Local Resources for Local Rights?

The Mumbai Fundraiser’s Dilemma

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Abstract

Local human rights organizations (LHROs) in the global South are increasingly keen to raise funds from co-citizens and local businesses to diversify their funding, increase their political legitimacy, and bolster their resilience to fluctuations in international donor trends. This concern with local funds has assumed new urgency today following the global governmental crackdown on foreign aid to domestic civil society. This article focuses on the potential for local human rights fundraising in Mumbai, one of India’s most important economic centers, as well as a hub of social movements and human rights organizing. Like other governments, India’s has launched a crackdown on foreign aid to local NGOs. Interviews with a representative sample of Mumbai’s LHRO leaders indicates that they depend on foreign aid, worry about government regulation, and are keen to raise funds from the city’s booming corporate sector. Our representative survey of 1680 adults living in Mumbai and its rural environs, however, shows that LHRO fundraising among Mumbai businesses could pose an acute reputational challenge. While LHROs do enjoy some public support, the public’s trust in these groups is statistically associated with greater mistrust in local businesses. LHRO leaders in Mumbai face a critical dilemma: the city’s booming corporate sector presents a tempting fundraising target, but any attempt to access these funds risks undermining the local rights sector’s reserves of public support.
1. Introduction

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) addressing human rights concerns in the global South often depend on money from sources in the global North (Berkovitch & Gordon 2008; Lawrence & Dobson 2013; Okafor 2006; AUTHORS). Local human rights organizations (LHROs) in the developing world are keen to raise more funds from co-citizens and local businesses, however, seeking to diversify their funding base, strengthen their political legitimacy, and bolster their resilience to fluctuations in international donor trends. In Africa, one local activist recently urged NGOs to “work harder to raise local funds” (Ojigho 2014) while another writes that the “time has come for African rights groups to look for local [financial] solutions” (Vandyck 2014). The problem with the current global human rights funding model, a third writes, is that “it’s hard to truly care about someone else’s problems when they are located far away, and when their suffering doesn’t impact you immediately and directly” (Ibe 2014). Consequently, “it is we Southerners who must fund the human rights work we want to do within our own regions.”

Activists living in Brazil, Israel, India, Palestine, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Mexico, and elsewhere voice similar concerns (Pannunzio 2014; Mendonça 2014; Ben-Sasson 2016; Ananthapadmanabhan 2013; Murad 2014; Legjeem 2015; To 2016; Barry 2015; Ibe 2014).

This concern for “local funds for local rights” assumes new urgency given the global governmental crackdown on foreign aid to domestic civil society (Christensen & Weinstein 2013; Mendelson 2015; Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014). Scholars chart a worldwide “pushback” against externally supported NGOs in low and middle-income countries, showing these new laws are driven by political considerations. As domestic rulers seek to bolster their political standing following nationally competitive elections, they restrict foreign aid to local NGOs to curb their autonomy and limit their support to domestic political challengers (Dupuy et
al. forthcoming). Leaders worldwide have internalized the lessons taught by a generation of transnational activists and scholars (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Wapner 1996; Carpenter 2014; Bob 2005; Hertel 2006). They realize that local NGOs are crucial political players in domestic and transnational politics, and recognize that dependence on foreign aid is these groups’ Achilles heel.

This article focuses on the potential for local human rights fundraising in Mumbai, one of India’s largest and most important economic and cultural centers. Like many other governments, India’s has recently launched a crackdown on foreign aid to locally operating civil society. These restrictions are not new, however. Delhi first passed the “Foreign Contributions Regulation Act” (FCRA) in 1976 during a national state of political emergency, seeking to curtail external aid to domestic challengers. The authorities tightened those rules further in 1985 and 2010, and in 2014, following the national election of BJP party leader Narendra Modi, cracked down even harder. The argument, according to Modi and others, is that foreign-funded domestic groups interested in human rights, the environment, and related causes are undermining the country’s economic development.¹

Although our interviews with LHRO leaders in Mumbai were conducted in 2010 and 2011—three years prior to the latest Indian government crackdown on foreign aid to local NGOs—most respondents were keenly aware of existing FCRA-related restrictions. Many, moreover, were eager to develop their local fund raising capacities. As one LHRO leader told us, “access to foreign funds is becoming difficult… so, very definitely, organizations are looking [for] Indian sources of funding.”² This interest in local funding is nothing new for Indian civil society, as it builds on a concern for self-reliance dating back at least to the country’s decolonization struggles. As one commentator notes, “Even in the direst of circumstances, [independence leader
Mahatma Gandhi followed a strategy that focused on self-reliance” (Dupuy et al. 2015). Still, LHRO leaders in Mumbai are increasingly committed to pursuing local funds.

Many LHRO leaders are also keen to explore fund raising with Mumbai’s booming business community, referred to locally as the “corporates.” As one Mumbai LHRO leader explained, “There is a lot of corporate funding available and we are looking for those sources…” These plans make sense, given that Mumbai’s business sector is one of India’s most vigorous, is located in one of the country’s wealthiest cities (Parilla et. al. 2015; Clark & Moonen 2014; Directorate of Economics and Statistics 2015), and is increasingly interested in corporate social responsibility, in part due to a 2013 federal law requiring large businesses to donate to charitable causes.

Our representative survey of 1680 adults living in Mumbai and its rural environs, however, suggests that any attempt at LHRO fundraising with Mumbai’s corporates will pose a series of reputational risks. Although local rights groups do enjoy some public support, trust in LHROs is statistically associated with greater mistrust in local businesses, controlling for other factors. The reasons for this association, we believe, are two-fold. First, many of Mumbai’s local rights groups have emerged from the leftwing strand of Indian political organizing, much of which is skeptical of corporate actors at global and national levels. Second, successive governments have portrayed human rights actors in India as the enemies of economic growth, influencing the public’s perception of these organizations. Contrary to the fears of some Marxist scholars, in other words, “human rights” in Mumbai is not identified with individualism, property rights, and capital, but rather with collectivist, leftwing politics opposed to untrammeled capitalist growth.
This association between trust in LHROs and mistrust in Indian corporates creates a dilemma for Mumbai’s rights groups. Although the city’s booming business sector offers exciting opportunities for local fund-raising, any concerted attempt to access these funds could undermine the public’s trust in their organizations. As such, Mumbai’s human rights groups do not face the same opportunities enjoyed by groups such as the New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW), which regularly and unapologetically raises funds from U.S. business leaders. In Mumbai, human rights fund-raising among the titans of business would likely be a serious reputational liability.

2. Background: Mumbai’s business and non-profit sectors

Mumbai, India’s financial, commercial and cultural capital, has a GDP of over 150 billion dollars, the country’s second highest (Parilla et. al. 2015). Before and during British rule, Mumbai’s economic prowess rested on its status as the subcontinent’s leading port and textile-manufacturing center; post-independence, the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, along with a burgeoning informal sector, became Mumbai’s new drivers of growth. Over the last 25 years, the city’s economy has shifted from trade and manufacturing to one based on services, leading to even greater comparative and absolute growth. As a result, Mumbai is home to many domestic and international banks, insurance companies, the national stock exchange, and thousands of domestic corporations, including some of India’s largest conglomerates, such as Reliance Industries, the Tata Group and the Aditya Birla Group. Mumbai also is headquarters to many of India’s largest companies (as per the Forbes Global 2000), well ahead of any other Indian city; its ports handle over a third of India’s foreign trade. Mumbai-based firms supply nearly 60% of India’s customs duties along with 40% of its income tax revenues (Clark &
Many wealthy individuals have made Mumbai their home, including the chairman of Reliance Industries, Mukesh Ambani, whose net worth is reportedly USD 21 billion (Forbes 2016).

Mumbai is also a center of social movement and non-profit organizing, however, with a plethora of groups engaging in service provision and advocacy. Some of these groups and movements label their activities in “human rights” terms. Organizing in explicit “human rights” terms began in India during the 1970s, following electoral fraud and the government’s declaration of a national state of emergency, and most of the country’s first formal rights groups focused on returning the country to electoral democracy (Patel 2010; Ray 2003). In the 1980s, the number of human rights groups increased; some continued to focus on liberal political rights, but others identified more closely with leftist social and political struggles (Gudavarthy 2008). By the 1990s, experts could discern three broad, non-mutually exclusive LHRO sub-types in India: 1) issue-specialized social movements and their associated NGOs working for the rights of women, Dalits, and the environment; 2) LHROs addressing communal tensions, minorities, and inter-group violence; 3) LHROs focused on protecting individuals and communities from the challenges of economic liberalization and globalization. All of these subtypes continued to thrive in the new millennium and achieved a number of successes, including legal support for citizens’ right to information, education, food, and to the sexual preference of their choice.

Mumbai’s non-profit rights sector has developed along similar lines. In the late 1970s and 1980s, most of the city’s LHROs focused on civil liberties, while in the 1980s, in response to planned slum evictions, many focused on the rights of slum and pavement dwellers. Mumbai also became a hub of women’s rights activism in those years, and other LHROs focused on justice for victims of the 1992-3 communal riots. More recently, the Ration Kriti Samiti (RKS)
network of Mumbai and Maharashtra-based organizations has tried to galvanize activism around inequities in public food distribution. Other Mumbai rights groups focus on all manner of specific issues, including the right to education, health, information, and the rights of LGBT individuals.

Over time, many in the Indian human rights community self-identify – and are identified by others - as part of the broader Indian political left, much of which has mobilized against the country’s market-oriented reforms over the last 25 years. As India has opened up its markets and resources to foreign investors and imports, the country’s corporate sector has aggressively pursued globalization, with particular emphasis on Mumbai (Patel 2003: 17-22). The political left has warned against this integration into global capitalism, arguing that it will increase domestic inequalities, strip citizens of their access to basic entitlements, and undermine the country’s commitment to the poor and lower middle class (Roy 2014; Basavarajappa 2014). Moreover, Indian rights groups, along with other organizations using rights-related rhetoric, have long been at the forefront of social movement struggles against assorted mega-development projects (Khagram 2004). Some have worked for the rights of people displaced by large hydroelectric dams, others oppose nuclear power plants, corruption and violation of environmental laws, and still others challenge the government’s takeover of property for sale or lease to developers, mining companies, and others. In Mumbai, where government, real estate developers and investors are particularly eager to accelerate growth, LHROs are increasingly focused on protecting the rights of the city’s many slum and pavement dwellers.

Successive Indian governments have long criticized domestic rights groups for joining the country’s anti-development alliance, and these criticisms escalated after Prime Minister Modi’s election in 2014. For example, not long after the new administration came into office, a
leaked internal report by the country’s Intelligence Bureau alleged that protests against
development projects were being fueled by foreign NGOs such as Greenpeace, Amnesty and
ActionAid. These protests, the bureau claimed, had slowed the country’s economic growth
considerably (Mashru 2014). 11 Prime Minister Modi has expressed particular concern over
India’s “five-star activists” funded from abroad, and has encouraged the Ministry of Home
Affairs to revoke the FCRA permits of many NGOs (Sharma & Sharma 2015; Tripathi 2015). As
one commentator put it, the “rhetoric against [Indian and foreign NGOs] has become rooted,…
Judgments about who can be trusted to mean well for India, and who cannot, have become a
crucial part of government policy” (Subramanian 2015).

To be sure, previous governments shared many of these sentiments, including the
government of the day in 2010-11, when we conducted our interviews with Mumbai’s LHRO
leaders, and in 2012-13, when we conducted our survey of the Mumbai public. In fact, it was the
previous Congress-led government that had commissioned the secret Intelligence Bureau report
in the first place, passed the more stringent 2010 version of the country’s FCRA law, and in
2012, criticized foreign funded NGOs as “not fully appreciative of the development challenges”
in India (Raj 2012). In 2013, the Congress government suspended the FCRA permit of the Indian
Social Action Forum – a network of 700 NGOs and peoples’ movements working on various
human rights issues (Lakshmi 2013).

3. The Mumbai LHRO Leader Sample

To learn more about funding for Mumbai’s LHROs, we identified 57 registered rights
groups in the year 2010, using extensive online searches, key informant interviews, and
telephone verification. 12 Each of these groups mentioned the word “rights” in their title, mission
statement, or in a description of at least one of their major activities. We then randomly chose 30 (52% of the total) for semi-structured, face-to-face interviews averaging 66 minutes, in English or Hindi. As Table 1 shows, most LHROs offered a senior staff member for interview, the majority of which were highly educated. Although these groups were scattered across the city, many were headquartered in the wealthier southern part of the city, where law firms, the High Court, and Maharashtra State headquarters cluster. The groups reported a median staff size of 50, of whom 67%, on average, were paid (the remainder was voluntary).

Table 1: LHRO Leader and Organization Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>43% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (mean)</strong></td>
<td>51 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended university</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>For at least four years</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position at LHRO</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years at current LHRO (median)</td>
<td>12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior staff position</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-related international trips in past five years</td>
<td>0.5 trips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had not taken a work-related international trip</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LHRO Establishment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (median)</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1993</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1993-2000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2001-2010</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LHRO Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid staff (mean)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (median)</td>
<td>50 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom third</td>
<td>1-15 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LHRO Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive government funding</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive foreign funding</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many of the LHROs in our sample combined service provision with human rights advocacy, indicating they were participants in the “rights based approach” to development, an
increasingly popular trend as of the late 1990s (Kindornay et al, 2012). Half were founded prior to 1990, indicating that Mumbai’s non-governmental rights sector is relatively well established.\footnote{15}

4. The Political Economy of Mumbai’s LHROs

Given political sensitivities, we did not ask LHRO leaders directly about their finances. Instead, we asked, “In your view, what percentage of HR organizations in Mumbai receive substantial funding from foreign donors such as Europe or Japan?” Although some said they “didn’t know,” almost half estimated that “most” Mumbai rights groups received “substantial” foreign funding (see Figure 1). And in response to a second question, 67% reported that their own groups were receiving foreign funds of some kind at the time of interview.

![Figure 1: Respondents Believe that Most LHROs Receive Substantial Foreign Funding (N=30)](image)

"In your view, what percentage of HROs in India receive substantial funding from foreign donors such as Europe or Japan?"

To probe further, we asked, “If foreign funding for human rights work in Mumbai was cut off, would local human rights activities collapse entirely, collapse somewhat, stay the same, grow somewhat, or grow a lot?” Over half (58%) responded that local rights activities would
collapse “somewhat” or “entirely.” As one leader noted, “Organizations won’t shut down, but their total manpower, their activit[ies], their number of programs, the kind of qualitative impact they are able to make will definitely get adversely affected.” 16 Or as another explained, organizations would have to find new sources of funding, or close down. After all, “nobody will work for free.” 17 Although these findings only capture LHRO leader perceptions, they are the best estimates available of the LHRO sector. Indeed, the only systematic study of Mumbai NGOs overall – conducted with representatives of 67 groups in 1994 – also found that two-thirds of sampled organizations received foreign funding, and that domestic funding comprised only a small portion of total funding (Desai 1999).

Both scholars and activists argue that India’s strict regulations on foreign aid to civil society (the FCRA rules) give officials the tools they need to weaken organizations deemed threatening (Sen 1992; Nair 2013). Indeed, some claim that the government routinely denies FCRAs to almost all NGOs in politically sensitive states, such as Jammu and Kashmir (Jalali 2008: 176-179). As discussed above, the Modi government – elected in 2014 – did not change the FCRA rules themselves; instead, it began enforcing them more rigorously. It revoked some groups’ FCRA permits, froze other NGOs’ foreign exchange accounts, and put some international donors on a watch list so as to better scrutinize their local activities (Bidwai 2015; Najar 2015).

Although Mumbai is located in Maharashtra State, not one of the country’s most politically sensitive, several LHRO leaders told us they had a hard time obtaining an FCRA permit. This was particularly true for groups that were smaller, had fewer personal connections to the Home Ministry, or that worked on issues of state accountability. As one LHRO leader explained, “There is a lot of pressure [and] surveillance from government sources… Not giving
[NGOs] an FCRA is one way of throttling an organization and throttling its campaigns and activities.”\textsuperscript{18} Officials have discretion over implementation of FCRA rules, subtly channeling foreign aid to less threatening groups and causes.

Given these challenges, Mumbai’s LHRO leaders told us they were interested in developing their local fundraising capacities. In fact, 70\% of the leaders we interviewed answered “yes” when asked whether local fund raising was “a possibility,” although 70\% also said that “very few” (43\%) or “some” (27\%) rights groups currently receive “substantial” local funding (See Figure 2). Most acknowledged that the local rights sector depended on foreign aid – only 13\% estimated that “most” groups received “most” of their funding from local sources – but many were frustrated at this state of affairs. The desire for local alternatives to foreign support was palpable.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Respondents Report Few LHROs Raise Significant Local Funds (N=30)}
\end{figure}

"In actuality, how many of India’s human rights groups raise substantial funds from local sources?"

I don't know (17\%)

Very few (43\%)

Most or all (13\%)

Some (27\%)
When asked to list potential local funders, LHRO leaders mentioned ordinary people living in the city (N=18) or “corporates” (N=17), the local term for Mumbai’s business sector; others listed local charitable foundations (N=7) or the government (N=12). Local fund raising was certainly possible, one leader explained, because charity has long been engrained in Indian culture. Muslims give a portion of their salary to zakat, Christians donate regularly to churches, and Hindus give to a wide range of charitable and religious institutions.19

Yet LHRO leaders also recognized that fund raising with individuals is difficult and resource intensive, requiring a large and well-trained staff. As one leader explained “[t]here are a lot of rich people who are willing to give money…they are happy getting an income tax exemption personally because they have donated money to an organization…but then, one needs to locate those people and be in touch with them, or else do a fundraising show [and] invite those people.”20 These efforts are even more resource-intensive when LHROs seek funds through direct mail, telephone, or one-on-one personal contact. As best we know, only one LHRO in Mumbai has successfully raised money from many local individuals – Child Rights and You (CRY). This group is uniquely placed to raise funds from individuals, however, as it received foreign support to build its local fundraising capacity (Mahal 2002: 111-112), and because its stated mission – helping Indian children – is politically innocuous and emotionally attractive.

Given the challenges of raising funds from individuals, some LHRO leaders said they hoped to raise money from local corporates, despite their sector’s long-established skepticism towards business. To be sure, many realized that corporate fundraising would be challenging, as most businesses prefer to focus on non-controversial issues and seek short-term, verifiable impacts; others realized that corporate funding could come with political strings attached. Still, many of the LHRO leaders we interviewed saw potential in Mumbai’s growing discourse
surrounding corporate social responsibility. As one explained, “Things in the funding scenario are changing now. We have a lot of local companies and… a lot of entrepreneurs are interested [in] corporate social responsibility...”21 Many Mumbai corporations are establishing charitable foundations and “adopting” NGOs.22 As another noted, “All major corporates [in Mumbai]…have their own foundations.” Some have long had charitable foundations, but today, “practically every corporate is [setting up] its own foundation.”23 And while many of these may shy away from contentious political issues, most would gladly consider less sensitive topics, even when framed in human rights terms. As one LHRO leader noted, “So long as it’s mainstream … groups fighting for … children’s rights or women’s rights, corporates would have no issues.”24 Or as another noted, some “clearly get [the rights-based approach],” and may even be willing to drop their focus on quantifiable outcomes. The “[t]hinking has changed,” he explained, and Mumbai’s corporations now understand “that they need to have a sustained contribution and involvement to show change…”26 Mumbai’s booming business sector, it seems, is an increasingly attractive fund raising target for the city’s rights activists.

The Indian government encourages corporate giving. In 2013, the federal government passed a bill requiring charitable donations for all companies of certain size; this legislation, which came into force in April 2014, is the first of its kind worldwide. The new law requires companies with a net worth of 5 billion rupees (USD 93 million), turnover of 10 billion rupees (USD 186 million), or a net profit of more than 50 million rupees (USD 0.93 million) to give 2% of their average net income to corporate social responsibility initiatives (Ministry of Corporate Affairs 2013). And while some corporations may channel these new funds through their own foundations, others are partnering with implementing organizations, including NGOs (Weeme 2015). The new law’s enforcement measures and impacts are still unclear, but its mere existence
is unprecedented and is likely to increase the pool of local money available to at least some of Mumbai’s LHROs.

Corporate fund raising in Mumbai is clearly of interest to some LHRO leaders. Although many have internalized their sector’s skepticism towards capitalism, they realize that the corporates offer a remarkable opportunity to escape their dependence on foreign donors. Our survey of the Mumbai public, however, suggests that any concerted LHRO fund raising effort of this sort has serious reputational risks, since the Mumbai public’s trust in LHROs is associated with greater mistrust in local business.

5. Public Trust in LHROs

To gauge the Mumbai public’s support for local rights organizations, we conducted multi-stage cluster sampling of 1680 adults aged 18 and over in December 2012 and January 2013. Our Indian survey partner, C-Voter, polled 1,380 Mumbai residents (including booster samples of roughly 150 Christians and 150 Buddhists), along with a booster sample of 300 rural residents in the surrounding Maharashtra State. Our enumerators conducted 51% of the interviews in Hindi and 49% in Marathi. Our primary sampling units were legislative assembly segments (Stage #1 of our multi-stage effort); within each of these, we randomly selected polling booth districts, our secondary sampling units (Stage #2). We then selected the first potential respondent from each booth’s electoral roll (Stage #3), and then selected additional persons to interview from that same electoral roll at pre-determined intervals (Stage #4). These interviews lasted 48 minutes, on average, with a range of 33-90 minutes. The response rate was 48%, and the estimated survey margin of error was +/- 2.5%. The poll is representative of adults living in Mumbai and rural Maharashtra State.
Our dependent variable in statistical analysis is *Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations*, scaled from 0, or “least trust,” to 1, or “most trust.” In the original question we asked for a four-point scale, but rescaled to 0-1 for statistical analysis. This variable aggregates responses to our question, *how much trust do you place in the following institutions, groups, or persons*, followed by a list of 16 international and domestic actors, including “Indian human rights organizations.” We systematically rotated the latter’s position among the other 15 options so as to avoid order bias or contaminating results through proximity to strongly liked, or disliked, institutions. Among our target population, average *Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations* in 2012-13 was 0.52, higher than the Mumbai public’s average trust in politicians (0.43); akin to its trust in the police (0.53); but lower than its trust in religious institutions (0.63) and the Indian army (0.63).

What does asking about “trust” really mean, however? Given the diversity of local rights groups and policy areas, can we really say anything meaningful about such an abstract concept? We believe so. Survey researchers have long grappled with analogous questions in other fields and have concluded, for the most part, that generalizing about abstractions such as “trust” can indeed be useful. Consider comparative democratization, where scholars routinely measure “satisfaction with democracy” (Crow 2010; Canache et al. 2001). One prominent interpretation argues that the concept is best thought of as a summary measure expressing the respondent’s overall judgment about democracy, into which different subcomponents enter with greater or lesser proportion (Clarke et al. 1993). “Satisfaction with democracy” is both conceptually and empirically useful because it predicts important forms of political participation, including voting and protest. Similar arguments apply to other intriguing measures, including “feeling thermometers” and “presidential approval” ratings in U.S. electoral studies (Wilcox et al. 1989;
Although both are polyvalent concepts, they have empirically definable content and meaningful statistical associations—including causal ones—with a variety of important outcomes, including electoral choices and legislative outcomes.

Reasoning analogously, “trust in local human rights organizations” is also a summary measure, a global judgment about the local rights sector as a whole. We can think of this summary measure as a weighted average of sorts, comprising different components. One of these is the type of organization that an individual respondent is thinking about, while another is the particular policy domain within which a given rights organization operates. Our research does not measure these specific components, but rather summarizes and encapsulates the respondents’ overall judgment of the organized, nongovernmental rights sector.

Another concern for this type of analysis is that we may, essentially, be measuring proclivity to trust in general. To account for this, our statistical analyses include a control measure of Average Trust, the mean of each individual’s trust in all 16 institutions we asked about. Since some people are more trusting than others, Average Trust helps us highlight the impact of trust in specific institutions, over and above respondents’ average propensity to trust.

Our independent variable is Trust in Indian Businesses, also scaled from 0, or least trust, to 1, or most trust. Intriguingly, the public’s average trust in this actor was 0.59, higher than Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations (0.52). If public support for local rights groups is indeed driven by mistrust in the private sector, we expect statistical analysis to reveal that Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations is both significantly and inversely associated with Trust in Indian Businesses, all other things equal.
To situate our dependent and independent trust variables in context, consider Figure 3, which displays the Mumbai public’s average trust in multiple institutions, including (in order of most to least trusted), the army, religious institutions, general population, Indian businesses, the national legislature (Lok Sabha), prime minister, the police, Indian human rights groups, foreign powers (multinational corporations and the US government combined), and Indian politicians. These comparative data indicate that the public’s trust in the domestic private sector is comparatively high.

Our statistical models control for a wide variety of potential influences on public Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations. Since earlier work established cross-nationally that public trust in local rights groups is influenced by demographics and socio-economic status (SES), we control for Age, Sex, Residence Type (urban or rural), Education (years), Household Income (subjective measure), Rooms in Home, Have Mobile Phone, Have Landline, and Internet Use.
Given the often politicized nature of human rights advocacy and activism, moreover, we control for respondents’ preferred choice of state-level Political Party, as well as their report of having Voted or not in the most recent national elections. And since confessional dynamics are important factors in Mumbai and India more generally (Varshney 2002), we control for Religious Identity. Given the social, economic and political weight of caste in India (Jodhka 2010), we control for respondents’ self-reported Caste Identity; and given the importance of language politics in Mumbai and India more generally (Guha 2007; Patel 2003; Sarangi (ed.) 2009), we control for the Language respondents reported speaking at home.

Since previous research also demonstrates that exposure to, and familiarity with, human rights ideas, workers, organizations and activities, is relevant, we control for these through a Human Rights Contact Index, which combines measures of how often respondents reported hearing the phrase, “human rights”; whether they reported ever having met someone whom they consider a human rights worker; whether they could name a specific “human rights” organization, when asked; and whether they could remember ever having participated in what they consider to have been some kind of “activity” of a rights-based organization. And since scholars suggest attitudes may be influenced by transnational diffusion processes (Calhoun 2002; Tarrow 2005; Smith & Wiest 2005), we control for respondents’ report of whether they have ever Lived Abroad, and the number of times they have Traveled Abroad for reasons of work, education, and more.

Since previous work demonstrates cross-nationally that Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations is influenced by respondent attitudes towards other powerful actors, we control for Trust in Foreign Powers (an index of respondent trust in the US government and multinationals) and Trust in Domestic Political Power (an index of respondent trust in Indian
politicians, prime minister, and the legislature). And finally, as noted above, we control for each individual’s personal propensity to trust – Average Trust – by averaging their response across all 16 trust categories.

6. The Correlates of Public Trust: Statistical Results

Our models predict Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, the simplest and most easily interpretable technique. We double-check our findings with ordinal logistic regression; the results are essentially the same. Table 2 presents the results of our OLS regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Indian Businesses</td>
<td>-0.163**</td>
<td>(0.0364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.0242</td>
<td>(0.0193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.000792</td>
<td>(0.000673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban or rural residence</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>(0.0303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.000497</td>
<td>(0.00244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-0.00274</td>
<td>(0.0109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms</td>
<td>-0.000170</td>
<td>(0.00907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile telephone</td>
<td>-0.0221</td>
<td>(0.0285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landline telephone</td>
<td>-0.0241</td>
<td>(0.0256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Use</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>(0.0282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party (Reference = No Party Preference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>-0.00859</td>
<td>(0.0350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Congress Party (NCP)</td>
<td>-0.115**</td>
<td>(0.0415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>(0.0419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ShivSena</td>
<td>-0.0387</td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS )</td>
<td>-0.0565</td>
<td>(0.0432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>-0.0396</td>
<td>(0.0544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of India (RPI)</td>
<td>-0.0688</td>
<td>(0.0544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party (IND)</td>
<td>0.0460</td>
<td>(0.0941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Behavior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>0.0391</td>
<td>(0.0431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identity (Reference = Catholic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant/Evangelical Christian</td>
<td>-0.0741</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>0.0908</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.0771+</td>
<td>(0.0457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-0.0799</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.0818</td>
<td>(0.0557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.0413</td>
<td>(0.0547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jain</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsi</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>0.0624</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste Identity (Reference = Scheduled Caste)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Tribe</td>
<td>0.00194</td>
<td>(0.0269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Backward Classes</td>
<td>-0.0131</td>
<td>(0.0326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.0134</td>
<td>(0.0309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Reference = English)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>-0.0357</td>
<td>(0.0549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>-0.0923</td>
<td>(0.0578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>-0.129+</td>
<td>(0.0712)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.0225</td>
<td>(0.0628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Contact Index</td>
<td>0.124+</td>
<td>(0.0637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Abroad</td>
<td>0.0657</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips Abroad</td>
<td>0.0353*</td>
<td>(0.0160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Foreign Powers (US Govt &amp; MNCs)</td>
<td>-0.161**</td>
<td>(0.0449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Domestic Authorities (Pols, Exec, Leg)</td>
<td>-0.288**</td>
<td>(0.0571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Trust</td>
<td>1.496**</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0587</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

As expected, Trust in Indian Businesses is both inversely and significantly related to Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations, controlling for other potential influences. And as Figure 4 demonstrates, this finding is also substantively meaningful; the public’s predicted Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations is 0.64 when Trust in Indian Businesses is 0, or maximum distrust. And when trust in Indian businesses is at 1, the maximum, predicted Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations drops to 0.48. Members of the Mumbai public who entirely...
mistrust businesses, in other words, are roughly 33% more trusting of their local human rights groups, controlling for other potential influences. Table 2 and Figure 4 show that this difference is both statistically significant and substantively meaningful.

Some of our other findings are as expected. As previous research discovered, trust in foreign powers and domestic political authorities is inversely related to trust in local rights groups; LHRO supporters are overall skeptical of concentrated political and economic power, in their own country and abroad. The human rights contact index is as statistically significant and positively associated with trust in local rights groups, as is the number of trips abroad and average respondent trust. Intriguingly, supporters of the National Congress Party are less trusting, on average, than those with no particular political preference, while Hindus are more trusting than Catholics. More research on these counts is warranted. Importantly, none of the sociodemographic or caste controls are significant. Overall, these findings suggest that Trust in
Local Human Rights Organization is part and parcel of a broader ideological orientation, rather than a product of concrete socio-demographic attributes. The most salient aspect of this orientation, for our purposes, is that trust in local corporations is inversely related to trust in local human rights groups.

Conclusion

Governments worldwide are cracking down on foreign aid to local NGOs, fearing these groups may be lending too much support to domestic political challengers and their transnational allies (Dupuy et al. n.d.; Christensen & Weinstein 2013; Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014; Sarah E. Mendelson 2015). This legal crackdown on foreign aid has placed local human rights organizations (LHROs) at a particular disadvantage, since rights groups are often the most politically oppositional of local NGOs, as well as the most heavily dependent on foreign funds (Berkovitch & Gordon 2008; Ron et al. 2016). In some cases, these foreign aid crackdowns have led to the wholesale collapse of the domestic human rights sector (K. E. Dupuy et al. 2015).

Local rights groups worldwide, along with their global North-based donors and other international allies, are scrambling to respond. One potential solution is increased emphasis on “local fund raising for local (human rights) problems,” in which local NGOs diversity their sources of funding away from international sources and focus on the local supporters. Today, domestic rights activists from Latin America to Africa and Southeast Asia say they are keen to explore this option.

This article explores the potential for local fundraising in Mumbai, India, one of the global South’s most economically vigorous urban locations, as well as a major hub of non-profit organizing, including for human rights. Our interviews with a representative sample of LHRO
leaders in Mumbai demonstrate that these groups depend on foreign funding, rendering them vulnerable to government restrictions. India passed strong regulations limiting foreign aid to local civil society as early as 1976, and has amended those laws several times since. In 2014, moreover, a newly elected government resolved to enforce those regulations with even greater stringency, fearing that local NGOs, including human rights groups, were undermining the country’s economic growth.

Mumbai’s LHRO leaders are keen to respond to these restrictions with greater local fund raising attempts. Many local rights leaders believe Mumbai’s booming corporate sector is a desirable fund raising target, given its wealth and growing interest in corporate social responsibility, a trend the current government is keen to encourage.

However, any LHRO attempt at fundraising with Mumbai’s corporate sector will prove challenging, given the public’s tendency to associate trust in LHROs with mistrust in local businesses. Following decades of organizational and social movement culture, as well as government criticism, the public identifies local rights groups as bulwarks against private business, rather than as potential ally. India’s local rights groups have typically allied with the country’s political left, which has been skeptical of the government’s opening to foreign markets, and encouragement of capitalist growth, over the past 25 years.

Having built their reputation over the past few decades as warriors against capitalism, LHROs now face the Mumbai’s fundraiser’s dilemma: the city’s corporate sector is flush with cash and interested in giving, but the public has come to identify corporates and rights groups as inherently opposed. Should LHRO leaders emulate the fund raising patterns of global peers and approach local businesses for financial support, their reputation is likely to suffer. Should they not build a greater capacity for local fundraising, however, they will continue to depend on
foreign aid in an era of increasing government scrutiny and regulation. Mumbai’s LHROs cannot afford not to pursue local fund raising opportunities, and local corporates offer one of their most likely funding solutions. And yet, any such attempt will exact a steep reputational price among the sector’s supporters among the general public.
1 For background on Indian restrictions to foreign aid, see Jalali (2008). For the recent Indian crackdown, see Guha (2015); Patkar (2014); Bidwai (2015); The Editorial Board (2015); Najar (2015); Vyawahare (2014); and Mashru (2014).
2 LHRO Interview: 187 – India.
3 For a detailed discussion of Swaraj see Dalton (2012).
4 LHRO Interview: 179 – India.
5 As per section 135 of the 2013 Companies Act, companies of a certain must size give 2% of their average net income from the previous three years to corporate social responsibility initiatives (Ministry of Corporate Affairs 2013).
6 The best known funder of this sort is George Soros (Strom 2010), but HRW readily acknowledges reliance on other wealthy individuals and businesses. For HRW, the key ethical commitment is to never take government funding.
7 These broad categorizations are not mutually exclusive and are based on comments from several key informant interviews conducted with human rights experts in India between September and November 2010. These interviews were conducted in person, via Skype or on the telephone by the first author. Individuals consulted included activists, lawyers, researchers, and practitioners who had extensive experience working in human rights organizations and/or researching, writing and working in the field of human rights in Mumbai, India and South Asia. All in person interviews were conducted in New Delhi and Mumbai. For more details, please contact authors.
8 The 2005 Right to Information Act provides for a timely response to citizen requests for government information; the 2009 Right to Education Act stipulates that children have a right to quality elementary education; and the 2013 National Food Security Act provides legal protection for the right to food. For more on the Right to Food Campaign see (Hertel 2014). In 2009 the Delhi High Court decriminalized homosexuality, however, the Supreme Court later overruled this ruling in December 2013.
9 In-person interview with a Mumbai-based key informant who has been involved in human rights activism in India for over 20 years and is the co-founder of two rights-based organizations and a human rights lawyer who practices in the High Court of Mumbai and the Supreme Court of India (November 11, 2010); For a detailed discussion of housing related developments in Mumbai and as well as key housing rights groups in Mumbai, see Chapter 4 and 5 of (Ramanath 2005); for a brief overview on housing related developments see Patel (2011).
10 For a historical overview of the early years of the RKS see (Goetz & Jenkins 2001).
12 We excluded all local branches of national or international organizations headquartered in other cities countries from the sample.
13 We asked LHRO respondents to take a look at our existing list of organizations to help identify organizations that were missing or changes required and made changes to the list after every 5 interviews, as there were not many new additions or subtractions.
14 A detailed report of the research methodology, characteristics of respondents and their organizations, key findings from the interviews, and a list of the sampling frame of organizations can be found online in AUTHORS.
15 The median founding year of the entire sampling frame (57 LHROs) was 1992. Of the five LHROs founded in the 1970s, three had adopted rights-based approaches in the late 1990s and 2000s.
16 LHRO Interview: 176 – India.
17 LHRO Interview: 170 – India.
18 LHRO Interview: 191 – India.
19 LHRO Interview: 196 – India.
20 LHRO Interview: 191 – India.
21 LHRO interview: 160 – India.
22 LHRO interview: 175 – India.
23 LHRO interview: 187 – India.
24 LHRO interview: 196 – India.
25 LHRO interview: 180 – India.
26 LHRO interview: 175 – India.
27 In multi-stage sampling, respondents are selected in a sequential process from successively smaller geographical units.
28 The others included domestic political institutions and actors, such as the Indian prime minister, Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian parliament), and Indian politicians; coercive state agencies, including the police and
army; the **general population**; **religious institutions**; the **Indian business sector**, including banks and corporations; **Indian NGOs in general**; and **international actors**, including the multinational corporations, the United Nations, European Union, U.S. government, international NGOs, and international HROs.

29 For earlier research on the cross national determinants of trust in Local Human Rights Organizations, see AUTHORS.

30 *Trust in Local Human Rights Organizations* is an ordinal variable, which suggests use of the ologit technique. We report OLS here because its coefficients are easier to interpret, and because ologit analysis reveals similar results.
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