
REVIEW

ESSAYS

Kosovo in Retrospect

James Ron

The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Noam Chomsky (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1999). 199 pp., paper (ISBN: 1-56751-176-7), \$15.05.

Kosovo: War and Revenge, Tim Judah (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). 368 pp., cloth (ISBN: 0-300-08313-0), \$40.00; 288 pp., paper (ISBN: 0-300-08354-8), \$17.05.

Civil Resistance in Kosovo, Howard Clark (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 224 pp., cloth (ISBN: 0-7453-1574-7), \$59.95; 268 pp., paper (ISBN: 0-7453-1569-0), \$19.95.

Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000). 343 pp., cloth (ISBN: 0-8157-1696-6), \$26.95.

Kosovo has come to occupy a special niche in the consciousness of internationally oriented Western intellectuals. For those who know something about the Balkans, the region's importance stems from its early role in triggering the ugly process of Yugoslav disintegration. Serbia's diaspora anxieties and resentment toward Yugoslav federalism began in its ethnic Albanian-majority province, and it was while grappling with Kosovo's ethnic tensions that Slobodan Milošević became a nationalist. For those more generally interested in war, peace, and international ethics, Kosovo appears vital because it seemed to be one of the few places where Western powers were willing to behave honorably. Unlike Bosnia, where NATO proved feeble and silly, or Rwanda, where Western states were gruesomely indifferent, Kosovo was the place where powerful democracies were going to be a force for good. Previously, the United States had tried and failed to portray its war on Iraq as an ethical crusade, but most observers recognized that effort as a fight to defend

oil profits and consumer demands for gas guzzlers. Conversely, the spring 1999 Kosovo intervention seemed to be cut from nobler cloth.

The four books compared here explore Kosovo events from a variety of perspectives, but none of them accept myths at face value. Noam Chomsky's *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* is the most provocative, rejecting outright any notion that NATO fought for moral reasons. Instead, Chomsky suggests, the war was waged *pour encourager les autres*, as a warning to would-be "rogue states" that America's will was not to be flouted. Chomsky charges NATO spin doctors with inflating Kosovo's suffering while ignoring the pain of others, backing his claims up with prodigious citations. While U.S. allies in Colombia, Turkey, Indonesia, and elsewhere escaped serious censure, Serbia was stigmatized and attacked because Milošević was openly defiant.

Chomsky's argument is interesting but risky, as it could have easily deteriorated into an apology for Serbian crimes. Chomsky does a good job, employing his usual sledgehammer combination of statistics and sarcasm. He condemns Milošević's Serbia but reserves most of his criticism for U.S. and British double standards. His work is disturbing and difficult to read but is worthwhile for critical scholars of humanitarianism, Kosovo, or international affairs.

Tim Judah's superb new book, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, is the polar opposite of Chomsky's. Rather than promoting a broader intellectual argument and analyzing Kosovo's place in the global scheme of things, Judah simply tells the Kosovo story well, with a wonderful eye for detail, causal mechanisms, and the broader regional picture. Based on Judah's own field interviews and observations, the book covers many key themes. It is in many ways a sequel to Judah's earlier excellent work, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. The Kosovo book's leading contributions include Judah's study of the origins of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and his explanation for its rise to prominence within the Kosovo national movement. A veteran journalist, Judah has a critical eye that spares neither Serbs, the West, nor Kosovars.

Judah's book is undoubtably the best all-round on Kosovo to date and is a must read for generalists and specialists alike. Although only lightly footnoted and with few scholarly ambitions, it is well researched and reliable. Unlike many academics, Judah writes with an engaging style, a talent honed during his long years of reporting for British and U.S. newspapers on the Yugoslav wars. It is particularly refreshing to see Judah refuse to treat Serbs as a homogenous bloc of nutty nationalists and to watch him avoid portraying Serbia's enemies, powerless though they may be, as latter-day saints. If you have limited time and want a good overview of Kosovo events, by all means read Tim Judah.

Howard Clark's intriguing but rather technical *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* advances our understanding of Kosovo politics and tactics, offering a sympathetic but critical evaluation of Kosovo's early efforts to oppose Serbia nonviolently. Clark, an astute writer who seems to have spent considerable time in the region, serves as coordinator for an NGO known as War Resisters International,

giving him important comparative insights into other nonviolent movements. Although Clark applauds initial Kosovar efforts to resist Serbian rule by creating parallel structures of education and health, he argues that the dominant political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), had by 1994 run out of ideas and energy.

As a result, when the 1995 Bosnian peace accord at Dayton, Ohio, left Kosovars with few diplomatic hopes, the option of armed rebellion seemed increasingly attractive. Instead of searching for ways of mobilizing the population and confronting Serbian authorities through aggressive but nonviolent methods, the LDK preferred to sit on its hands, waiting for Western salvation. The West eventually did step in, but this happened only after a violent revolt by the KLA triggered bloody Serbian reprisals.

As a peace activist, Clark views the rise of the KLA as a tragedy and devotes considerable effort to exploring other options. His hard-headed but ethically informed analysis is a wonderful synthesis of activism and scholarship, and will be of value to readers interested in nonviolent tactics in general and Kosovo in particular.

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon's *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* is the least accessible and most narrowly focused of the four but is valuable for those with a specialized interest in U.S. strategy and military tactics, especially as they pertain to Kosovo. Daalder was a member of the National Security Council in 1995–1996 and is now based at the Brookings Institution, studying U.S. security policy and European affairs. O'Hanlon, also of Brookings, is a defense analyst specializing in budget priorities, combat technology, and strategy. Unlike Judah or Clark, Daalder and O'Hanlon do not seem to have ever spoken with people living in or around Kosovo. Nevertheless, they have scoured English-language sources for details of American and NATO policy and have interviewed multiple political and military officials. As such, their work provides a useful complement to Judah's and Clark's analyses.

Daalder and O'Hanlon suggest that the U.S. could have avoided the war altogether by pressing harder for a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo early on. More important, perhaps, the authors convincingly argue that once the NATO air war began in March 1999, Western forces took no effective measures to protect the ethnic Albanian population from Serbian retaliation. Ground forces were not on NATO's agenda until much later, and NATO pilots remained at impossibly high altitudes, exposing Kosovar civilians to intense violence. Under such conditions, any argument suggesting the war was fought chiefly to *protect* Kosovars from Serbian abuse seems absurd. Yet both Daalder and O'Hanlon are staunch supporters of U.S. liberal internationalism and are reluctant to do more than critique U.S. tactics.

Although Daalder and O'Hanlon never mention Chomsky's work, their conclusions fully support the radical critic's most powerful claim—namely, that the United States and its allies cared little for the actual safety of Kosovar

civilians, high-minded protestations to the contrary. Read together, Chomsky's work and that of the Brookings duo deeply challenge the notion of Kosovo being a humanitarian watershed.

KOSOVO: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN

Few Western writers have demonstrated Judah's and Clark's ability or inclination to probe political dynamics within Kosovo's ethnic Albanian community. Of special significance is Judah's analysis of tensions over who did what during the communist era (1945–1990). Judah points out that the Kosovo branch of the Yugoslav communist party (League of Yugoslav Communists, or LCY) recruited many ethnic Albanians in the 1970s after Tito, Yugoslavia's authoritarian ruler, loosened Serbia's grip on the province. The Kosovo branch of the communist party soon enjoyed much autonomy from its Serbian counterpart, gradually coming under the sway of procommunist ethnic Albanians. As Clark (p. 231, fn. 46) notes, the number of ethnic Albanian party members in Kosovo climbed from 12,226 in 1953 to 100,000 in 1981.

Consequently, when protestors took to the streets of Kosovo's capital, Pristina, in 1981 to demand full republican status within Yugoslavia, the officials and security police responsible for suppressing ethnic Albanian riots were their conationals (Judah, p. 41). As government repression of Kosovo nationalism mounted throughout the 1980s, ethnic Albanians were on the front lines on both sides. In 1989–1990, Serbian authorities abolished Kosovo's autonomy and forced most ethnic Albanians out of the public sector, "homogenizing" Kosovo society through an outpouring of anti-Albanian actions and sentiment.

Yet Judah suggests that Kosovo is still marked by cleavages between those who once worked with, or collaborated for, Yugoslav socialism and those who embraced the nationalism early on. Kosovo's unwavering commitment during the 1990s to full independence from Serbia, despite Western guarantees that nothing of the sort would be tolerated, can be explained partially by the desire of political leaders of all stripes to avoid being labeled "collaborationist." This was especially true for the LDK, which absorbed many former communist party members into its ranks. Tensions between the LDK, which preferred nonviolent methods, and adherents of armed struggle also were partially generated by communist–nationalist cleavages dating back to the 1980s.

THE TURN TO ARMED STRUGGLE

Although many authors analyze the Western intervention, we should recall that the campaign would never have taken place if armed struggle had not dominated Kosovo resistance efforts. Until the rebellion began, Serbian forces in Kosovo did not massacre or forcibly displace Kosovars, and Western powers remained largely indifferent to Kosovar pleas. If the insurgents had not begun a

shooting war, Kosovo would never have moved up on the diplomatic to-do list. How and why the guerrillas were able to take the initiative, trigger Serbian reprisals, and involve the West is vitally important.

On this topic, Judah has no English-language rivals. His book traces the fortunes of Kosovo's nationalist militants throughout the communist era, reviewing the history of small splinter groups that sought closer ties with Albania and greater independence from socialist Yugoslavia. Although these groups were then called "Marxist-Leninist" or "Enverist" for their ties to Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha, they were concerned above all with national self-determination, viewing Yugoslav socialism as a guise for Greater Serbian hegemony. Many of the most committed activists fled into European exile in 1981, following street protests and government crackdowns. Some created local chapters of the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova, or LPRK, a small pro-independence grouping active since the late 1970s. During the 1990s, while the mainstream LDK was still adhering to a policy of "passive nonviolence," Popular Movement radicals in Europe were trying to build cross-border networks, purchase arms, and develop forward bases in northern Albania. Although most mainstream leaders *within* Kosovo steered clear of the militants, Judah believes that Bujar Bukoshi, Kosovo's "prime minister" in exile, explored limited collaboration with the would-be guerrillas at various points during the 1990s.

The rebels took years to gain momentum since the movement's dearth of arms, money, and a secure territorial base seemed overwhelming. The would-be fighters had few modern weapons of their own, and Albania was unwilling to permit large-scale arms trafficking. Although Albanian authorities might tolerate low-key training in remote mountainous areas, government support for weapons acquisition and cross-border infiltration was out of the question, given the power and proximity of Serbia.

In 1993, the radical LPRK split into two new groups, the Popular Movement for Kosova, rooted chiefly in the European diaspora, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova, based more heavily in Kosovo itself. The Popular Movement took the initiative in creating an armed wing, founding the KLA in 1993 during a secret Macedonian meeting.¹ Conditions were still not right for a serious armed effort, largely due to Albania's unwillingness to risk angering Serbia. That last barrier disappeared in spring 1997, when Albania's fraudulent pyramid schemes collapsed amid accusations of corruption, mismanagement, and government graft. Massive economic losses sparked popular protest against the Albanian regime, which was widely suspected of colluding with pyramid organizers. State authority disappeared overnight as crowds looted municipalities, police stations, and military bases, flooding the black

¹The KLA is known in Kosovo as the UÇK, short for *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*.

market with cheap assault rifles. Equally important, northern Albania slid from central state control. Suddenly, the KLA had easy access to modern weapons, a territorial base, and the Kosovo border. In late 1997, the KLA stepped up attacks in the Drenica region, chipping away at Serbian authority. Serbian security forces counterattacked, but the subsequent brutality only generated new KLA recruits. As the armed struggle gathered steam, Serbia responded even more harshly, generating public pressure in the West for military intervention.

THE NONVIOLENT OPTION

Were there other alternatives to armed rebellion? It certainly seemed so during 1990–1997, when Kosovo’s nonviolent tactics earned the acclaim of wrestling with civil war in Bosnia and Croatia. LDK leader and Kosovo “president” Ibrahim Rugova committed his constituents early on to peaceful noncompliance with Serbian rule and urged Albanian Kosovars to give Serbia no excuse for war. The West, Rugova promised (with little good reason), would eventually reward Kosovar patience with independence. For a while, Rugova’s policy seemed to have spared Kosovo the ravages of war. While other areas were pushed into ethnic cleansing and savagery, Kosovo was not, although Serbian police abuses—including torture, unlawful detention, and persistent harassment—continued.

Although international observers praised Kosovo’s leaders’ nonviolent ideals, it seems that the LDK tactics were triggered chiefly by Kosovo’s strategic predicament, not by its elite’s ideology. Most important, Kosovo’s Territorial Defense (TD) armories, which might have provided secessionists with the means to resist Serbian police and Yugoslav troops, were confiscated early by Milošević’s regime. Most republics and autonomous regions had stockpiled weapons for home defense during the socialist era, and their availability or lack thereof shaped the trajectory of Yugoslavia’s breakup. Denied access to the weapons that made revolt possible in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, Kosovo had few options. Judah (p. 61) quotes Rugova acknowledging as much, saying, “We have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern weaponry in Serbian hands,” which would give Kosovars “no chance of successfully resisting the army.” For Rugova, it was better to “do nothing and stay alive . . . than to be massacred.” Sheer force of material circumstance had made armed revolt appear suicidal.

At the same time, Kosovar politicians searched for ideas to legitimate their tactical choice. The example of Eastern Europe in 1989–1990 was particularly inspiring since unarmed street protestors and intellectual dissidents had abruptly toppled communist authorities there. According to Clark, the LDK’s leaders themselves, who were drawn largely from professional/intellectual associations, learned from the East European experience that “being European” and “modern” meant being “nonviolent.” For Kosovo to gain Western support for

independence, it must behave like a “civilized” and nonviolent society. Although Western diplomats assured both Serbia and the LDK that they would most certainly *not* tolerate Kosovo’s secession, the LDK never accepted that as the West’s final word, believing Kosovo would eventually earn its sovereignty through patience and good behavior. Although the European history of state formation is rife with awful violence, the LDK leadership thought it could forge a less brutal path.

Given this strategy, the LDK did nothing during the 1990s to help the Serbian opposition topple Slobodan Milošević. Many influential Albanian Kosovars believed that as long as an authoritarian ex-communist remained in charge in Belgrade, the West could not leave Kosovo trapped within Serbia. “On the assumption that Milošević was good for the Kosovo Albanians,” Judah writes, “the worst thing that could happen was that he might be replaced by a Western-minded democrat” (p. 75). The LDK feared that even a half-hearted Serbian compromise proposal—such as allowing Kosovo to regain its lost autonomy—might sidetrack its drive to independence. Although few ethnic Albanians would entertain the notion of remaining within Serbia, Western leaders might be convinced that autonomy was a viable option.

To head off Serbian compromise and emphasize its rejection of Serbian institutions, the LDK boycotted all national and local elections, even though ethnic Albanian voters might have made a crucial difference. With 800,000 potential voters, some believe that Milošević could have been unseated with the help of the ethnic Albanian vote, especially when Milošević’s grip began to slip in 1996. Although the LDK began the electoral boycott in 1990 to protest Serbia’s revocation of Kosovar autonomy, it elevated the boycott to the status of a non-negotiable principle. Collaboration of any kind with Serbian institutions was viewed as a threat to independence.

Serbia’s anti-Albanian invective and human rights abuses were terrible, and Clark understands the reasoning and emotion behind Kosovo’s boycott policy. Still, he is critical of the LDK for refusing to somehow try and connect with anti-Milošević Serbs. Although Clark does not say Kosovars should have voted in national elections, he does believe that some form of participation, if only in local elections, might have generated greater chances for a peaceful and just resolution. For nonviolence to truly succeed, Clark says, the opponent’s will must be *altered*, not overruled. Such alterations, he argues, can be achieved only through aggressive but nonviolent confrontation, combined with persuasion, shaming, and dialogue. Yet the LDK “paid less attention to making allies in FRY [Yugoslavia] or using divisions between the population and the regime, than to appealing to the greater power of international force.” This, Clark believes, reflected an unfortunate “exclusivist impulse” that ultimately damaged the LDK’s ability to construct an effective nonviolent strategy (p. 130). This was especially true during 1996–1997, when anti-Milošević demonstrators poured onto Belgrade’s streets and seemed liable to topple the regime. Although Clark

acknowledges that Serbian opposition figures did not make it easy for the LDK, expressing little sympathy for the ethnic Albanian plight and taking a tough line on Kosovo, he believes much more could have been done to change Serbian popular opinion.

Clark devotes considerable space to analyzing the LDK's efforts to create parallel structures of de facto governance in Kosovo, which it hoped would eventually lead to de jure sovereignty. Efforts in health and education were particularly important, as ethnic Albanians had resigned or were pushed out of most public institutions. The self-governance campaign attracted international sympathy and admiration, appearing, for at least a while, to offer an important mechanism for nonviolent mobilization and protest. The Mother Teresa Association built up some ninety health clinics and recruited hundreds of medical professionals during the 1990s, serving some 350,000 Kosovar patients in 1999 alone. Schools and universities convened in private homes, attending to the needs of over 300,000 students.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Clark notes that funds for these projects came chiefly from within Kosovo, with the bulk coming from small businesses whose taxes were assessed by volunteers working with local financial councils. The rest came from taxes levied on members of the sizeable Kosovar diaspora. Kosovar activists also created an efficient human rights network at home and abroad, documenting Serbian abuses and disseminating the evidence worldwide. These efforts did much to earn Kosovo international sympathy, Clark (p. 80) says, highlighting its plight and drawing attention to its nonviolent tactics. International resolutions regularly condemned Serbian abuses while voicing approval for ethnic Albanian restraint.

Yet Clark also criticizes the self-governance system for running out of ideas and energy by 1994. Once the health, educational, and human rights networks were in place, the LDK seemed disinclined to further deepen grassroots efforts, focusing instead on controlling the existing self-governance structures and engaging in elite contacts with Western leaders. The LDK was content to sit and wait, doing little to devise new strategies or to promote "active nonviolence" that might confront Serbian rule publicly, dramatize Kosovo's predicament, and attract dissident Serbs as allies. The LDK gradually came to exert a stultifying control over all political life in the province, insisting that everyone wait for the leadership to negotiate a deal with the West. As a result, Clark believes, Kosovo's population became demoralized and apathetic, and important opportunities for successful nonviolent action were missed.

Clark outlines a number of alternatives, including participation in local elections, efforts to seize control of local administrations, and attempts to send representatives to meet with sympathetic Yugoslav parliamentarians. Kosovars could have demonstrated in front of schools and government clinics, highlighting the denial of access for both Serbs and international observers. They might have also experimented with popular, small group mobilization, rather than

simply looking to LDK leaders for guidance and diplomacy. Such grassroots efforts would have energized the national movement, breaking the LDK's hold over discourse and action and returning a sense of empowerment to the broader population. All this, Clark believes, could have allowed at least some Kosovars to explore alternatives to full independence. Clark also argues that Kosovars should have pursued a strategy of economic self-empowerment, rather than relying almost exclusively on remittances from abroad. Even partial economic autonomy would have boosted morale and facilitated a boycott of Serbian goods. All of these things were missing, creating a sense of despair that eventually fueled support for the KLA's desperate guerrilla initiative.

For a brief moment in 1997, Clark notes, it seemed as if the Kosovo scene might be energized *without* resort to armed struggle. In September that year, ethnic Albanian students defied both the LDK and Western diplomats and launched a series of risky street demonstrations demanding that Serbia respect their right to education. In effect, Clark says, the students were launching a revolt against *all* of the de facto elites in Kosovo, including Serbian authorities, the LDK leadership, and Western diplomats. For the first time since 1990, ethnic Albanians were back on Kosovo's streets, protesting Serbian rule and dramatizing their claims. Over 15,000 students demonstrated in Priština, and another 30,000 marched elsewhere. The Serbian authorities reacted with disproportionate force, but the protests attracted international attention and raised local morale. The demonstrations continued during the fall, and one particularly brutal police response in December 1997 spurred prominent Serbs, including the Serbian patriarch, to criticize government actions. Had the students been able to continue, Clark believes, significant gains could have been made. The students were suddenly eclipsed by the Kosovo guerrilla movement in early 1998.

KOSOVO: THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

Chomsky's *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* makes a simple but oft-overlooked methodological point. The notion of Kosovo somehow ushering in "a new era of humanitarianism and justice," he says, can be easily tested by "ask[ing] how the same enlightened states behave elsewhere" (p. 38). If we really want to assess the West's global agenda, in other words, we cannot look only at Kosovo, designated in the late 1990s as the "Western crisis of the moment." In social science parlance, any effort to examine the West by focusing on Kosovo would be selection on the dependent variable, a methodological fallacy yielding false conclusions. According to both Chomsky and received methodological wisdom, a better strategy would be to examine a broad range of cases of Western intervention and nonintervention in the contemporary world. It is only by examining such a "large N" sample that we can draw any useful and generalizable conclusions. Predictably, Chomsky's sample has Western powers—with special emphasis on the United States—come off looking poorly.

For starters, Chomsky draws our attention to Turkey, where, in a conflict that has received little U.S. publicity but is better known in Europe, the government fights a bitter war with Kurdish separatists. Following the Gulf War and the creation of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, Kurdish rebels gained access to territory and arms near Turkey's southeastern border, much as the KLA did when Albania collapsed in 1997. The Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK, launched an effective cross-border infiltration and insurgency effort in Turkey's southeast, capturing several towns, as well as chunks of rural land. Responding in 1991–1994 with methods similar to those used by Serbia later on in Kosovo, Turkish security forces shelled urban areas and brutally emptied Kurdish villages. The precise number of internally displaced Turkish Kurds is unknown, but most estimates put it at between 500,000 and 1.5 million, with thousands dead and injured. The magnitude of Turkish repression, in other words, was easily comparable to Serbian actions in Kosovo during 1998, when security forces slew some 2,000 and displaced 250,000–300,000. Because Turkey is a member of NATO and a staunch U.S. ally, it received little more than an international slap on the wrist. Chomsky discusses other contemporaneous cases, including Colombia, where a U.S.-backed regime, along with government-supported paramilitaries, has generated hundreds of thousands of internally displaced and thousands of casualties in a war to eradicate insurgents and narcotics.

For Chomsky it is clear why some countries do not receive the same harsh international scrutiny as others do. The West, he says, differentiates between “state terror conducted with the approval and avid support of the enlightened states . . . and state terror that is villainous and must be severely punished because it conflicts with their demands” (p. 8). The world's most powerful states focus with “laser like” intensity on the crimes of their enemies but obfuscate, downplay, or ignore outright the crimes of their friends. Even scholars and well-meaning human rights activists can get caught up in the game, losing sight of the broad international “sample” and dwelling only on those cases where complaints of government abuse receive a Western hearing.

What Chomsky's work does not do is provide a compelling analysis of the interests driving U.S. and NATO selection policies. What explains Serbia's designation as “villain” in the post–Cold War world? Although the utility of Turkey and Colombia to American interests is clear (NATO unity and narcotics), why was Serbia denied the same Western tolerance? At times, Chomsky seems to be making a Durkheimian functionalist argument, suggesting that the United States and its allies need to make an example of a designated miscreant to reinforce the Western public's sense of unity and morality. Elsewhere, he appears to suggest that Serbia's fate was triggered by its own bullheaded determination to resist Washington's instructions. Yet there is something rather unsatisfying about both explanations. During the Cold War, the designation of friends and enemies followed a predictable pattern, but now, more nuanced analyses are required. My hunch is that a domestic politics analysis, focusing on the role of

humanitarian activists and epistemic communities in the United States and Europe, would do a better job in explaining Serbia's stigmatization.

But Chomsky does not stop here. He argues that even if we look exclusively at Kosovo, there is little to suggest that the NATO intervention was essentially "humanitarian" in nature. He bases this conclusion on the uncomfortable and often denied fact that the NATO air war interacted with Serbian intentions to trigger escalation. The air raids gave Serbian forces the excuse and opportunity to engage in a systematic ethnic cleansing effort in Kosovo's cities, towns, and villages, something they had refrained from doing throughout 1998 and early 1999, despite heavy clashes with the KLA. Indeed, Chomsky does a nice job of demonstrating NATO's attempt to cover up this unpleasant fact (p. 82). Some U.S. officials said they knew Serbia was planning to escalate anyway, while others, including top intelligence and military brass, denied that preparations for a massive ethnic cleansing were known to them beforehand. I found evidence for this latter position from my own experience in northern Albania when the war began, where NATO had clearly done nothing to help prepare for a massive refugee outflow. Had the United States and its allies really known of an impending Serbian expulsion campaign, would they not have made plans for refugee support, or at least prepositioned humanitarian supplies in northern Albania, a particularly remote and inaccessible zone?

On this point Daalder and O'Hanlon are in full agreement with Chomsky, although they might be uncomfortable at being placed in his "radical" camp. Supportive of the Kosovo intervention for both moral and strategic reasons (stability in Europe and the Balkans), their investigation reveals that the NATO high-altitude air war strategy, combined with the absent threat of ground forces, facilitated the Serbian ethnic cleansing effort. In the first weeks of the NATO campaign, they argue, the alliance was "losing the war" because it both failed to bend Serbia's will and did nothing to protect Kosovar civilians, the avowed object of the entire intervention. "Despite the fact that most of the world's best air forces were conducting combat missions over Yugoslavia from March 24 [1999] onwards," the Brookings scholars write, "the early phases of the conflict were dominated militarily by Serb units in Kosovo . . . and the Kosovo Albanian people paid the price" (p. 3).

Unlike Chomsky, the two scholars do not take this as evidence of U.S. and NATO cynicism. Rather, they regard it as a policy and tactical failure that stemmed chiefly from poor planning, lack of understanding for Serbian motivations, and domestic politics within NATO countries, especially those complicating the use of ground forces. Daalder and O'Hanlon, in other words, do select on the dependent variable, making no effort to place the Kosovo intervention in comparative perspective. I suspect they might shrug off comparisons to Turkey and Colombia by noting that in the real world, some conflicts simply get more attention than others. Although they may oppose Western double standards, they will not write a book about them either.

WHAT ELSE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE?

Three of the four volumes surveyed here have numerous ideas about what might have been done differently. For Judah, the LDK could have participated in national Serbian elections and helped bring Milošević down, and while there is no guarantee this would have worked, Judah seems to think it would have been worth a try. He also believes the West could have devoted far more diplomatic energies to Kosovo during the mid-1990s, when attentions were focused on Bosnia and Croatia. Judah points to the 1995 Bosnia peace conference at Dayton as a particular source of Kosovar frustration since it was there that Bosnian Serbs gained partial recognition for their ministate while Albanian Kosovars earned nothing for their patience. The message given to Kosovars at Dayton, Judah observes, was that violence, rather than “good behavior,” pays. If Western diplomats had not been so keen to resolve Bosnia to the exclusion of all else, Judah suggests, they might have used Dayton to produce political momentum on Kosovo.

Clark agrees that the LDK could have tried other methods, focusing on contacts with potential Serbian allies, as well as a range of confrontational but non-violent protest tactics (discussed above). Such a strategy could have mobilized the population, made it harder for the KLA to attract support, and might even have produced a willingness on both sides to explore alternative political arrangements, including some form of shared sovereignty or transitional autonomy.

Daalder and O’Hanlon also seem to believe that a more vigorous diplomatic strategy during the mid-1990s would have been worth a try, but they spend most of their time focusing on Western negotiations with Serbia during the second half of 1998. During that time, they say, the United States and its allies could have responded to the Serbian counteroffensive with a far more robust combination of threats, including air strikes, ground force preparations, and economic sanctions. This might have forced Serbia early on to accept a NATO peacekeeping force for Kosovo, ending the vicious cycle of KLA attack and brutal Serb retaliation. Although Daalder and O’Hanlon are unsure as to whether a more credible threat would have actually persuaded Milošević to accept a NATO protectorate over Kosovo without a war, they believe it was worth a try. By refusing to discuss ground forces until the very last days of the military campaign, NATO was denied use of its most credible means of persuasion.

MACEDONIAN EPILOGUE

In the winter of 2001, government troops began clashing with armed Albanian insurgents in Macedonia. The KLA rebellion in Kosovo had petered out under international military occupation, but some ex-KLA members, joined by radicals from Macedonia and elsewhere, sought to carry the fight to other contested

lands. Macedonia was in a very different situation than Serbia, producing a different outcome, at least temporarily.

First, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia tend to participate in national elections and government, unlike their conationals in Kosovo, who boycotted Serbian institutions since 1990. As a result, the rebels in Macedonia were marginal actors, unlike their KLA counterparts. When Macedonian troops cracked down on guerrilla strongholds, they did not trigger mass guerrilla recruitment. A bloody Serbian crackdown on KLA gunmen in early 1998 had swelled the KLA's ranks by the thousands, but the Macedonian rebels were far less popular.

Second, Macedonia is a close Western ally, unlike Serbia. Western powers tacitly authorized (and perhaps even encouraged) the government crackdown, believing the ethnic Albanian rebels were on the verge of destabilizing the entire region. Macedonian troops were not as indiscriminately brutal as their Serbian counterparts, moreover, making it easier for the United States and its allies to support the campaign. If Macedonia combines its coercion with generosity toward ethnic Albanians, say, in a reformed government structure, the insurgency is likely to wither away. If the radicals keep pushing for a Macedonia confrontation and Macedonia loses its self-restraint, a new and more broadly based insurgency could emerge in the coming years. Perhaps Macedonia's leaders have learned from the Serbian experience that coercion without consent is ultimately counterproductive. If not, NATO troops may soon find themselves shooting at the same ethnic Albanian rebels they ostensibly came to help in summer 1999.

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