Who Trusts Local Human Rights Organizations? Evidence from Three World Regions

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ABSTRACT

Local human rights organizations (LHROs) are crucial allies in international efforts to promote human rights. Without support from organized civil society, efforts by transnational human rights reformers would have little effect. Despite their importance, we have little systematic information on the correlates of public trust in LHROs. To fill this gap, we conducted key informant interviews with 233 human rights workers from sixty countries, and then administered a new Human Rights Perceptions Poll to representative public samples in Mexico (n = 2,400), Morocco (n = 1,100), India (n = 1,680), and Colombia (n = 1,699). Our data reveal that popular trust in local rights groups is consistently associated with greater respondent familiarity with the rights discourse, actors, and organizations, along with greater skepticism toward state institutions and agents. The evidence fails to provide consistent, strong support for other commonly held expectations, however, including those about the effects of foreign funding, socioeconomic status, and transnational connections.

I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic civil society is a crucial player in international efforts to promote human rights. Without organized pressure “from below,” governments will rarely translate international human rights laws and commitments into mean-
Sustained, committed, and sometimes risky collective action by dedicated civic groups is often necessary—if insufficient—for meaningful, human rights-oriented change.2

Domestic rights champions come in all shapes and sizes, including trade unions, professional associations, faith-based organizations, parents’ associations, victims’ groups, and other sundry citizens’ groups. This article focuses on one such actor, the local human rights organization (LHRO), which we define as a domestically headquartered and focused, organized, non-profit, and nongovernmental organization (NGO), whose stated goal is to promote one or more of the principles articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its associated treaties.3

LHROs are one of many nodes in networks of domestic and transnational civic actors.4 They gather information, publish reports, meet with political officials, propose policy reforms, conduct education and media campaigns, and legally represent or counsel victims. On occasion, LHROs may organize or participate in street demonstrations and social protests, transforming themselves—if only briefly—into more activist-style “social movement organizations.”5 Increasingly, some LHROs engage in a mixture of human rights


3. Note, however, that we did not impose this definition on our survey respondents.


advocacy and service provision, drawing on the “rights-based approach” to development used in United Nations (UN) and other policy circles.6

LHROs differ in advocacy strategies and target audiences. Some groups are elite-focused, orienting themselves toward the commanding heights of national political institutions and state institutions, national or international media, international organizations, transnational NGOs, or the domestic and international private sector. Others are more popularly or “grass roots”-oriented, concentrating on their links to the general public or disadvantaged communities.

Public trust is important to all LHRO subtypes, albeit for different reasons. For “rights-based groups” oriented toward marginalized communities, popular trust is a necessary precondition for successful attempts to empower, mobilize, activate, and stimulate more meaningful political engagement.7 For those LHROs oriented toward elites, their attempts to persuade the powerful will always carry more weight when domestic and international forces regard LHROs as trusted sources of information.8 Public trust may also be vital for purposes of NGO accountability and resource mobilization.9 Public trust can never guarantee LHRO success, but it is a key resource, along with organizational capacity, human capital, money, and connections of all kinds.

Despite the importance of public trust in LHROs, we have little empirical knowledge about the phenomenon’s correlates.10 Although the human rights research community does regularly study LHRO emergence, behavior, and impact, few—if any—scholars have used statistically reliable samples and


10. We know of only a handful of investigations into the link between public opinion and trust in human rights organizations. The first, conducted by the Edelman Barometer, a private consulting firm, asked “opinion leaders” in various countries about their trust in Amnesty International. Their data and methods are not publicly available, however. The second is a series of private surveys for Israeli NGO clients, the data from which is also not publicly available. Personal email from Jessie Montell, former Executive Director of the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem (18 Aug. 2013).
surveys to measure and explain popular trust in these groups. Instead, most scholars use qualitative methods to study individual organizations or national sectors. Although case studies of this sort contribute greatly to theory and provide internal validity, they cannot, by definition, offer much empirical support for probabilistic, general, or cross-national claims.

To fill this gap, we began by interviewing 233 key informants from sixty countries. Then, we devised a unique Human Rights Perceptions Poll—a survey instrument that asks ordinary people for their views on human rights issues, organizations, and policies. We administered versions of the poll to representative samples of the public in four countries: Mexico, Colombia, Morocco, and India.

These countries all had sufficient levels of democracy and press freedom to permit at least some public human rights debate, and all four had sufficiently large LHRO communities to justify the inquiry in the first place. Taken together, our samples represent populations from three world regions (Latin America, North Africa, and South Asia); three major world religions (Catholicism, Islam, and Hinduism); three different colonial traditions (Spain, France, and Britain); and five different linguistic groups (Spanish, French, Arabic, Hindi, and Marathi).

The survey made no assumptions as to what respondents might be thinking of when asked for their views on “Human Rights Organizations in [their] country.” As scholars have shown, the public’s working definition of “human rights”—and, by logical extension, “human rights organizations”—varies widely. Instead, the survey left the definition of “human rights organization” open to interpretation, hoping to evaluate respondents’ general attitudes toward the concept as a whole. As we argue below, generalizations of this kind are both meaningful and useful, as they are “summary measures” encapsulating respondents’ overall sentiments toward a given issue, concept, or sector.


12. See Appendices A and B for details.

13. See Appendix C for details.


To generate expectations about likely statistical relationships between respondent attitudes and attributes, and “trust in local human rights organizations,” we drew on the scholarly literature and on our interviews with 233 key informants. We developed five hypotheses about the effects of respondents’: 1) exposure to LHROs and human rights language (“familiarity”); 2) beliefs that LHROs receive foreign funding (“foreign funding”); 3) trust in national political institutions (“anti-politics”); 4) exposure to transnational information and ideas (“transnational connectivity”); and 5) socioeconomic status (SES).

Aided by separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for each country and multiple indicators for each hypothesis, we tested these five expectations on our survey data. Although evidence from four countries cannot offer a definitive test of cross-national hypotheses, it does provide a strong, empirically based “plausibility probe” of our expectations, especially given our strategy of “maximum variation sampling” across world regions, colonial legacies, languages, and world religions.

The data offers strong support for two of our five expectations, but offers weak or no evidence for the other three. We find solid empirical support for the “familiarity” and “anti-politics” hypotheses, but discovered only limited support for the “foreign funding” hypothesis. Most surprisingly, the data largely debunk the socioeconomic status and transnational connectivity hypotheses. These counter-intuitive findings highlight the importance of careful empirical research and country-specific analysis. Human rights thinkers and activists often make sweeping claims, and while some of these may be true, anecdote, theory, and personal experience are no substitute for systematic empirical investigation.

II. WHAT DOES “TRUST IN LHROS” MEAN?

Given the diversity of LHRO organizations and policy areas, can researchers say anything meaningful about so abstract a concept as “trust in LHROs”? We believe so. After all, survey researchers have long grappled with analogous questions in other fields and have concluded, for the most part, that generalizing about abstractions such as “trust” is indeed useful. Consider the field of comparative democratization, where scholars have long debated the utility of measuring the concept of “satisfaction with democracy.”

cause democracy can encompass so many potential elements—including politicians, policies, institutions, and democratic principles—which of these are survey respondents thinking of when they respond to researchers’ questions? One prominent interpretation argues that the concept, “satisfaction with democracy,” is best thought of as a “summary measure” that expresses a respondent’s overall judgment about democracy, into which different subcomponents enter with greater or lesser proportion.19 “Satisfaction with democracy,” the argument goes, is both conceptually and empirically useful, as it often predicts important forms of political participation, including voting and protest.

Similar arguments apply to other intriguing measures, including “feeling thermometers”20 and “presidential approval” ratings21 in US electoral studies. Although both are highly polyvalent concepts, they have empirically definable content and meaningful statistical associations—including causal ones—with a variety of important outcomes, including electoral choices and legislative outcomes.

Reasoning analogously, “trust in LHROs” is also a summary measure, a global respondent judgment about the national human rights sector as a whole. We can think of this summary measure as a weighted average of sorts, comprising different components. One of these components, surely, is the type of LHRO about which specific respondents are thinking, while another is the particular policy domain within which a given LHRO operates. Our research does not measure these specific components, but rather summarizes and encapsulates the respondents’ overall judgment of the organized, nongovernmental human rights sector in their respective countries.

III. FIVE COMMON EXPECTATIONS

A. Expectation #1: Familiarity

How does the respondent’s familiarity with LHROs and the human rights discourse shape trust? One strand of conventional wisdom would suggest that familiarity builds trust, while another would suggest that it breeds contempt. At the most general level, moreover, the empirical evidence cuts both ways.

One heavily cited study of trust among private firms, for example, found that “familiarity between organizations through prior alliances does indeed breed trust,”\(^{22}\) while another discovered that “thicker” institutional relationships—such as greater interaction and physical proximity—increased US citizen trust in specific policy agencies.\(^{23}\) A third study of US political party “brand recognition” went so far as to combine measures of familiarity and trust because the two factors appeared so closely correlated.\(^{24}\) Familiarity, in these cases, does breed trust.

Other research, however, suggest that familiarity can have negative effects. US citizens who display greater familiarity with their country’s Congress, for example, also tend to hold that body in lower esteem.\(^{25}\) Individuals who get to know each other better, moreover, often dislike one another more because their mutual knowledge helps clarify their dissimilarities.\(^{26}\) When knowledge about others is scarce, this study claims, individuals assume others are similar and, thus, likeable. In these and other studies, familiarity does indeed breed contempt, or something close to.

Still a third group of studies suggests that the association between trust and familiarity is shaped by other factors, including duration of contact,\(^{27}\) the surrounding political environment,\(^{28}\) changing assessment criteria,\(^{29}\) and more.

For our purposes, the literature on trust, social capital, and democracy is particularly pertinent, and much of that work stresses the importance of connectivity.\(^{30}\) Most scholars of the relationship between civic action, democracy, and social capital suggest that more and better ties between civic groups—and between civic groups and citizens overall—have positive effects, such as greater public trust in each other and in institutions, as well as better quality democracy.\(^{31}\)


\(^{29}\) Mondak et al., *supra* note 25.


Many of our 233 key informants subscribed to the “familiarity promotes trust” notion. Consider the activist from Morocco, for example, who told us that LHROs in her country had successfully “penetrated the grassroots” through determined organizational outreach, including efforts to use “mules to access mountainous rural areas and teach women about women’s rights.” The result of this “proximity work,” she said, was increased public support for human rights ideas and organizations. Or consider the rights worker from Cameroon, who explained that “the key is to build trust with people” through personal contacts, which also helps rights workers “to understand their reality.” In Sri Lanka, a third said, village leaders often invite LHRO representatives to speak because ordinary people “want to know more about their rights, and the things available from the government sector and other sectors.” These meetings, she said, created warmer relations between the rights groups and the public.

To be sure, some qualitative evidence has emerged of negative relations between professional, foreign-funded rights advocates and the general population. Still, without strong evidence that this problem is broadly pervasive, we follow the logic of social capital theorists and expect to find that:

_Hypothesis 1: Greater familiarity with LHROs is Positively Associated With Trust._

**B. Expectation #2: Foreign Funding**

Our second expectation addresses perceived links between funding for LHROs and national identity. Human rights activists often view themselves as members of a transnational and cosmopolitan “principled issue network” through which resources flow, in a spirit of shared commitment and solidarity, from richer to poorer network components. In the Global South, moreover, local rights groups tend to be dependent on funds from the Global North. And while relations among members of these North-South networks are by no means conflict-free, the most vocal criticisms of contemporary human

32. Interviews 192-Morocco; 205-Morocco.
33. Interview 36-Cameroon.
34. Interview 1-Sri Lanka.
35. _Id._
36. ENGELUND, _supra_ note 11, at 185–190.
39. SHAREEN HERTEL, _UNEXPECTED POWER: CONFLICT AND CHANGE AMONG TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISTS_ 17 (2006); BOB, _supra_ note 8, at 117.
rights resource flows have come from critics outside the human rights community—from governments, political conservatives, or nationalists. From Canada to Israel, Russia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and India, critics of domestic human rights campaigns often portray North-to-South resource flows as a form of foreign intervention, manipulation, and interference. As a result, the number of public laws banning or restricting foreign aid to local NGOs is on the rise.

More often than not, these critics of foreign investment in local rights groups appeal to the public’s concern for national sovereignty. In Moldova, for example, local officials accused one of our respondents of being a spy because his group received support from the US-based Open Society Foundation. In the Palestinian territories, another said, “When I give lectures [about human rights] . . . the first question when I’m finished [is always], ‘who sponsored you, and why?’” In Turkey, similarly, “[t]aking foreign money makes Turkish human rights groups vulnerable to attack from all quarters,” including Turkish Marxists, nationalists, and Islamists. In Kenya, critics often “resort to crude imagery, depicting rights leaders as traitors and money scavengers chasing foreign cash.” Nationalist appeals of this sort are replicated across both democratic and authoritarian contexts.

Although we have little systematic information about the public’s view of all this, the scholarly literature suggests that quotidian, or “banal,” nationalism remains pervasive, even in countries that appear least vulnerable to xenophobia. As the founder of the World Values Survey notes, “Despite globalization, the nation remains a key unit of shared experience, and its educational and cultural institutions shape the values of almost everyone in that society.” Or, as another expert on nationalism observes, “We cannot but be struck by the hold and tenacity of local, ethnic, and national cultures, and the failure to instill in the mass of the world’s population a truly cosmopolitan outlook.” Worldwide, the public’s commitments to national pride, community, and sovereignty appear remarkably persistent. Based

41. Id.
42. Interview 83-Moldova.
43. Interview 73-Palestine.
on this, we expect the general public to be concerned and mistrustful of foreign-funded LHROs, leading to our expectation that:

_Hypothesis 2: Belief that LHROs are Foreign-Funded is Inversely Related to Trust in LHROs._

### C. Expectation #3: Anti-Politics

A major part of the LHRO mission is to criticize official laws, agencies, and personnel, even though greater respect for human rights often requires more state strength and better state administrative capacity. In some cases, rights groups attack the state because the state itself perpetrates abuses; in other instances, they criticize it for failing to create sufficiently progressive policies, or for not stopping private actors from abusing others. And while human rights activists need the support of politicians and governments, they are also vocal about the failures of traditional parties and agendas. As a result, some scholars argue that human rights activists, like other members of liberal “global civil society,” are agents of “anti-politics”—professional skeptics of anything resembling traditional politics or elections.

Our key informant interviews lend weight to these claims. For example, only 19 percent of the human rights workers we interviewed said they were politically active before beginning their work with a human rights-related organization, while only 13 percent reported that “more than half” of their co-workers were currently active in a political party or organization. Only 8 percent, moreover, said their parents were “very much” engaged in politics, while only 13 percent said the same of their siblings. The human rights key informants we interviewed, in other words, tended to come from relatively apolitical families.

Of course, many human rights advocates argue that skepticism toward traditional politics is itself a form of politics, albeit of a different sort. Human rights workers may not explicitly join a specific political party, but they are

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49. Note that this consideration is separate from the debate over the universalism of human rights ideas. Here, we are concerned only with whether respondents believe local human rights groups are externally or locally funded, and not whether human rights principles are inherently congruent with, or opposed to, local values.


52. We asked this question only of the 128 purposively selected respondents; sixty-eight answered our question about their prior political activities, while ninety-four answered about their co-workers’ political engagements.

53. We asked this question of the 128 purposively selected respondents, 119 of whom answered.

by no means anarchists or simple charitable providers. Instead, the ideal human rights worker contests and engages with power in all its manifestations, championing the rights of the powerless regardless of political affiliation.

Still, the general “anti-politics” point remains. Supporters of human rights organizations should, on average, prove more skeptical or disenchanted with mainstream political figures and state agencies, leading us to expect that:

_Hypothesis 3: Trust in politicians, political institutions, and the state is negatively associated with trust in LHROs._

**D. Expectation #4: Transnational Connectivity**

What about the effects of transnational connections? What are the impacts of international travel, internet connectivity, and linguistic diversity on trust in LHROs? Human rights draw on universal principles and cosmopolitan identities, and are often juxtaposed to the local, the particular, and the national.

To be sure, cosmopolitanism is not inherently at odds with localism.55 Transnational activists, including those engaged in human rights work, can and do have feet in both the universal and the particular camps.56 Still, even the most mixed or diluted cosmopolitanism must be constructed through transnational connections of some kind. Although cosmopolitans need not be rootless wanderers, they must have a modicum of interactions with, and connections to, the world outside their political boundaries. Trust in LHROs, which are explicit representations of universal ideas, should therefore be higher among respondents with stronger and more numerous transnational experiences. In other words, we expect that:

_Hypothesis 4: Transnational connectivity is positively related to trust in LHROs._

**E. Expectation #5: Socioeconomic Status**

Finally, we explore the likely impact of socioeconomic status on the public’s trust in LHROs. On the one hand, the poorest, least educated, and most marginalized communities are also the most vulnerable to human rights abuses. As one authority notes, poverty and human rights abuses are linked in a “vicious circle” of vulnerability and deprivation57—a claim confirmed

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56. Sidney Tarrow, _The New Transnational Activism_ 42–48 (2005); Merry, _supra_ note 11.
by careful statistical analysis.\textsuperscript{58} In theory, therefore, society’s poorest have the greatest incentive to feel warmly inclined toward LHROs, who ostensibly fight on their behalf.

Another established body of research, however, suggests that support for the kind of liberal democratic principles underlying individual human rights are often strongest among persons of higher socioeconomic status, including urban residents and the middle or professional classes.\textsuperscript{59} Modernization theory has a long history of equating democracy, liberalism, and the middle classes, but even some neo-Marxist versions support this notion, although they also tend to include the organized working class as a likely supporter of liberal rights.\textsuperscript{60} These scholars would not expect the rural poor, or other acutely marginalized groups, to be strong supporters of liberal rights.

Among scholars of human rights, many note that that the abstract nature of human rights principles, along with their grounding in the liberal professions—international law, diplomacy, and global policy—give them a decidedly upper-crust aura.\textsuperscript{61} Human rights ideas and organizations, in this view, are often equated by the public with elite, capital city affairs, rather than with the quotidian struggles of the powerless and the poor.

Many of the human rights workers we interviewed also expected SES to be positively correlated with support for human rights. 60 percent of our key informant sample, for example, agreed that human rights ideas and principles were hard for ordinary people to understand.\textsuperscript{62} As one respondent from Cameroon explained, “Poverty has...a very negative impact on human rights learning and education,”\textsuperscript{63} while in Burundi, ordinary people think human rights “is an issue for those people who are involved in legal studies, lawyers, judges,” rather than for the public at large.\textsuperscript{64}

Many of our key informants also highlighted the importance of the rural-urban divide. As one Zimbabwean informant argued, urban residence...
tended to “produce more enlightenment” on human rights issues, while in Tunisia, another said, “Urban people are more open and accessible” to human rights ideas and organizations. In the Ukraine, similarly, “The countryside people actually don’t know about [human rights] NGOs,” in part because most of the “NGO activity is in the cities.” In the Armenian countryside, another said, “It’s really awful…[people] don’t want to know anything about their rights…They just live and are not interested [in human rights].” These human rights experts and activists attributed this rural disinterest in human rights to poverty, inadequate education, poor communications, and the rural “mindset.” Cumulatively, these claims about the likely effects of urban residence, poverty, and education suggest that:

Hypothesis 5: Higher Socioeconomic Status is positively associated with trust in LHROs.

IV. DATA AND METHODS

To systematically test the evidence for these five hypotheses, we conducted nationally representative surveys in the year 2012 of all over-18 adults in Mexico (n = 2,400) and Colombia (n = 1,699), along with statistically representative surveys of over-18 adults living in the Moroccan political capital, Rabat; its financial capital, Casablanca; and these cities’ rural environs (n = 1,100). We also sampled over-18 adults living in India’s financial capital, Mumbai, as well as its rural Maharashtra State environs (n = 1,680). We oversampled Christians and Buddhists in India, and rural residents in India and Morocco.

We began by validating our Human Rights Perception Poll in Mexico and then applied the same Spanish-language questionnaire in Colombia. Next, we adapted the survey to the Moroccan context, where interviewers administered questions in Arabic and French, and to India, where they administered questions in Hindi and Marathi. In Mexico and Colombia, we collaborated with the “Mexico, Americas, and the World” survey project, while in India and Morocco, we worked with respected local survey companies. In Morocco and India, we accompanied the interviewers during their pilots, participated in interviewer training, and were closely involved in sample design. For details, see Appendix C.

65. Interview 61-Zimbabwe.
66. Interview 120-Tunisia.
67. Interview 19-Ukraine.
68. Interview 5-Armenia.
70. See Appendix C.
A. Measuring Trust in LHROs: The Dependent Variable

Though we know of no direct precedents for asking specifically about trust in LHROs, cross-national survey researchers have ample experience in probing trust for a wide variety of institutions and agents in different national contexts. Following the well-developed, cross-nationally validated format, we asked respondents to rate their trust in LHROs on an ordinal, four-point scale as part of a multi-item trust battery: “Please tell me, how much trust do you place in each of the following institutions, groups, or persons: a lot, some, a little, or none?” One of these institutions was “[country toponym] Human Rights Organizations.”

The public’s trust in LHROs differs significantly across the four countries we surveyed. Figure 1 shows average trust (with 95 percent confidence intervals) in each, represented by the middle, darker gray bars. Treating the ordinal response categories as equidistant (or “linear”), and rescaling from 0 to 1, average trust is highest in Colombia, at .58 (above the scale’s midpoint of .5), and lowest in Rabat/Casablanca, at .43 (below the midpoint). The difference between the means in Colombia and Rabat/Casablanca represents over 15 percent of the scale’s range. Mumbai (.55) and Mexico (.55) are tied, occupying a middle ground between Colombia and Rabat/Casablanca—distinguishable from both, though closer to Colombia than the Moroccan cities.

Are these high or low levels of trust? Aside from comparing the countries among themselves, another way of getting a handle on the question is to compare trust in LHROs to that in other institutions and people within each country. Figure 1 therefore shows mean trust in the most trusted institutions or groups (the white bars to the left of LHRO trust) and the least trusted (the light gray bars to the right of LHRO trust). Trust in LHROs is middling or


72. In Mexico, as part of a survey-embedded scale experiment, we split the sample and asked one half-sample (n = 1,200), “On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means ‘not at all’ and 7 means ‘a lot’, please tell me how much you trust each of the following institutions, groups, or persons?” To avoid losing half our observations in the regression analysis, we projected both the four- and seven-point responses in Mexico onto a 0-1 scale; the means and distributions produced by the two response scales were similar enough for us to equate the two items. Then, to make coefficient magnitudes comparable across countries, we also rescaled our dependent variable in Colombia, India, and Morocco.
higher: pretty good, but could be better. In all cases, LRHOs fall between the most and least trusted institutions, though clearly closer to the most trusted. Interestingly, although the most trusted institutions vary from country to country (business in Colombia, the Catholic Church in Mexico, banks in India, and the army in Morocco), “politicians” are the least trusted group in three of the four locales (Colombia, Mexico, and Mumbai); in the fourth (Rabat/Casablanca), it is the US government.

B. Operationalizing Our Hypotheses: The Independent Variables

To thoroughly probe our hypotheses, we implemented most with several indicators. Some concepts, such as “transnational connectivity” and “familiarity with human rights,” might be reasonably captured through measurement of distinct behaviors. Other concepts, such as “socioeconomic status,” are highly abstract, theoretically contested, and difficult to measure. In the case of foreign funding, for example, respondents may distinguish between different foreign funders, disfavoring some but not others. For all these reasons, we embody each hypothesis in several measurements.

Our first hypothesis expected that greater respondent familiarity with human rights concepts, organizations, and practitioners would boost their trust in LHROs (H1). To measure familiarity, we asked three questions: 1) “In your daily life, how often do you hear the term ‘human rights’: daily, frequently, sometimes, rarely, or never?”74; 2) “Have you ever met someone who works in a human rights organization?”; and 3) “Have you ever participated in the activities of [human rights organizations]”? The latter two were simple yes/no questions.

Our second hypothesis (H2) expected that respondent trust in LHROs would be associated with respondent assessment of whether LHROs are locally or internationally funded. To measure this assessment, we asked respondents, “In your opinion, where do you think that most of the non-governmental human rights organizations in [country] receive their funding from?” The closed response options were “[country’s] citizens,” “[country] government,” “foreign citizens,” “foreign governments,” “international organizations,” and a residual “other” category.

Our third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses suggested that respondent trust in political and state institutions (H3), transnational connections (H4), and socioeconomic status (H5) would be associated with trust in LHROs. Cultural differences between countries necessitated, however, that we occasionally operationalize these questions in slightly different ways.

To measure respondent trust in political and state institutions (H3), our third hypothesis, we asked respondents for their views toward five political actors and institutions, three of which are different classes of elected officials (the chief executive—president or prime minister75—politicians, and parliament or congress), and two of which (the police and the army) are coercive state institutions. We drew these questions from the same battery as our dependent variable, “trust in LHROs.”

A recurring phenomenon in political trust research is the tendency of trust in some institutions to predict trust in others.76 Trust, in other words, seems to be of a piece; instead of differentiating trust among different groups of institutions, respondents tend to trust or distrust all institutions.77 Including political trust variables in unmodified form, then, could capture the effect of an individual-level propensity to trust all institutions, including LHROs, as much as the effect of any single institution.

74. For ease of exposition, we “linearized” this variable; analysis showed that the effects of the ordinal categories, where they existed, were monotonic.
75. Morocco has liberalized considerably, but asking about trust in the king is still sensitive.
77. Single-factor confirmatory models corroborated this insight in the four cases considered here.
Taking our cue from fixed effects models, the solution we devised was to not use the raw scores of the five trust variables, but to “mean center” institutional trust at the individual level. That is, we averaged each respondent’s trust over all the institutions in the trust battery (fifteen to seventeen questions about trust in various institutions altogether, depending on the country) and subtracted this average from respondents’ scores on each trust item. Thus, we express trust in a specific institution as a deviation from individual level average trust. The effect of separating out between-subject variation in trust from within-subject variation is to purge evaluations of specific institutions (within-subject) of an overall predisposition to trust (between-subject). We thus get “clean” estimates of each institutional actor’s effect on trust in LHROs.

Our fourth hypothesis expects to find that greater transnational connectivity (H4) should increase respondent trust in LHROs (H4). To measure connectivity, we asked respondents if they use the Internet, speak a foreign language, have lived abroad (all yes/no questions), and the number of times, if any, they had travelled abroad.

Finally, we expected to find that higher socioeconomic status would be associated with more trust in LHROs (H5). Socioeconomic status is a multi-dimensional concept, however, so we measured it with several questions; some of these questions were common to all four countries, while others were country-specific. The common measures were years of education completed, urban residence, and subjective perceptions of income relative to expenditures (“With total family income, which statement best describes your income status: my income can cover expenses and save; my income can just cover expenses, without major difficulties; my income cannot cover expenses and I have difficulties; or my income cannot cover expenses and I have major difficulties?”). We also included the square of this income measure to test the hypothesis that respondents at the extremes of the income distribution trust LHROs less than people in the middle—in which case we could speak of trust in LHROs as a middle class phenomenon—or vice versa.

Another measure of socioeconomic status, however, did not travel well. An item commonly used in Mexico and Colombia—the number of light

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79. We omitted this question from our Mumbai analysis, since only three respondents reported having lived abroad.
80. Even this question, though, needed to be adapted to the peculiarities of the countries’ education systems and the categories that citizens of different countries use to report educational attainment.
81. Each survey also had a traditional monetary measure of income. Since these measures are notably prone to measurement error—especially in countries with high rates of informal employment, where it is not always easy to know how much one makes—we opted to use the subjective income measure instead.
bulbs in a house—proved infeasible in Morocco, where electric chandeliers are common even in lower status households. After consultation with the local survey team, we decided to ask about the number of rooms in a house—including the kitchen and bathroom—a question we repeated in the Indian survey.

### C. Control Variables

We also controlled for factors that either scholarship or logic suggests might shape public attitudes toward LHROs. The first was political participation, especially in the arena of party politics. Though LHROs may be seen as an antidote toward formal politics—according to our “anti-politics” hypothesis—they are, at the same time, inserted into a specific political context in which human rights issues or organizations may be associated with one or another political party. Party affiliation, for example, could trump a general anti-politics attitude, as it does when US voters like their particular congressperson, but disapprove of Congress, political parties, and national politics on the whole. To measure respondent political affiliations, we asked about party preference (whether true believers or just “leaners”), participation in political parties (yes/no), and voting in the last executive elections.

Other controls included sex, age, ethnicity (here, the mix of ethnicities varied from country to country), and, in India, caste and home language.

### V. FINDINGS

Table 1 summarizes the relationship between each group of independent variables and trust in LHROs. “Positive” means that where one or more of the variables used to operationalize a hypothesis had significant effects in a given country, all were positively related to trust (i.e., higher values redounded in more trust). “Negative” means all, or most, significant variables in a country were negatively related to trust (i.e., higher values equate to lower trust). “Mixed” means that existing effects are inconsistent or contradictory. And

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82. Over the protestations of our local Moroccan survey team, we insisted on including the light bulb question in the pilot survey. We immediately realized the question would not work when respondents began counting rapidly out loud or on their fingers, or laughing outright. Walking in the streets of Casablanca, we happened upon a discarded flyer advertising cheap chandeliers.


84. We did not ask this question in Colombia or Mexico.

“no finding,” or “n.f.,” means that none of the variables in the hypothesis were significant in that country.

As expected, familiarity with human rights terms, activists, and organizations increases trust in LHROs (H1), as does mistrust, or skepticism, in national politicians and, in some countries, national security forces (H3). The evidence is either more slim or nonexistent, however, for our other three propositions.

Table 2 presents the results of our regression analysis in detail. Since we rescaled our dependent variable from 0 to 1, the coefficient values may be interpreted straightforwardly as a linear change in percentage points ($\beta \times 100$) produced by a one-unit increment in the independent variable, where 100 percent means a respondent trusts LHROs “very much,” and 0 percent, “not at all.” For dummy variables, the coefficient simply represents the difference, in percentage points, between the group asked about—ethnicity, party sympathizer, language group, et cetera—and the reference category.

### A. Finding #1: As Expected, More Contact with Human Rights Terms, Organizations, and Practitioners is Associated with More Trust in LHROs

As social capital and democracy theorists might expect, familiarity with human rights practice and discourse is positively associated with greater trust in LHROs in Colombia, India, and Mexico. As Figure 2 illustrates, all else being equal, knowing an LHRO worker raised Colombians' trust by nearly eight percentage points ($\beta = .079, p = .001$)—from .56 for someone who does not know an LRHO worker (dark gray bar) to .64 for someone who does (light gray bar)—and raises Mumbaikars and rural Marathis by a whopping seventeen percentage points ($\beta = .170, p = .000; .55$ to $72$ predicted trust). Participating in an LHRO's activities, moreover, raised trust in Colombia by over twelve percentage points ($\beta = .126, p = .001$), from an estimated .57 to .70. In Mexico, frequently hearing the phrase “human

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Rabat/Casablanca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: Familiarity</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Organizational Funding</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3: Anti-Politics</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4: Transnational Connectivity</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5: Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>n.f.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. In some countries, however, the public’s trust in specific coercive state agencies, such as the army or police, is positively related to public trust in LHROs.
2015 Who Trusts Local Human Rights Organizations?

rights” (derechos humanos) was associated with respondents’ being much more trustful of LHROs (β = .018, p = .009). A Mexican who reports hearing the words “human rights” every day trusts LHROs a little over seven percentage points (4 × .018) more than one who never hears those words (predicted value of .63, compared to .56).

In short, it would appear that LHRO workers’ claim that “to know them is to love them” is an accurate description of the relationship between familiarity and trust.

One relevant policy lesson from this may be that LHROs should get the word out as much as possible and increase their public contacts. Until we can better resolve problems of endogeneity, however, it is hard to draw firm conclusions in this regard. After all, the causal arrow might be reversed, with people who trust LHROs being more likely to hear about human rights, or to seek out contact with human rights organizations, activities, and people.

Still, our findings show that public familiarity with rights groups and the rights message does not have negative effects, unlike Englund’s pessimistic findings for Malawi. The evidence thus supports the “familiarity breeds trust”

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87. Englund, supra note 11.
arguments advanced by our key informants and by social capital scholars who argue that more frequent personal contacts tend to breed greater trust and better democracy.88

B. Finding #2: Public Beliefs about LHRO Funding Sources are Associated with Trust in LHROs, but Less than Expected

Public perception of LHROs’ association with foreign money affects trust in these organizations, but less—and sometimes in different ways—than anticipated. Colombia most clearly meets our expectations, since adult residents of that country who believe that foreign nationals fund LHROs trust these groups nearly six percentage points less than respondents who believe that Colombian citizens are LHROs’ main funders (the reference category). Figure 3 depicts the decline from .59 (leftmost bar) to .53 (third bar from left) in average trust. Similarly, Colombians who believe that foreign governments (fourth bar from left) are funding LHROs trust them just over five percentage points less (from .59 to .54) than those Colombians who believe their fellow countrymen bankroll LHROs.

---

88. Putnam, supra note 30, at 171; Stark, Vedres & Bruszt, supra note 30.
After Colombia, however, the view becomes more muddled. Respondent belief that international organizations (IOs) finance LHROs affects trust in both India and Morocco, but in opposite ways. Consonant with our expectations, persons living in and around Casablanca/Rabat are distrustful of LHROs when they think they get money from IOs; that trust declines by eight percentage points when compared to the reference category, namely those respondents who believe that Moroccan citizens, rather than foreigners, finance LHROs. In India, on the other hand, the predicted trust of Mumbaikars and rural Marathis who think IOs finance LHROs increased from .57 to .71, or nearly fourteen percentage points. Thus, while Moroccans are mistrustful of international funders, persons living in and around Mumbai are more supportive.

Finally, we found no statistically significant association between beliefs about LHRO funding sources and public trust in LHROs in Mexico, save for the residual “other” category.

An interesting, and unanticipated, finding is the negative relationship between trust and domestic government funding of LRHOs. In both Colombia and Mumbai, respondents who believed LHROs received most of their money from their own governments were less likely to trust LHROs. In Colombia, the difference in predicted trust was large, declining by over ten percentage points (.59 to .49). In Mumbai and its rural environs, the difference was smaller but still strong (.57 to .52). This dovetails with other findings, detailed below, on the inverse association between respondent trust in national politicians and trust in LHROs.

In what should be encouraging news for both LRHOs and their international donors, public trust in LHROs is not reliably and consistently undermined by foreign aid. Contrary to the logic of “banal” or otherwise enduring nationalism89—and contrary, perhaps, to the hopes of sundry critics of human rights work—ordinary people do not consistently “penalize” LHROs for their reliance on outside money. In some cases, moreover, they are more suspicious of LHROs when they think rights groups receive government money. Although critics of foreign-supported rights work make much of LHROs’ external financial dependence, these allegations do not reliably persuade.

C. Finding #3: As Expected, Public Mistrust in National Politics is Associated with Greater Trust in LHROs

As expected, public trust in politicians, political institutions, and in some cases, state security forces is inversely associated with trust in LHROs. The most striking and consistent pattern regards politicians: In all four countries, greater trust in politicians implies much less trust in LHROs.

A one-point increase in respondent trust in politicians, for example, was associated with a whopping twenty-two point linear decrease in respondent trust in LHROs in Colombia ($\beta = -0.217, p = .000$), 20 percent in Mexico ($\beta = -0.196, p = .000$), a fifteen point linear decrease in Mumbai and its rural environs ($\beta = -0.146, p = .000$), and a more than fifteen-point linear decrease in Rabat/Casablanca and their environs ($\beta = -0.152, p = .007$).

Figure 4 illustrates these effects across all four countries. Moving from the minimum (dark gray bars) to the maximum values (light gray bars) of trust in politicians reduces public trust in LHROs by 46 percent in Colombia (from .71 to .38), 43 percent in Mexico (from .74 to .42), about 33 percent in Mumbai (.65 to .43), and nearly 42 percent in Rabat/Casablanca (.55 to .32).

![Figure 4. Predicted Values of Public Trust in LHROs (Rescaled 0-1) at Maximum, Mean, and Minimum of Public Trust in National Politicians (with 90 percent Confidence Intervals)](image-url)
More trust in the national parliament also implied less trust in LHROs in Mexico ($\beta = -0.062, p = .059$), Mumbai ($\beta = -0.114, p = .000$), and probably Rabat/Casablanca ($\beta = -0.114, p = .105$), where it narrowly missed statistical significance at the $p = .10$ level. Participating in political parties, moreover, was associated with lower respondent trust in LHROs by nearly nine points in Mumbai ($\beta = -0.087, p = .006$), although participation increased trust in Mexico ($\beta = .036, p = .058$).

Trust in coercive state institutions also had significant associations with trust in LHROs, although in three cases, the direction of that association was contrary to expectations. Trust in the police conformed, for the most part, to our anti-politics hypothesis; when trust in the police rose by one unit, trust in LHROs fell in Mexico by nearly eight percentage points ($\beta = -0.079, p = .008$) and, particularly, in Mumbai, by nearly thirteen points ($\beta = -0.128, p = .059$).90 The exception was Morocco, where trust in the police increased LHRO trust ($\beta = .107, p = .040$).

The army, by contrast, was an exception to our anti-politics hypothesis. Although, as expected, Mumbaikers and rural Marathis who trust their army mistrust LHROs ($\beta = -0.081, p = .043$), trust in the army had the opposite effect in the two Latin American countries, since both Colombians and Mexicans who trusted the army also trusted LHROs more ($\beta = .158, p = .000$ and $\beta = .232, p = .000$, respectively). This is a puzzling finding, given that armed forces in both countries have been implicated in rights violations. The explanation, we believe, may be the comparisons that citizens in these countries make between their national police and military forces. Colombians, as well as Mexicans, rank their militaries as among the most trustworthy public institutions, but rank their police forces among the least.91 In both countries, moreover, the armed forces have spearheaded the war on drugs, which has enjoyed broad public support. The Latin American counter-pattern could, therefore, owe to recent political circumstances.

In all events, our findings on the Mexican and Colombian militaries are the exceptions that prove the rule. Overall, of thirteen significant variables measuring respondent trust in political institutions (counting the near miss for the national parliament in Rabat/Casablanca), ten are negatively associated with respondent trust in LHROs. The evidence for our anti-politics hypothesis, in other words, is both clear and consistent. The domestic support base

90. In Colombia, trust in the police may possibly have raised LHRO trust ($\beta = -.059, p = .145$).
for LHROs is, indeed, strong among those most inclined to be skeptical of public officials and institutions.

D. Finding #4: Contrary to Expectations, Transnational Connectivity is Not Associated with More Trust in LHROs

Although many believe that better transnational connections promote appreciation for human rights organizations, our data indicate otherwise. Controlling for other factors, our surveys uncovered no evidence that individuals with stronger connections to global currents are more likely to trust their country’s human rights organizations. Internet use, facility in a foreign language, number of trips abroad, and the experience of living abroad all bore little relationship to respondent trust in LHROs.

The sole exception was for Moroccans who lived abroad. But here, the effect was the opposite of what we expected: Moroccans who had lived in another country tended to trust their country’s LHROs less than those who had never done so. Since many of those temporarily expatriate Moroccans lived in European democracies, it may be that negative experiences of discrimination led them to view those country’s professed human rights values negatively. What immigrants learn in foreign lands, after all, is conditioned by their circumstances and experiences.92

E. Finding #5: Socioeconomic Status Is Associated With Trust in LHROs Less Than Expected

Finally, we discovered that socioeconomic status mattered less than expected. Contrary to expectations, most indicators of higher socioeconomic status bore no relationship to respondent trust in LHROs. Of those that did have a significant association, some reduced trust—the precise opposite of what we expected—while others exhibited a nonlinear relationship.

Consider urban status, which we expected would be associated with more trust in LHROs. In fact, urban residency had no statistically discernable association with trust in Morocco, Mexico, and Colombia; in these samples, city residents did not trust LHROs any more than those residing in rural areas. In Mumbai, moreover, urban residency was associated with less trust in LHROs (β = −.064, p = .013), rather than more, since Mumbaikars trusted LHROs over six percentage points less than rural Marathis. Again, this finding was unexpected.

Next, consider education, which we also anticipated would have positive associations with trust in LHROs. In reality, however, education had no discernible effects on trust in Colombia or Mumbai, while in Mexico and Rabat/Casablanca, the effects were negative, though slightly above the $p = .10$ threshold for significance ($\beta = -.003$, $p = .111$ in Mexico and $\beta = -.006$, $p = .142$ in Morocco). If we were to take these estimates at face value, a Mexican who completed primary school would score about three percentage points higher on the LRHO trust scale than one with a university degree, while the same figure for Morocco would be six percentage points. If correct, it would seem that in Mexico and Morocco, education induces skepticism toward human rights organizations, rather than respect. Still, given the higher than desirable $p$-values, we hesitate to make too much of these findings. Instead, it seems safest to conclude that public trust in LHROs certainly did not increase with more education in these four samples.

Finally, consider income, the results of which also confounded our expectations, as it had no effect in Colombia, Mexico, or Mumbai. As Figure 5 indicates, moreover, the income/trust relationship in Rabat and Casablanca is that of an inverted-U ($\beta_{\text{INCOME}} = .276$, $p = .004$, $\beta_{\text{INCOME}}^2 = -.054$, $p = .001$). This means that in Morocco, people in the middle of the income distribution—the middle classes—trust LHROs more than people at the extremes—the poor and the wealthy.

![Figure 5. Effects of Respondent Income on Respondent Trust in LHROs, Rabat/Casablanca](image-url)
F. Controls

Some of our control variables were also significantly associated with trust in LHROs. In Mumbai and rural Maharashtra State, we discovered several party-specific effects, with sympathizers of two Marathi and Hindu nationalist parties—the Shiv Sena ($\beta = -0.085, p = .005$) and a spinoff party, Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, or MNS, ($\beta = -0.076, p = .049$)—trusting LHROs less than adherents of the catch-all Indian National Congress (INC). On the other hand, adherents of the center-left Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), a 1999 breakaway from the long-dominant INC, also trust LHROs much less than INC followers ($\beta = -0.189, p = .000$). Participation in political parties was also related to trust in LHROs in Mumbai and Mexico, albeit in opposite ways. Political party participants in Mumbai and its rural environs trust LHROs nearly nine percentage points less than those who do not participate ($\beta = -0.087, p = .006$), while in Mexico, party involvement increases trust by about three and a half percentage points ($\beta = 0.036, p = .059$). In India, moreover, those who “don’t know” what party they identify with trust LHROs more ($\beta = 0.072, p = .059$), while in Morocco, those without a clear party affiliation trust LHROs less ($\beta = -0.081, p = .012$).

Some demographic variables also influenced trust. Men trust LHROs about eight percentage points less than women in Morocco ($\beta = -0.077, p = .006$). Colombians of African descent trusted LHROs about six percentage points less ($\beta = -0.056, p = .091$), while those who declared they had “no” ethnicity, over seven points less ($\beta = -0.075, p = .054$) than the mixed-race (Spanish/indigenous) mestizo reference group. This is perhaps a counter-intuitive finding, as ethnic minorities are presumably groups most in need of the protections afforded by human rights. In Mumbai and rural Maharashtra, Hindi speakers were nearly seven percentage points less trustful of LHROs ($\beta = -0.069, p = .003$) than the Marathi-speaking majority.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

LHROs are crucial pieces of the global human rights puzzle. Without a vibrant and effective LHRO community, it will be hard—if not impossible—to promote domestic respect for internationally recognized human rights. Without substantial support from LHROs and other civil society actors, the international human rights toolkit of treaties, declarations, UN audits, and NGO reports is likely to have little effect.

Popular trust in LHROs is an important part of this equation. Although LHROs may help shape specific government policies without public support, their efficacy is likely to be enhanced when they enjoy the trust of ordinary people. In a truly “rights respecting” society, domestic human rights groups
should, in theory, be regarded with warmth and respect by a substantial public cross section. On its own, trust in LHROs cannot shape policy or create rights respecting societies, but it is a crucial asset in civil society’s struggle for a more just social order.

Scholars and activist communities voice a series of claims about the correlates of public trust in LHROs. Until now, however, no scholars have put these assumptions to systematic test. Although a thriving scholarly community studies the emergence and work of LHROs, much of this research is qualitative and oriented toward individual countries and organizations. As a result, it cannot, by definition, provide strong evidence for probabilistic and externally valid claims.

This article has sought to do just that. We began by interviewing 233 key informants from sixty countries, and then constructed a unique Human Rights Perception Poll—a survey instrument with a battery of questions about the public’s views of domestic human rights issues, policies, and organizations. We first administered the survey to nationally representative Mexican and Colombian samples and then translated, adapted, and administered it to representative samples in key parts of Morocco and India.

Drawing on the scholarly literature and our key informant interviews, we generated five expectations about the correlates of popular trust in LHROs. The data, however, provided strong support for only two of the five.

Our most consistent finding is that support for LHROs is strongest among those citizens who are deeply skeptical of their country’s mainstream political institutions, agencies, and actors. For these people, human rights groups offer an attractive political alternative. As expected, moreover, respondents in Mexico, Colombia, and India with greater human rights familiarity were also more trusting of LHROs. Although the causal relationship is unclear, this finding is good news for LHROs and their supporters. Contrary to Englund’s troubling discovery of a negative public/LHRO relationship in Malawi, public familiarity with rights groups is clearly associated with greater, rather than lesser, trust in three of our four samples.

LHROs and their international supporters should also be encouraged to learn that ordinary people do distinguish between sources of LHRO funding and care less than expected about foreign investment in local rights activities. Perceived financial support from foreign citizens and governments is

93. For the distinction between rights-respecting societies and states, see Dicklitch & Lwanga, supra note 1, at 494–96. For discussions of how LHROs can shape government policy without broad public support, see James Ron, Varying Methods of State Violence, 51 Int’l Org. 275, 291 (1997); Shor, supra note 2, at 134.


95. Englund, supra note 11.
negatively related with public trust in LHROs only in Colombia, while beliefs about the importance of IO funding for local rights groups has opposite effects in India (positive) and Morocco (negative). Overall, the publics we sampled seem somewhat indifferent to LHRO funding sources. Although governments, leading conservatives, and other elite critics of human rights work make much of LHROs’ external financial ties, their rhetoric is not as persuasive as they might hope.

The relationship between socioeconomic status and trust is even more inconsistent, even though this putative link has attracted substantial attention. In Morocco, the middle class trusts LHROs more than either the poor or the wealthy, but income has no relationship elsewhere, much like urban residence. The lack of a significant association with measures of transnational connectivity was another surprise, and warrants further empirical and theoretical research.

Overall, our polls highlight the importance of empirical analysis and contextual, country-specific explanations. Although global donors and NGOs can try to support LHRO work cross-nationally, many of the most important factors are local, contextual, and specific. Broad generalizations about the natural inclinations of this or that group—such as the middle class, the educated, the urban, and the transnationally connected—may be partially, or even entirely, wrong. Nationalism, moreover, may not shape popular attitudes as much as both human rights advocates and their critics expect.

Our unique Human Rights Perception Polls across three world regions, colonial traditions, and world religions discovered fewer constants than expected and cast doubt on some commonly held assumptions. To truly substantiate and/or undermine cross-national claims, however, more country polls are warranted.
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Table 2. Determinants of Public Trust in LHROs (Rescaled 0-1) in Colombia, Mexico, Mumbai, and Rabat/Casablanca

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Rabat/Casablanca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1: Familiarity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Phrase &quot;HR&quot;</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>-0.009 0.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know Someone Working in LHRO</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.763 0.170***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in LHRO activities</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.193 -0.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **H2: Organizational Funding** |          |        |        |                  |
| Funded by GOV | -0.108** | 0.002  | -0.004 | 0.845 -0.047*** |
| Funded by NGO CTZN | -0.059†  | 0.100  | -0.004 | 0.888 0.006   |
| Funded by NGO GOV | -0.052†  | 0.058  | -0.029 | 0.362 -0.053  |
| Funded by INTL ORG | 0.024     | 0.308  | -0.009 | 0.683 0.136*** |
| Funded by OTHERS | -0.073     | 0.444  | -0.147†| 0.087 -0.210  |

| **H3: Anti-Politics** |          |        |        |                  |
| Trust Executive | 0.027     | 0.486  | -0.028 | 0.351 0.030   |
| Trust Politicians | -0.217*** | 0.000  | -0.196***| 0.000 -0.146*** |
| Trust Parliament | 0.053     | 0.167  | -0.062†| 0.059 -0.114***|
| Trust Police | -0.059     | 0.147  | -0.079**| 0.008 -0.128***|
| Trust Army | 0.158***   | 0.000  | 0.232***| 0.000 0.107*** |

| **H4: Transnational Connectivity** |          |        |        |                  |
| Internet | 0.028     | 0.210  | -0.024 | 0.173 0.003   |
| Speaks Foreign Language | -0.012     | 0.705  | -0.006 | 0.815 0.150   |
| No. of Trips Abroad | -0.001     | 0.579  | -0.000 | 0.625 0.020   |
| Lived Abroad | 0.011     | 0.799  | -0.022 | 0.313 -0.106***|

| **H5: Socioeconomic Status** |          |        |        |                  |
| Urban Resident | -0.028     | 0.254  | -0.064***| 0.013 -0.033   |
| Years of Education | -0.002     | 0.499  | -0.003 | 0.111 0.002   |
| Income | 0.081     | 0.134  | 0.017  | 0.680 -0.049   |
| Income Squared | -0.013     | 0.213  | -0.004 | 0.665 0.013   |
| No. of Light Bulbs | -0.000     | 0.849  | 0.009  | 0.882 -0.005   |
| No. of Rooms | 0.001     | 0.899  | 0.001  | 0.894 -0.001   |

N 1,197 1,748 1,034 636
R-Squared 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.16
Adj. R-Squared 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.11
RMSE 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.32

APPENDIX A

The Sixty-Country Purposeful Sample: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics

The project began with ten pilot interviews in June 2005 at a three-week training seminar run by an NGO in Canada. According to the NGO staff, some 600 men and women from the Global South and former Communist countries apply to the seminar each year. The NGO offers admission to some 130 of these, the majority of whom eventually attend. Selection criteria

96. We omit coefficients for control variables and country-specific political parties and ethnic groups, noting relevant results in the text. For full results, consult Appendix D.
include applicants’ experience in rights-related work, the strength of their written recommendations and statements of intent, minimal competence in French or English, and eligibility for Canadian Overseas Development Assistance, typically granted to persons from countries below a certain per capita income.

Most applicants work in their country’s nongovernmental sector, live in a major city, are university educated, and have some human rights experience. Our analysis of the 2006 applicant pool suggests that successful applicants tend to be more organizationally senior, and have more human rights experience, than those who are unsuccessful.

Figure 1. Respondent World Region (N=128)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin &amp; Central America</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; N. Africa</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast &amp; East Asia</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe &amp; Russia</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Respondent Countries of Activity (n = 128)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The team conducted 128 standardized interviews at the seminar site in June 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010. NGO staff helped select respondents based on considerations of world region, country, English or French competency, and sex. The goal was to achieve rough parity across these five variables. The median number of respondents from each country was two; the range was 1–7; and only three countries supplied more than five respondents.

Figures 1 and 2 detail respondents’ region and country of origin.

The team employed a standardized oral and written questionnaire with structured and semi-structured questions and qualitative probes. The interview’s oral segment included fifty (structured and semi-structured) questions, took place in English or French, and lasted fifty-seven minutes, on average (range = 29–84 minutes, standard deviation = 12). At the interview's end, we asked respondents to fill out and return a written questionnaire with forty-one structured questions, and to provide signed consent for use of their data. A handful failed to return those forms, and their data was discarded.

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT NGOS

As shown in Figure 3, eighty-eight (69 percent) of our 128 respondents worked for a domestic NGO, the median founding date of which was 1996. The remainder (16 percent) worked for their country’s public service (a local or regional branch of an international NGO (8 percent), a regional or international NGO (1 percent), or other (7 percent)). Many did not identify their domestic NGOs as “human rights organizations,” preferring instead to self-identify as members of the development or social justice sector, with an interest in human rights. This blurring of identities and mandates is increasingly common due to international donor interest in the rights-based approach to development.

The domestic NGOs in our sample had a median staff size of seventeen, of whom 72 percent, on average, were paid, rather than volunteer. Over
Figure 4. Respondent Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency/ Percent</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Information</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age at Time of Interview</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Years at Current Workplace</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Level Position</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Level Position</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Level Position</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median # Work-Related International Trips in Last 5 Years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried, Full-Time</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried, Part-Time</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid, Volunteer</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicing Members of Faith</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary School</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended University</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Years at University</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Attended University</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Attended University</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Secondary School in a Major City</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended University in a Major City</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Professional Background/Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Teacher</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Professor</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Half (54 percent) operated at the national level, while 24 percent operated at the subnational level.

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

The 128-strong sample was evenly split by sex and included persons drawn from either the senior (48 percent) or middle (44 percent) tier of their orga-

97. “Other” includes backgrounds with less than 5 percent representation: medicine, religious service, economics, psychology, sociology, civil engineering, pharmacy, mathematics, international affairs, accounting, anthropology, engineering, community development, chemical engineering, architecture, political science, science, statistics, public service, rural development, students, and business.
nization’s hierarchy. Most respondents (77 percent) were salaried; 66 percent full-time, and 11 percent part-time. The average respondent age was thirty-seven years. They came from a range of professional backgrounds, including positions such as: lawyer (27 percent), social worker (9 percent), teacher (5 percent), university professor (5 percent), and journalist (5 percent). On average, respondents had begun working for entities interested in human rights in 1998, and 36 percent had prior experience with other types of NGOs.

Respondents were highly educated, well-traveled, and largely religious. Virtually everyone had attended university in a major city, and over three quarters had also attended secondary school in a major city. Their median number of work-related international trips over the preceding five years was three. Over 70 percent were practicing members of their faith.

APPENDIX B

Sampling Local Human Rights Organizations in Mexico, Morocco & India Methodology & Descriptive Statistics

A. Mexico City, Mexico

The Mexico City data was gathered from May 2010 to March 2012. The frame includes fifty Local Human Rights Organizations (LHROs), of which the research team sampled thirty—or 60 percent.

Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: NGOs that were legally registered as “civil associations”; based in Mexico’s Federal District; were not members or branches of an international NGO; and that contained the term “rights,” either in an international language or in the vernacular, in their mission statements or major activity descriptions.

Web-based Searches: All fifty groups had a web presence. We found no legally registered LHROs in Mexico City without a URL. We searched the following online sources and scrutinized them for candidate organizations. We then verified those meeting our inclusion criteria through further web searches, phone calls, physical contact, or key informant consultation.

- First five pages of results from a search of Google.int/en using the terms “Derechos Humanos y Mexico” and “Derechos Humanos y Distrito Federal.”
- UNESCO’s list of Mexican NGOs.
- www.idealista.org
- Development Organizations Index 2010.
• National networks, including: Red Mexicana de Acción frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC); Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia México (MCD México); Red de Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos; Red por los Derechos de la Infancia en México; and Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos “Todos Derechos para Todas y Todos.”

**Issue Crawler Search:** Google for “Derechos Humanos” + “Distrito Federal,” and “Derechos Humanos” + “Mexico” on Google.int/es on 6 May 2010, and input URLs from the first five pages into Issuecrawler, a web-based “mapping” device that identifies inter-organizational networks on the Internet. We conducted two “crawls,” one for the “Distrito Federal” results, and another for the “Mexico” results. Our goal was to identify two different “issue networks” of organizations with a valid web presence, working on rights-based issues in the Distrito Federal and in Mexico as a whole. We compared these two lists to the list created through the web searches outlined above and added new organizations that matched our criteria.

**Key Informant Verification:** We sent a draft sample frame to five key informants in Canada and Mexico for verification and substantiation. Two of these were based at Canada’s International Development Research Centre, one at the Ottawa-based nonprofit Inter Pares, one from the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) Mexico City Office and one informant from the Mexican National Network for Human Rights (Todos los Derechos para Todas y Todos).

This led to a final sampling frame of fifty LHROs in the Mexican Distrito Federal.

**Sampling:** On 27 May 2010, we conducted an inter-actor Issue Crawl on the URLs of all fifty LHROs. From these results, we created two sampling strata: one with twenty-nine “core” groups whose URLs received at least two links from the other forty-nine URLs, and another with twenty-one “peripheral” groups whose URLs received one or no links from the others.

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98. We also included legally registered network secretariats, as long as they had human rights in their mandates.


100. Our team conducted the web crawls on 6 May 2010. See Issuecrawler.net, *Scenarios of Use for NGOs and Other Network Researchers: Issue Crawler Applications for Civil Society*, Govcom.org (n.d.), available at http://www.govcom.org/scenarios_use.htm, for a description of social networks versus issue networks. This page describes an issue network as “the network of organizations around a particular issue” and notes that Issuecrawler was originally created to locate such networks.
Aided by a random number generator, we selected, contacted, and interviewed representatives of seventeen “core” and thirteen “peripheral” groups, largely in Spanish. We conducted the first fourteen interviews from June to August 2010, and the remaining sixteen from February to March 2012.

**Survey Instruments:** The interview’s oral portion included nineteen questions and several probes, and its written portion had thirty-one closed questions, as well as a signed consent form.

**Interview Duration:** Our thirty interviews lasted 73 minutes, on average, with a range of 24–138 minutes, and a standard deviation of 26.

**Data Recording and Analysis:** The interviews were taped, and the digital files are on file with the project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.

**Funding:** The Mexico City interviews were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Mexico City Sampling Frame

1. Abogados y Abogadas para la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos, A.C.
2. Academia Mexicana de Derecho de la Seguridad Social
3. Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, A.C. (AMDH)
4. Agenda LGBT
5. APIS - Fundación para la Equidad, A. C.
6. Asistencia Legal por los Derechos Humanos, A.C.
7. Asociación Nacional de Locutores de Mexico, A.C.
8. Asociación Nacional para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y La Vigilencia Permanente de la Aplicación de la Ley, A.C.
9. Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de Personas Violadas (ADIVAC)
10. AVE DE MÉXICO, A.C.
11. BALANCE, Promoción para el Desarrollo y Juventud, A.C.
12. Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir, A.C.
13. Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria, O.P.
14. Centro de Reflexión y Acción Laboral (CEREAL-DF) (Distrito Federal) - SEE COS-MONTIEL EMAIL FOR INFO
15. Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C. (CEMDA)
16. Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social, A.C.(CENCOS)
17. Cochitehua centro mexicano de intercambios, A.C. (CEMIAC)
18. Colectivo contra la Tortura y la Impunidad, A.C.
19. Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, A.C.
20. Comité Nacional de los 63 Pueblos Indígenas, A.C.
21. Comunicación e Información de la Mujer, A.C. (CIMAC)
22. Convergencia de Organismos Civiles, A.C.
23. Desarrollo, Educación y Cultura Autogestionarios (DECA) Equipo Pueblo
24. Educación con el Niño Callejero (Ednica) - Institución de Asistencia Privada (IAP)
25. El Centro de Derechos Humanos “Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez,” A.C.
26. Enlace, Comunicación y Capacitación, A.C. (ENLACE)
27. Equidad de Género: Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia, A.C.
28. FIAN México, A.C. (Red por el Derecho Humano a Alimentarse)
29. Fundación Infancia, A.C.
30. Fundar  
31. GIMTRAP, A.C. - Grupo Interdisciplinario sobre Mujer, Trabajo y Pobreza (Mexico)  
32. Grupo de Educación Popular con Mujeres (Mexico)  
33. Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida - GIRE, A.C.  
34. Incide Social, A.C.  
35. Iniciativas para la Identidad y la Inclusión, A.C. (INICIA)  
36. IQ, INVESTIGACIONES QUEER, A.C.  
37. Letra S, Sida, Cultura y Vida Cotidiana, A.C.  
38. Liga Mexicana por la defensa de los derechos humanos  
39. Proyecto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, A.C. (PRODESC)  
40. Red de Jóvenes por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos, A.C.  
41. Red Democracia y Sexualidad, A.C. (DEMYSEX)  
42. Red Nacional Género y Economía (REDGE) / Mujer para el Dialogo (Mexico)  
43. Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos “Todos Derechos para Todas y Todos” - Secretaría Ejecutiva  
44. Red por los Derechos de la Infancia en México  
45. SERAPAZ (Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz)  
46. Servicios a la Juventud, A.C.  
47. Sin Fronteras, I.A.P.  
48. SIPAM - Salud Integral para la Mujer, A.C.  
49. Sociedad Mexicana por los Derechos de la Mujer (SEMILLAS)  
50. Taller Universitario de Derechos Humanos, A.C. (TUDH)

B. San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas State, Mexico

The San Cristóbal data was gathered in 2010. The sampling frame included twenty-five LHROs in the city of San Cristóbal, of which the team sampled fifteen—or 60 percent.

Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Identical to Mexico City; see above.

Web-based Searches: Eighteen of the final list of twenty-five LHROs had a web presence. To locate these LHROs, we conducted the following searches, identified candidate NGOs, and verified that they fit our inclusion criteria through online searches, phone contact, physical contact, or key informant input:

- Key issues or rights categories in Spanish, including women’s rights, indigenous rights, migrant rights, reproductive rights, children’s rights, and land rights, on the same search engines listed above. This led to the discovery of several issue-specific networks.
- Member lists of Mexican NGO and social movement networks identified above.
Online directories, such as *The Struggles for Women’s Rights in Chiapas: A Directory of Social Organisations Supporting Chiapas Women*, and the *Development Organizations Index*. We searched each of these directories independently, first selecting San Cristobal-based organizations, then narrowing this list down to organizations using rights language, and then, finally, selecting only those groups that were legally registered civil associations.

**Issue Crawler:** On 6 May 2010, we searched for “Derechos Humanos” + “San Cristobal” and “Derechos Humanos” + “Chiapas” on Google.int/es and identified all URLs of NGOs in the first five pages of results. We then entered those URLs into Issue Crawler, conducting separate “crawls” for San Cristobal and Chiapas. This created two “issue networks,” which we compared to the list of LHROs created above.

**Key Informants:** We sent the draft list to four key informants, including one employee of the *Fray Bartolomé Centre for Human Rights* in San Cristobal; one from SIPAZ; one former employee of DESMI; and one from CIEPAC. They checked our list, and added several additional groups that we had not identified.

**Sampling:** Seventeen of the final list of twenty-five San Cristobal-based LHROs had websites. We entered their URLs into Issue Crawler for an inter-actor crawl on 12 July 2010 and identified seven “core” groups whose URLs received at least two links from the other eighteen URLs, and ten “peripheral” groups with one or no links from the other URLs. We also had a further eight groups with no web presence at all.

Aided by an online random number generator, we selected, contacted, and interviewed representatives of five LHROs from each strata.

**Survey Instruments:** We conducted interviews in Spanish, with the same Spanish language questionnaire used in Mexico City (see above).

**Interview Duration:** These fifteen interviews lasted 67 minutes, on average, with a range of 40–92 minutes, and a standard deviation of 17.

**Data Recording and Analysis:** The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.

**Funding:** The San Cristobal de las Casas interviews were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
San Cristóbal de las Casas Sampling Frame

1. Capacitación, Asesoría, Medio Ambiente y Defensa del Derecho a la salud, A.C. (CAMADDs)
2. Centro de Capacitación en Ecología y Salud para Campesinos—Defensoría del Derecho a la Salud, A.C.
3. Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas, A.C.
4. Centro de Derechos Humanos “Fray Bartolomé de las Casas,” A.C.
5. Centro de Investigación y Acción de la Mujer Latinoamericana, A.C.
6. Chiltak, A.C.
7. Colectivo de Empleadas Domésticas de los Altos de Chiapas, A.C. (CEDACH)
8. Colectivo de Promoción de los Derechos Civiles y Desarrollo Social, A.C. (DECIDES/Alianza Cívica Chiapas)
9. Colectivo Educación para la Paz y los Derechos Humanos, A.C.
10. Comité de Derechos Humanos de Base de Chiapas “Digna Ochoa”
11. Coordinación Diocesana de Mujeres
12. Diócesis de San Cristóbal de las Casas
13. Formación y Capacitación, A.C. (FOCA)
14. FORO para el Desarrollo Sustentable, A.C.
15. Fortaleza de la Mujer Maya, A.C. (FOMMA)
16. Grupo de Mujeres de San Cristóbal, A.C. (COLEM)
17. K’inal Antsetik, A.C. (Chiapas)
18. Maderas del Pueblo del Sureste, A.C.
19. Melel Xojobal, A.C.
20. NICHIM JOLOVIL Asociación Civil
21. Otros Mundos Chiapas, A.C.
22. Programa de Apoyo a la Mujer, A.C.
23. Proyecto DIFA, Alternativas y Actualización, A.C. (DIFA)
24. Red de Defensores Comunitarios por Derechos Humanos, A.C.
25. Skolta’el Yu’un Jlumaltic–Ch’ulme’il, A.C. (SYJAC)

C. Rabat & Casablanca, Morocco

The team created the combined Rabat/Casablanca sampling frame of fifty-six LHROs and interviewed representatives of thirty (53 percent), from September 2010 through May 2011. We pooled these two cities’ LHROs because they are geographically close and are often regarded as a single unit. Casablanca is Morocco’s financial capital, while Rabat is its political capital.

Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Legally registered entities; headquartered in the Rabat or Casablanca prefectures; not part of an international NGO; and that contained the term “rights”—either in an international language or in the vernacular—in their mission statements or major activity descriptions.

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101. Morocco’s administrative map divides the country into sixteen regions, which in turn are sub-divided into provinces (forty-eight) and prefectures (thirteen). Provinces and prefectures are the second level of administrative division, the former referring to rural centers and the latter referring to urban centers or cities. Cities are further subdivided into municipalities (communes) and districts (arrondissements) in certain metropolitan areas.
Web-based Searches: Thirty-five of the fifty-six LHROs had a web presence. To locate them, we conducted the searches noted below, identified candidate NGOs, and verified that they fit our inclusion criteria through telephone or in-person contact. In a smaller number of cases, it was possible to verify inclusion through a web investigation.

- Google international (www.google.com) and Google Morocco (www.google.ma), using the following key words: “rights-based organisations” +”Morocco” +”rabat” + “casablanca,” “human rights organisations” +”Morocco” +”rabat” +”casablanca,” “organisations de droits humains” +”maroc” +”rabat” + “casablanca,” “organisations de droits de l’homme” +”maroc” +”rabat” + “casablanca.” Searches in English and French.

- Google search using the Arabic translation of “human rights organisations Morocco.” This did not generate additional organisations over those already identified above.

- www.tanmia.ma, an extensive database of 7492 Moroccan NGOs (as of February 2012), 663 of which are located in Casablanca, and 709 of which are in Rabat. We searched for all organizations in each city, as well as for all “human rights” groups in each city.

- The more limited UNESCO human rights organisations database (http://rabat.unesco.org/droits_humains/mot.php3?id_mot=1)

Key informants: The president of the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH) shared their human rights group database, which we used to cross-check our own draft list. The former president of l’Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines provided more suggestions, as did the president of la Ligue Marocaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme.

Sampling: We input the thirty-five URLs into Issue Crawler on 23 February 2011 and conducted a crawl to identify twelve (21 percent) “core” groups that received two or more incoming links from the other thirty-four URLs, and twenty-three (41 percent) “peripheral” groups that received one or less links from the other thirty-four. To this, we added another group of twenty-one (36 percent) with no web presence at all.

We then used a random number generator to select, contact, and interview thirty of the fifty-six groups. Seven of these were “core” groups, twelve were from the “peripheral” category, and eleven were from the strata with no web presence at all.

Survey Instruments: We translated the Mexico questionnaire into French and Arabic, and conducted the interviews in both languages.
**Interview Duration:** These thirty interviews lasted 67 minutes, on average, with a range of 40–92 minutes, and a standard deviation of 17.

**Data Recording and Analysis:** The interviews were digitally taped and are on file with the project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.

**Funding:** The Morocco interviews were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

**Rabat & Casablanca Sampling Frame**

1. Al Wassit - Le Mediateur
2. Amicale Marocaine des Handicapes
3. Association ADALA-JUSTICE
4. Association AMAL femmes en mouvement pour un avenir meilleur
5. Association Chouala pour l’éducation et la culture
6. Association de Lutte Contre le Sida (ALCS)
7. Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc
8. Association des amis des centres de reforme et la protection de l’enfance
9. Association Espam pour la Protection des Personnes Agées au Maroc (ESPAM)
10. Association femmes pour l’égalité et la démocratie
11. Association Manbar Al Mouak
12. Association Marocaine d’Aide aux Enfants en Situation Précaire (AMESIP)
13. Association marocaine de la femme handicapée
15. Association marocaine de recherche et d’échange culturel
16. Association Marocaine de soutien et d’aide aux handicapés mentaux AMSAHM
17. Association Marocaine des Déficients Moteurs
18. Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)
19. Association Marocaine pour Adultes et Jeunes Handicapés
20. Association Marocaine pour la promotion de la femme rurale
21. Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes
22. Association Médicale de Réhabilitation des Victimes de la Torture (A.R.M.V.T)-Centre d’Accueil et d’Orientation des Victimes de la Torture
23. Association OloK
24. Association Soleil pour le soutien des enfants affectés et infectés par le VIH/SIDA au Maroc
25. Association solidarité féminine
26. ATFAL
27. Bayti
28. Carrefour marocain des jeunes pour la modernité
29. Centre d’Etudes en Droits Humains et Démocratie (CEDHD)
30. Centre de Démocratie
31. Centre Marocain des Droits de l’Homme
32. Comité de Soutien à la Scolarisation des Filles Rurales
33. Défi environnement - Tahaddi Baya
34. Energie pour le Développement Humain
35. Espace Associatif
36. Espace des jeunes pour l’innovation et le développement
37. Femme Action
38. Femme Activité Physique et sport
39. Fondation marocaine pour le développement de l’handicape
40. Forum des alternatives Maroc
41. Forum Vérité et Justice (FJ)
42. Institution Nationale de Solidarité avec les Femmes en Détresse- INSAF
43. Jossour Forum des Femmes Marocaines
44. La Voix de la Femme Amazighe
45. Ligue Démocratique des Droits des Femmes
46. Ligue Marocaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme
47. Montada Al Mowatana-Citizenship Forum
48. Mountada azzahrae pour la femme marocaine
49. Mouvement Mouwatinoun
50. Muntada Al Karama
51. Observatoire Marocain des Prisons
52. Observatoire marocain de l’intégration de la femme dans la vie politique
53. Organisation des libertés des médias et d’expression
54. Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH)
55. Réseau Amazigh pour la Citoyenneté
56. Union pour l’Action Féminine (UAF)

D. Mumbai, India

Our researchers identified fifty-seven LHROs in Mumbai and interviewed representatives of thirty (52 percent), between July 2010 and April 2011. This list may not be complete, as many smaller groups in Mumbai are extremely difficult to locate.

Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: Legally registered organizations; headquartered in Mumbai; use the word “rights” in their mandate, mission statement, objectives, “About us” section, or description of activities. We excluded the Mumbai branch offices of groups headquartered elsewhere in India or the world.

Web-based Searches: Forty-eight of these fifty-seven had some kind of web presence. To locate them, we conducted the following searches and then examined candidate organizations to see if they fit our inclusion criteria. Verification was done online, via phone, in person, or by key informant.

- Idealist.org, consulted 17 July 2010, and filtered using “non-profit organizations” in Mumbai.
- Human Rights Internet, consulted 18 July 2010, searched by “NGOs,” “India,” “national” level work, and “HROs.”
- The Indian government’s NGO partnership system database of NGOs and Voluntary Organizations, consulted 19 July 2010 and 21 August 2010. Organizations listing “human rights” or “right to information and advocacy” as an area of interest, filtered from within the “Mumbai” and “Mumbai suburban” parts of Maharashtra State.
- www.Karmayog.org, consulted 6–7 August 2010, filtered by “Mumbai,” “human rights” and “legal aid.” Searched again on 6 September 2010, and listed all 1355 organizations in Mumbai, each of which was manually searched for “rights” in their work description.
• International Human Rights Association list, consulted 7 August 2010, searched by “Mumbai” and “Maharashtra.”

• www.GivelIndia.org, consulted 7 August 2010, searched by “human rights.”

• Google International and Google India, searched August 7, 2010 with the keywords “human rights” and “Mumbai,” first ten pages of results.

• Google International, searched 7 August 2010, with the keywords “democratic rights + Mumbai” and “civil liberties + Mumbai,” first five pages of results.

• ww.sulekha.com, consulted 8 August 2010, searched by “city,” “nonprofit organizations,” and “social justice NGOs.”

• Child Rights Information Network (CRIN) database, consulted 19 August 2010, searched for NGOs that included “training or education on child rights,” “research child rights,” “rights-based programming,” or “reporting to, or monitoring, the Convention on Children’s Rights” in their mandate, and that were based in India (seventy-eight) and then Mumbai (two).

• Google International and Google India, 21 August 2010, with the keywords “Manav Adhikar” and “Mumbai,” first ten pages of results.

Directory of Development Organizations in India 2010, searched for all groups in Mumbai, and then individually scrutinized.

• http://www.maharashtra.ngosindia.com/ database, consulted 18 October 2010 for NGOs in Maharashtra, and then Mumbai.

• Google India, 20 October 2010, keywords “Manav Adhikar” and “Mumbai” in Marathi/Hindi in first ten pages of results.

• The Mumbai Street Children’s Empowerment Network.

Issue Crawler: A team member searched on 6 May 2010 for “Human Rights” + “Mumbai” on Google.int/en, identified URLs of NGOs in the first five pages of results, and input those into Issue Crawler to identify “issue networks” of groups with a valid web presence and working on rights-based issues in Mumbai. We compared these results to those obtained through the search efforts described above.

Key Informants: Researchers shared a draft sampling frame with eight Mumbai-based and three New Delhi-based key informants. Several said the list was comprehensive, several could not comment, and one said it was
impossible to compile a complete Mumbai list. Two were concerned that a handful of the groups either did not truly exist, or were front organizations for political organizations.

**Sampling:** We conducted an Issue Crawler inter-actor analysis of the available forty-eight URLs on 23 November 2011. Only three were “core” organizations receiving two or more incoming links from the other forty-seven URLs; the rest were “peripheral” groups with one or no incoming links from the other forty-seven. Given this dearth of virtual LHRO networks in Mumbai, we randomly sampled from the entire list of fifty-seven groups, assisted by a random number generator.

**Survey Instruments:** We translated the English questionnaire into Hindi and used both languages in the thirty interviews.

**Interview Duration:** These thirty interviews lasted 66 minutes, on average, with a range of 34–136 minutes, and a standard deviation of 125.

**Data Recording and Analysis:** We taped the interviews, and those digital files are on file with the project leader. Interviewers took written notes during interviews, summarized the interview’s contents after the interview, and translated and added verbatim interview quotes.

**Funding:** The India interviews were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

**Mumbai Sampling Frame**

1. Able Disabled All People Together (ADAPT - formerly the Spastic Society of India)
2. Academy for Mobilising Urban Rural Action through Education (AAMRAE)
3. Akshara
4. All India Citizen’s Vigilance Committee
5. All India Human Rights Citizen Option
6. All Maharashtra Human Rights Welfare Association (India)
7. Apnalaya
8. Arpan
9. Association for Early Childhood Education and Development
10. Awaaz-e-Niswan (AEN)
11. Bal Prafullata
12. Basic Equality and Development (BEND) Foundation
13. Bombay Catholic Sabha
14. Bombay Urban Industrial League for Development (BUILD)
15. Centre for Enquiry Into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT)
16. Centre for Social Action
17. Child Rights and You
18. Childline India Foundation
19. Committed Communities Development Trust (CCDT)
20. Committee for the Right to Housing
21. Committee of Resource Organizations for Literacy (CORO)
22. Disability Research and Design Foundation
E. Descriptive Statistics

The median founding date of all NGOs represented in all of our samples combined is 1995, and most focus their work on the subnational or national level. Their median staff size is twenty-two, but only 63 percent of these, on average, are partially or fully paid. Most groups work on human rights education (20 percent), legal interventions (25 percent), or public advocacy (18 percent).

Respondents tend to be urban-raised, highly educated, middle-aged, and are senior members of their respective organizations. Their work-related international exposure is moderate, with an average of three work-related international trips over the past five years. Respondents from Mexico City tended to travel the most internationally, while those in Mumbai traveled the least. Over half the sample reported being a practicing member of their faith, but this varied substantially by city.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combined (n = 105)</th>
<th>Mexico City (n = 30)</th>
<th>San Cristobal (n = 15)</th>
<th>Rabat-Casablanca (n = 30)</th>
<th>Mumbai (n = 30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HISTORY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded Before 1993 (%)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded Between 1993 and 2000 (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded Between 2001 and 2010 (%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STAFF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Number of Staff</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Percentage of Paid Staff (%)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCOPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Number of Visits by Foreigners in the Last Year</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or Village Level Focus (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or National Level Focus (%)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Regional or Global Focus (%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MAIN ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Legal Interventions (%)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Advocacy (%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights Education with Government Officials or Average People (%)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Some respondents listed multiple “main activities,” but this table relies only on the first mentioned.
Figure 2. Respondent Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combined (n = 105)</th>
<th>Mexico City (n = 30)</th>
<th>San Cristobal (n = 15)</th>
<th>Rabat-Casablanca (n = 30)</th>
<th>Mumbai (n = 30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age (at time of interview)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Years at Current RBO (#)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Years at Current RBO (#)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Level (%)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Level (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Level (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or More Work-related International Trips in the Last 5 Years (%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELIGION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian (%)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu (%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (%)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion (%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicing Members of Faith (%)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary School (%)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended Secondary School in a Major City (%)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended University (%)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Years at University (#)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended University in a Major City (%)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Attended University (%)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Attended University (%)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Human Rights Perception Polls Methodologies

In 2012, in collaboration with local partners in Mexico, Colombia, Morocco, and India, we conducted representative public opinion polls on perceptions of human rights and human rights organizations. Nationwide samples were collected in Mexico and Colombia, whereas city-samples with smaller rural comparative samples were collected from Morocco and India. Country- and context-specific methodologies were adopted in each country in order to gather data from average citizens.

A. Mexico

In order to conduct the national Mexican poll, we collaborated with the Americas and the World survey based at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City. Since 2004, this initiative has been conducting multi-country surveys on foreign policy and public opinion in Latin America on a biannual basis. The surveys are conducted on a national level and include a wide range of topics, including: interest in politics, contact with the world, trust and security, national and regional identity, political knowledge, foreign policy and the country’s role in the world, international norms, and regional and international relations.

In 2012, we added a battery of nine questions, specific to perceptions of human rights and human rights organizations, to the existing Mexico survey instrument.103

Sampling: A local Mexican survey firm, Data-OPM, executed the survey between August and October 2012 after pilot tests. The survey included only Mexican nationals, residing in Mexico, aged eighteen years and older.

The sampling frame was electoral sections defined by Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which included data from the 2012 federal election. The survey utilized a multi-stage sampling strategy where the survey firm conducted a randomized selection process for each of the three sampling units. The primary sampling units were electoral polling districts, the secondary sampling units were blocks within each electoral polling district, and the tertiary sampling units were the households and individuals within each block.

103. The Mexico survey instrument and further details are available upon request.
The survey firm collected a sample of 2,400 to allow for analysis of results at national and regional levels. Field researchers hired by the survey firm conducted face-to-face interviews in Spanish, and the sample margin of error was +/- 2.0 percent. Details on the territorial and national breakdown of the sample and more information on sampling procedures are available online.\footnote{104}{See Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez et al., Mexico, the Americas, and the World 2012–2013, Foreign Policy: Public Opinion and Leaders, Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDÉ, International Studies Division, available at http://dominio1.cide.edu/documents/320058/3a95d83b-12e8-41e8-9255-22b5ce1e55ab.}

**B. Rabat & Casablanca, Morocco**

We conducted a poll of Moroccan nationals residing in Morocco above the age of eighteen in collaboration with the Casablanca-based research firm, LMS-CSA. To match the geographic focus of our 2011 survey of Moroccan human rights activists, we conducted the public opinion survey in Rabat and Casablanca, their surrounding environs,\footnote{105}{More specifically, we took our urban samples in Grand Casablanca from the following administrative units: Casablanca, Mohammadia, Médîouna, and Nouâsseur. In Rabat, we sampled from Salé-Skhirat-Témara.} and in a smaller sample of rural municipalities within 70 kilometers of the two cities.\footnote{106}{Given the high degree of urbanization in the two targeted regions of the study, we chose to include among eligible sampling points some communes rurales, which, administratively speaking, do not belong to the targeted regions, but lie within a radius of 70–80 km from Casablanca, Rabat, Salé, and Skhirat-Temara.} With LMS-CSA’s expertise, we established that an urban sample of 800, combined with a rural sample of 300, would be sufficient to create a representative poll of adults living in these areas.

**Sampling:** LMS-CSA conducted a proportional stratified random sampling process for the urban and rural samples. In other words, each of the two samples (Urban and Rural) were allocated to the regions covered (Casablanca, Rabat-Salé, and Skhirat Temara) depending on the weight of their target population.

For the urban sample, the primary sampling units were local municipalities, the secondary sampling units were permanent landmarks within municipalities, and the tertiary sampling units were the households and individuals within municipalities. For the rural sample, the primary sampling units were rural municipalities, the secondary sampling units were Mosques within the municipalities, and the tertiary sampling units were households and individu-
als. The survey firm randomly selected each sample unit and conducted no more than thirty interviews per urban municipality, as well as no more than twelve interviews per rural municipality.

The local field research team conducted interviews in Arabic and French in October 2012 after piloting the questionnaire in September. The questionnaire had thirty-one questions. For more details on sampling, data entry, weighting process, and survey instruments, a full methodological report is available from the authors upon request.

C. Mumbai, Maharashtra, India

In collaboration with CVOTER, an Indian research firm, we polled 1,680 Indian adult citizens over eighteen years of age in Mumbai and rural Maharashtra. To triangulate findings with those of the representative LHRO survey completed in Mumbai in 2010 and 2011, we collected a representative sample of 1,080 residents of Mumbai, booster sample of Christians and Buddhists of 150 each, and a sample of 300 rural Maharashtrian residents.

**Sampling:** A multi-stage stratified random sample was conducted in Mumbai and the rural Maharashtra. The primary sampling units for Mumbai were the legislative assemblies that form part of Mumbai and Maharashtra’s parliamentary constituencies. Using random number generator software, CVOTER first selected assembly segments. Within each selected assembly segment, they selected a polling booth as the secondary sampling unit. From each selected polling booth’s corresponding electoral roll names, they randomly selected the first individual’s name for interview, and from there, if the interview was successfully completed, they chose every tenth individual’s name on the list for an interview. When the listed individuals were not available or chose not to participate, the next name on the list was contacted until a full valid interview was completed.

**Booster & Rural Sampling:** In order to collect booster sample data of Buddhists, Christians, and rural residents, the survey firm conducted a qualitative analysis of Mumbai’s booth lists and created a separate list of neighborhoods and communities with greater Buddhist and Christian population densities, as well as rural polling booths in Maharashtra. From these lists, booths and respondents were selected, and interviews were conducted following the same procedures as described above.

CVOTER’s field research team conducted all interviews in Hindi and Marathi between December 2011 and January 2012 after pilot testing the survey
questionnaire, which included thirty-four questions. For more details on the sampling, data entry, weighting process, as well as the survey instrument, a full methodological report is available from the authors upon request.

D. Colombia

We collaborated with The Americas and the World Initiative, at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City, and their Colombian partner, the Universidad de los Andes Colombia, to gather the Colombian national data. The Colombian research team conducted a national survey between November and December 2012 using a questionnaire that utilized the same battery of questions on human rights and human rights organizations included in the Mexican national survey.

**Sampling:** The Colombian sample is a multi-stage stratified random sample. The pollsters used maps from the National Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística) to select municipalities across the nation as the primary sampling units. The secondary sampling units were blocks selected proportionally to rural stratus and districts. The tertiary sampling units were the households in each segment. At each step, the survey team randomly selected the sampling units.

Working groups were organized in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Pasto, and interviewers moved from these cities to cover all points of the sample. Interviews were face-to-face in respondents’ homes, and field supervisors called 20 percent of interviewed households to verify.

A total of 1,699 adults were interviewed, creating a 95 percent confidence level with an expected error of +/- 3 percent. The sample is nationally and regionally representative, but is not representative of the municipal level. Further details are available upon request.
### Appendix D. Determinants of Trust in LHROs in Colombia, Mexico, Mumbai, and Rabat/Casablanca (Full Regression Results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Mumbai</th>
<th>Rabat/Casablanca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1: Familiarity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Phrase &quot;HR&quot;</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know Someone Working in LHRO</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in LHRO activities</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2: Organizational Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHRO Funding (Reference=GOV)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded by GOV</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded by FGN CTZN</td>
<td>-0.059†</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded by FGN GOV</td>
<td>-0.052†</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded by INTL ORG</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded by OTHERS</td>
<td>-0.073*</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>-0.147*</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.792</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H3: Anti-Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Executive</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Politicians</td>
<td>-0.217***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.196***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Parliament</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>-0.062†</td>
<td>0.059</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Police</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.079*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Army</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.232***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H4: Transnational Connectivity</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks Foreign Language</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Trips Abroad</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Abroad</td>
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<td>0.739</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.313</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H5: Socioeconomic Status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural (Base=Rural)</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.665</td>
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*Significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.