving zakat, suggesting that our survey—which asked only about donations to “religious organizations”—likely did not capture this phenomenon.

Views on International Human Rights Organizations

Respondents trusted LHROs more than their international counterparts, but trusted the latter more than any other international actor. Overall, fewer respondents had opinions about the different international actors, perhaps due to lack of familiarity.

Figure 3.13
Although Few Donate, LHROs May Get More than Others

*“Have you ever donated money to any of these organizations?”*

Figure 3.14
Respondents Trust Moroccan LHROs More than International HROs

*“Please tell me how much trust you would place on the following institutions, groups or persons...”*

Considering again popular trust in institutions, Figure 3.14 demonstrates that Moroccans in our target area trust domestic LHROs much more than the international variant.\footnote{247 There is a statistically significant difference in the mean levels of trust of international and domestic HROs (sig.=.000).}

Yet as Figure 3.15 indicates, respondents trusted international HROs \textit{more} than all other international actors in our survey. Although the differences in mean levels of trust are small, they are statistically significant.\footnote{248 There is a statistically significant difference in the mean levels of trust between international HROs and both international NGOs (sig.=.064) and the EU (sig.=.000).} However, given the low response rates to most questions about international actors, these results must be interpreted cautiously.

**Figure 3.15**

Respondents Trust International HROs More than Other International Actors

"Please tell me how much trust you would place on the following institutions, groups or persons..."

![Mean Level of Trust](chart)

To probe further, we evaluated how favorable respondents’ feelings were towards the well-known international HRO Amnesty International. Providing a list of international institutions, we asked, \textit{“On a scale of 0-100, with 0 being very unfavorable feelings, 100 being very favorable and 50 being neither a favorable nor unfavorable feelings, what are your feelings towards the following international organizations?”}\footnote{248 There is a statistically significant difference in the mean levels of trust between international HROs and both international NGOs (sig.=.064) and the EU (sig.=.000).}

Interpret these results too with caution, given low response rates. In fact, the response rate to our Amnesty question was particularly low; only 301 answered this question, offering a mean ranking of 44, suggesting limited name recognition within our target population. As Figure 3.15 suggests, those who did respond placed Amnesty slightly ahead of the Arab League and International Monetary Fund, but slightly below multinational corporations, the UN and EU. We note, however, that the differences in the
mean levels of support are not statistically significant between Amnesty and the IMF, multinational corporations, or the UN, as indicated by the box depicting statistical equivalence in Figure 3.16.\textsuperscript{249}

### Conclusions

Human rights workers in Morocco are generally self-confident and optimistic. They see human rights ideas as broadly resonate and explain that the situation is improving as government support grows, LHROs adopt a new focus on socioeconomic rights, and human rights work begins to focus more heavily on providing direct action in local communities. Although their organizations rely on foreign funds, human rights workers feel that volunteerism is the backbone of their movement. Rights groups often have contentious relationships with Islamist groups. These religious organizations have widespread appeal and mobilizing power, but LHROs see them as often working in opposition or spreading propaganda about human rights. Human rights workers are eager, on the other hand, to collaborate with other NGOs, seeing their contributions as complementary to those engaged in local development work.

In many ways, human rights workers’ optimism seems warranted. The public in Rabat, Casablanca, and their rural surroundings do hear human rights discourse and associate it with promoting women’s rights, socioeconomic justice, and freedom from torture and murder. They see LHROs as brave and helpful and report higher trust in local rights groups than their international counterparts. These generally positive perceptions, however, do not seem to translate into action and engagement. The public doesn’t know human rights workers or organizations and doesn’t participate in or donate to their activities. This suggests, perhaps, that the ground is fertile for the growth of human rights work in Morocco, but the sector has not yet developed strong local roots.

\textsuperscript{249} There is a statistically significant difference, however, in the mean levels of support between Amnesty and both the Arab League (sig.=.001) and the EU (sig.=.002).
Appendices

Appendix A: Key Informant Descriptions

**Key Informant 1** is an activist and leader in Moroccan civil society, focused specifically on human rights. Key Informant 1 is a member of several organizations which seek to promote civil society, protect human rights, and encourage governmental transparency. Key Informant 1 currently works in microfinance. Interviewed January 2011.

**Key Informant 2** is a human rights activist and pioneer who helped to lead one of the first major human rights organizations in Morocco, beginning in the 1970s. Interviewed January 2011.

**Key Informant 3** is a human rights scholar, activist, and the current or former leader of several organizations. Key Informant 3 also works as a human rights expert and consultant with national and international institutions. Interviewed December 2010.

**Key Informant 4** is a lawyer, public speaker, and human rights activist. Key Informant 4 has been involved in Moroccan human rights issues since the 1960s, founding and leading a prominent human rights organization, and was formerly a political prisoner. Interviewed January 2011.

**Key Informant 5** is an activist, scholar, and leader focused on the promotion and protection of human rights in Morocco. Key Informant 5 is particularly engaged in working with the government to implement human rights reforms and protections. Interviewed December 2010.

**Key Informant 6** is a pioneer and activist focused on human rights with an emphasis on women’s and children’s rights. Key Informant 6 works on human rights issues in both Morocco and abroad, lecturing and publishing on women’s rights. Interviewed December 2010.
Appendix B: Rabat and Casablanca LHRO Sampling Methodology

The research team created the combined Rabat/Casablanca sampling frame of 56 LHROs (included in Appendix C), and interviewed representatives of 30 organizations (53%) from March to May 2011. We pooled these two cities’ LHROs because they are geographically close, and are often regarded as a single unit. Casablanca is Morocco’s financial capital and Rabat is its political capital.

Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: To be included in the sampling frame, organizations needed to be: legally registered entities; headquartered in the Rabat or Casablanca prefectures; not part of an international NGO; and contain the term “rights” (either in an international language or in the vernacular) in their mission statements or major activity descriptions.

Web-based Searches: 35 of the 56 Moroccan LHROs that fit the inclusion criteria had a Web presence. To locate them, we conducted the searches noted below, identified candidate NGOs, and verified that they fit our inclusion criteria through telephone or in-person contact. In a smaller number of cases, it was possible to verify inclusion through a Web investigation.

- Google search using the Arabic translation of “human rights organisations Morocco.” This did not generate additional organisations beyond those already identified.
- Search of www.tanmia.ma, an extensive database of 7492 Moroccan NGOs (as of February 2012), 663 of which are located in Casablanca, and 709 of which are in Rabat. We searched for all organizations in each city, as well as for all “human rights” groups in each city.

Key Informants: The president of the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH), shared their human rights group database, which we used to cross check our own draft list. The former president of l’Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines provided more suggestions, as did the president of la Ligue Marocaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme.

Sampling: We input the URLs of the 35 LHROs with a web presence into Issue Crawler on February 23, 2011, and conducted a crawl to identify 12 (21% of the sampling frame) “core” groups that received two or more incoming links from the other 34 URLs, and 23 (41%) “peripheral” groups that received one or less links from the other 34. To this, we added a third group of 21 groups (38%) with no web presence at all.

We then used a random number generator to select 30 organizations for inclusion in the sample,

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250 Morocco’s administrative map divides the country into 16 regions, which in turn are sub-divided into provinces (48) and prefectures (13). Provinces and prefectures are the second level of administrative division, the former referring to rural centers and the latter referring to urban centers or cities. Cities are further sub-divided into municipalities (communes) and districts (arrondissements) in certain metropolitan areas.
stratifying the sample according to the groups described above. Seven of the selected LHROs were “core” groups, 12 were from the “peripheral” category, and 11 were those with no web presence at all.

**Survey Instruments:** The research team had conducted similar interviews in Mexico. For this data collection, we translated the Mexico questionnaire into French and Arabic and conducted the interviews in both languages.

**Interview Duration:** The interviews lasted 67 minutes on average, with a range of 40 to 92 minutes, and a standard deviation of 17 minutes.

**Data Recording and Analysis:** The interviews were digitally recorded and are on file with the project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.

**Funding:** This data collection was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
## Appendix C: Rabat and Casablanca LHRO Sampling Frame

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al Wassit - Le Mediateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Amicale Marocaine des Handicapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Association ADALA-JUSTICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Association AMAL femmes en mouvement pour un avenir meilleur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Association Chouala pour l'éducation et la culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Association de Lutte Contre le Sida (ALCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Association des amis des centres de reforme et la protection de l'enfance</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Association Espam pour la Protection des Personnes Agées au Maroc (ESPAM)</td>
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<td>Association femmes pour l’égalité et la démocratie</td>
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<td>Association Manbar Al Mouak</td>
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<td>Association Marocaine d’Aide aux Enfants en Situation Précaire (AMESIP)</td>
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<td>Association marocaine de recherche et d’échange culturel</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Association Marocaine de soutien et d'aide aux handicapés mentaux AMSAHM</td>
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<td>Association Soleil pour le soutien des enfants affectés et infectés par le VIH/SIDA au Maroc</td>
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<td>Carrefour marocain des jeunes pour la modernité</td>
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<td>Centre d'Etudes en Droits Humains et Démocratie (CEDHD)</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Centre de Démocratie</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Centre Marocain des Droits de l'Homme</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Comité de Soutien à la Scolarisation des Filles Rurales</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Défi environnement - Tahaddi Baya</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Energie pour le développement Humain</td>
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<td>Numéro</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Espace Associatif</td>
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<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Espace des jeunes pour l'innovation et le développement</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Femme Action</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Femme Activité Physique et sport</td>
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<td>39.</td>
<td>Fondation marocaine pour le développement de l'handicape</td>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>Forum des alternatives Maroc</td>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>Forum Vérité et Justice (FVJ)</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>Institution Nationale de Solidarité avec les Femmes en Détresse- INSAF</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>Jossour Forum des Femmes Marocaines</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>La Voix de la Femme Amazighe</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>Ligue Démocratique des Droits des Femmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Ligue Marocaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Montada Al Mowatana-Citizenship Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Mountada azzahrae pour la femme marocaine</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>Mouvement Mouwatinoun</td>
</tr>
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<td>50.</td>
<td>Muntada Al Karama</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>Observatoire Marocain des Prisons</td>
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<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Observatoire marocain de l'intégration de la femme dans la vie politique</td>
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<td>53.</td>
<td>Organisation des libertés des médias et d'expression</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH)</td>
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<td>55.</td>
<td>Réseau Amazigh pour la Citoyenneté</td>
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<td>56.</td>
<td>Union pour l'Action Féminine (UAF)</td>
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</table>
Appendix D: Rabat and Casablanca Human Rights Perceptions Poll Survey Methodology

We conducted a poll of adult (at least 18 years old) Moroccan residents in collaboration with LMS-CSA, a Moroccan research firm. To obtain data consistent with the representative LHRO survey completed in 2011, we decided to conduct the survey in Rabat and Casablanca, their surrounding urban environs, and a smaller sample of rural municipalities within 80 kilometers of the two adjacent cities. With LMS-CSA’s expertise, we established the target of generating an urban sample of 800 and a rural sample of 300.

**Sampling**: LMS-CSA conducted a proportional stratified random sampling process for the urban and rural samples. Each of the two samples (urban and rural) were stratified according to two regions to be covered (Casablanca and Rabat - Salé, and Skhirat Temara), depending on the weight of their target population.

For the urban sample, the primary sampling units were local municipalities, the secondary sampling units were permanent landmarks within municipalities, and the tertiary sampling units were the households and individuals within municipalities. Casablanca had 25 primary sampling units and Rabat had 16. For the rural sample, the primary sampling units were rural municipalities, the secondary sampling units were mosques within the municipalities, and the tertiary sampling units were households and individuals. The survey firm randomly selected each sample unit and conducted no more than 30 interviews per urban municipality and no more than 12 interviews per rural municipality.

Potential respondents needed to be at least 18 years old and live in the selected household at least six months of the year.

**Interviewing**: The local field research team consisted of three investigators: two interviewers and one team lead. Interviewers conducted six to eight interviews per day. The team lead supervised the sampling process and monitored the quality and consistency of the interviews. After pilot testing the questionnaire in September 2012, interviewers conducted interviews in Arabic and French in October 2012. The survey questionnaire consisted of 31 questions, and ranged in length from 14 to 41 minutes. Trained survey analysts entered the data, and their supervisors employed a variety of oversight methods to ensure accuracy and reliability.

For more details on the sampling, data entry, weighting process, or the survey instrument, a full methodological report is available from the authors upon request.

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251 The urban samples were specifically taken from Grand Casablanca Casablanca, Mohammedia, Médiouna and Nouasseur and Rabat - Salé - Skhirat and Témara.

252 Given the high degree of urbanization in the two targeted regions of study, we expanded the geographic scope of the investigation and included among the eligible sampling points some “communes rurales” which, administratively speaking, do not belong to the targeted urban regions but lie within a radius of 70-80 km from the main cities (Casablanca, Rabat, Salé, and Skhirat Temara). The selection of rural sampling points was compiled using road maps of the neighboring regions of Casablanca, Rabat-Salé-Skhirate-Temara.
Appendix E: Characteristics of Human Rights Perceptions Poll Respondents

Socioeconomic Status

There were 1,100 respondents in the public opinion poll, with 800 sampled from urban regions and 300 from rural regions. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents are described below. As Table E.1 illustrates, about half of the sample was female. The mean age was approximately 38 years old. The typical household made between $2,000 and $3,000 a month, combined income of all individuals who work. Just 16% of respondents had completed secondary school. A small number of respondents had lived outside Morocco, with about half of those being for work. Most respondents had not traveled outside Morocco, either. Most respondents had a cell phone, rather than a home telephone. About a quarter of respondents reported using the Internet. Excluding their kitchen and bathroom, respondents typically had about three rooms in their homes.

Table E.1
Respondent Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>52% female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>38 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>18-82 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly household income range (median)</td>
<td>$2,000-$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary education or above</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived outside Morocco</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelled outside Morocco</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of trips outside Morocco (mean)</td>
<td>1 trip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has home telephone</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has cellular/mobile phone</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms in home (mean)</td>
<td>3 rooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses the internet</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a day</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

253 All percentages reported represent valid percent, meaning missing values or non-applicable responses are excluded in calculating the percentage. The data presented is weighted to adjust the sample to the Moroccan population on age and education within the urban and rural samples, respectively.

254 According to the CIA World Factbook, the median age in Morocco is 27.3 years. The median age of survey respondents here is 36 years old; the survey only included adults. CIA World Factbook figures apply to the entire Moroccan population, so certain discrepancies in these comparisons are expected. See “Morocco,” CIA World Factbook, accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html, on 25 March 2013.

255 The GDP (PPP) per capita for Morocco in 2012 was $5,300. CIA World Factbook, op. cit.

256 In 2011 there were about 36.6 million cell phones in Morocco; with a 2013 national population of 32,649,130 people, this figure indicates most of the population has at least one cell phone line. There were also about 3.7 million telephone lines in Morocco in 2011. CIA World Factbook, op. cit.

257 In 2009 there were about 13.2 million internet users, or about 40% of the population. CIA World Factbook, op. cit.

258 This is not a valid percent, but rather indicates that 14% of the total sample reported using the internet at least once a day.
Respondents were asked, “What was your main activity last week?” About 37% currently were working (this includes respondents who did not happen to be working the previous week, but do usually) while 47% stayed at home, 8% were students, and about 5% were seeking work but were currently unemployed.\(^{259}\)

Respondents who worked outside the home were asked, “What activity is the institution or company you work for involved in?” As indicated in Figure E.2, of respondents who worked, about 22% worked in commerce and another 22% worked in industry. A significant minority also worked in non-commerse service industries, in the public sector, and in farming.\(^{260}\)

\(^{259}\) The 2012 unemployment rate in Morocco was 8.8%. CIA World Factbook, \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{260}\) In 2006, the labor force in Morocco was 44.6% agriculture, 19.8% industry, and 35.5% services. CIA World Factbook, \textit{op. cit.} Rural areas are underrepresented by design in our sampling strategy, so it is expected that the level of participation in agriculture is lower than the national level.
Next, respondents were asked, "With the total family income, which statement best describes your income status...?" Most respondents felt that their household income did not adequately cover their living expenses, and just about 4% reported that their income allowed them to have enough left over for savings.\textsuperscript{261}

As mentioned above, about 60% of respondents did not go beyond a primary education. About 29% of the sample reported having no formal education, and just about 8% reported any university education.

\textsuperscript{261} In 2007, 15% of the population in Morocco was living below the poverty line. CIA World Factbook, \textit{op. cit.}
Ethnicity and Language

When given the options of Arab, Berber (Amazigh), or Arab-Berber, the majority of the sample (about 84%) self-identified as Arab.\textsuperscript{262}

Expectedly, all respondents could speak Moroccan Arabic (Darija). Additionally, however, about 40% of respondents could speak classical Arabic, about 35% spoke French, and 15% spoke Berber.

Religious Practice and Salience

Like 99% of the population of Morocco, the survey respondents were Muslim.\textsuperscript{263} On average, respondents went to the mosque for daily prayers or Friday prayer one to two times per month. There was considerable variation, however, as over a third of respondents reported attending more than once a week, but close to half (about 48%, combined) reported attending rarely or never.\textsuperscript{264}  

\textsuperscript{262} About 99% of the population in Morocco is Arab-Berber and 1% is “other” ethnicity. CIA World Factbook, \textit{op. cit.}  
\textsuperscript{263} About 99% of the population of Morocco is Muslim, 1% is Christian, and 6,000 people are Jewish. CIA World Factbook, \textit{op. cit.} The local survey team advised that asking religious identity was a sensitive topic and our sampling was unlikely to pick up any Christians or Jews. As such, interviewers did not ask about religious preference.  
\textsuperscript{264} This is consistent with previous survey data. According to the Pew Research Center, 28% of Muslims in Morocco attend mosque more than once a week and 26% attend once a week for prayer. See http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment.aspx#mosque for more information. Accessed 23 March 2013.
Although many respondents did not attend mosque frequently, respondents typically reported praying at least once a day. Aside from prayers at the mosque, the vast majority of respondents (85%) said they pray several times each day.\(^\text{265}\)

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\(^{265}\) This finding is also consistent with the Pew Research Center, which found 67% of Muslims in Morocco reported praying all five daily prayers. See [http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment.aspx#prayer](http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment.aspx#prayer). Accessed 23 March 2013.
Similarly, respondents reported that religion was highly salient in their lives. When asked, “On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means not at all important and 10 very important, could you tell me how important religion is in your life?” about 96% of respondents chose 10, the highest category. The mean rank of the importance of religion in respondents’ lives was 9.9.

**Political Orientation and Participation**

To determine political affiliation, respondents were asked, “Regardless of the party you voted for, do you normally consider yourself as a supporter of [which party]?” The majority of respondents (61%) did not identify with any political party; of those who did, the majority (27% of the total) identified with the Justice and Development Party. Among those who did identify with a particular political party, there was not much variation in the strength of their support. Respondents who did identify with a party were

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266 Once again, this is consistent with the data collected by Pew Research Center, finding that 89% of Muslims in Morocco reported that religion is very important in their lives. See [http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment.aspx#importance](http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-2-religious-commitment.aspx#importance). Accessed 23 March 2013. Similarly, the World Values Survey asked, “How important is God in your life?” On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being “very important,” 88% choose 10. See the World Values Survey, available online at: [http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalyzeQuestion.jsp](http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalyzeQuestion.jsp). Accessed 21 April 2013.
asked, “Would you say your support for this party is strong or somewhat strong?” For all political parties, 65 to 76% of respondents who identified with the party reported strong support for the party.

As one measure of political engagement, respondents were asked, “It is known that some people were unable to vote the day of the elections. Did you vote in the parliamentary elections of November 2011?” Respondents were nearly equally split in whether or not they voted in the most recent general election. About 47% reported voting, while 51% did not vote. Although the option was not given while administering the survey, about 2% of respondents volunteered that they annulled their vote in the election.

Survey participants were asked to rank their political orientation on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning the political left and 10 being the political right. Most people were unsure about this question, and 57% of respondents said they did not know where their political orientation fell on this scale. Of those who did respond, most clustered around the middle values (5 or 6) or at the very ends of the spectrum. The mean value was 5.5.

Figure E.11
Respondents were Most Likely to See their Political Orientation as Moderate (N=219)